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Few topics are sexier among commentators on corporate governance now 
than whether activist hedge funds are good for, a danger to, or of no real con-
sequence to public corporations and the people who depend upon them. As 
befits tradition in this space, catchy pejoratives caught on, and the phenome-
non of concerted action by hedge funds and other more traditional money 
managers, such as actively traded mutual funds who often encourage and sup-
port the investment strategy of the alpha wolf, to influence public companies’ 
business plans has been deemed “wolf pack activism.” 
For a term so evocative of dangers to the flesh, the debates over wolf packs, 
and more generally the topic of hedge fund activism, have a surprisingly blood-
less quality—one that uses abstraction and distancing to obscure what may be 
really at stake. In the back and forth about short-term effects on stock price, 
Tobin’s Q, survivorship bias, and the like, the flesh-and-blood human beings 
our corporate governance system is supposed to serve get lost. 
But, unless we consider the economic realities of these ordinary human in-
vestors and how those realities bear on what is best for them, we are not fo-
cused on what is most important in assessing the public policies shaping our 
corporate governance system. Stated in a somewhat crude but generally accu-
rate way, we started with a system that reflected some implicit assumptions, in-
cluding that: 
 
 stockholders had a long-term stake in the company’s best interests; 
most stockholders owned their shares directly, for their own benefit, 
and held them for lengthy periods; 
 the stockholders who were most active and vocal were those who had 
the longest-term stake in the corporation; 
 when corporations became more profitable, they tended to create more 
jobs, pay workers better, and create positive externalities for the com-
munities within which they operated; 
 corporations had a national, and often regional focus, and their man-
agers, directors, employees, lenders, and even stockholders often had 
ties of loyalty to those communities; and, finally, 
 corporate managers were well but not lavishly paid, a plan of internal 
succession was common, and corporate managers tended to live in the 
community where the corporation was headquartered and be engaged 
in community affairs. 
 
In recent decades, these assumptions have been undermined and often 
turned upside down: 
 
 corporate stockholder bases turn over rapidly; 
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 most stock is owned by institutional investors, but represents the capi-
tal of largely silent human investors, and many of these institutional 
investors engage in much greater portfolio turnover; 
 the actual human investors whose capital is ultimately at stake are by-
standers and do not vote; 
 the most vocal and active stockholders tend to be the ones with the in-
vestment strategies most in tension with the efficient market hypothe-
sis, and often involve hedge funds who only became stockholders after 
deciding to change the company and who have no prior interest in the 
company’s well-being; 
 the tie between increasing corporate prosperity and the best interests of 
corporate workers has been sharply eroded, with corporations not 
sharing productivity gains with workers in their pay and focusing on 
offshoring and job and wage cuts as methods to increase profits; 
 corporations increasingly have no national, much less community, 
identity and are willing to not only arbitrage their communities against 
each other, but also to abandon their national identity for tax savings; 
and, finally, 
 top corporate managers have been promised pay packages way out of 
line with other managers, but in exchange must focus intently on stock 
price growth and be willing to treat other corporate constituencies cal-
lously if that is necessary to please the stock market’s short-term wish-
es. 
 
Indeed, as we shall see, these human investors are not so much citizens of 
the corporate governance republic as they are the voiceless and choiceless many 
whose economic prospects turn on power struggles among classes of haves 
who happen to control the capital—of all kinds—of typical American investors. 
And for all the talk of creating an ownership society, close to half of Americans 
do not have any investments in equity securities, even in the form of 401(k) 
and individual retirement account (IRA) investments in mutual funds. As or 
even more important to the current topic, typical Americans who are investors 
in the equity markets remain primarily dependent on wage employment for 
their wealth, and the wealth they can deploy as owners of equity capital is not 
controlled directly by them. Instead, the power of their capital is wielded by 
others. Most traditionally, of course, we focus on corporate managers as exem-
plifying that reality, the so-called separation of ownership from control. But 
now most Americans’ direct investments in equities and debt are controlled by 
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professional money managers,
1
 from whom escape is virtually impossible. I 
have called this phenomenon the “separation of ownership from ownership.”
2
 
The republic upon which typical Americans depend is one where the debate is 
between corporate-manager agents and money-manager agents, both of whom 
have different interests than ordinary human investors. 
The nature of this republic must be understood if we are to assess how to 
address the emergence of activist hedge funds as a powerful force acting upon 
public companies. Assuming or pretending that the proxy voting units of insti-
tutional investors will reliably identify what is in the best interest of human in-
vestors hardly instills peace of mind. Nor is ignoring the “do as I say, not as I 
do” quality of those who wield power within our corporate governance system, 
in which claims to have the same perspectives as ordinary Americans are con-
founded by actions such as rapid-fire portfolio turnover, abandoning ship 
when you’ve piloted it into rock-filled waters, and demanding the right to do 
things you then say you don’t have the time or resources to do well. 
Most fundamentally, one can’t fail to consider the oddity of a system where 
the loudest voices mostly represent one interest, that of equity capital, but are 
not representing the viewpoint of those human investors who entrust their 
capital to the corporations whose futures are at stake. Now, the voice of equity 
capital is represented most loudly by those whose investment philosophy the 
efficient market hypothesis argues is most likely to fail—active speculators try-
ing to outguess the market. Many hedge funds themselves fly a reckless flight 
plan under the efficient market hypothesis and purport to be good at building 
long-term engines of economic growth, but are public-spirited enough to leave 
the resulting growth powerhouses after a few years, even though their influ-
ence on the corporation will last far beyond that. Because ordinary Americans 
are stuck in the market for years and depend on its long-term, sustainable 
growth for jobs and portfolio gain, they are exposed to a corporate republic in-
creasingly built on the law of unintended consequences. That republic is one 
where those with electoral power—the money managers with direct control 
over the shares purchased with human investors’ money—act and, one would 
 
1. By “money manager,” I mean the mutual funds, pension funds, other investment funds, and 
others whose business is deciding how to invest someone else’s money to achieve a return, as 
opposed to corporate managers who run businesses that make products and deliver services 
to their customers. 
2. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Inter-
ests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 
6-7 (2007) [hereinafter Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground]. See generally 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling 
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014) (discussing the “sep-
aration of ownership from ownership” and its implications). 
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thus infer, think based on considerations of gains over periods of one to two 
years. If out of this debate among those with short-term perspectives comes 
optimal policy for human investors with far longer time horizons, that happy 
coincidence would be remarkable. 
To shed light on how hedge fund activism, including so-called wolf pack 
activism, affects human investors, Part I of this Feature highlights the flesh-
and-blood attributes of typical American investors—the real people, which this 
Feature refers to as human investors, who use the capital markets to invest and 
save for important life events like retirement or college education for their chil-
dren. Then Part II explains what is meant by the confusing terms “activist 
hedge fund” and “wolf pack” activism. From there, Part III will describe the 
corporate republic upon which human investors are dependent but in which 
they are largely bystanders to a power struggle among two classes of agents, 
corporate managers and professional money managers. Part IV then explains 
the two ways in which human investors are subjected to whatever benefits and 
risks activist hedge funds may cause to our corporate governance system, both 
as indirect investors in hedge funds and as workers dependent on pension 
funds, and, more importantly, as human beings who derive most of their 
wealth from the ability of our economy, including its public companies, to cre-
ate good jobs and raise wages. Sections IV.A and IV.B will explore these sub-
jects and highlight the critical issues raising doubts that hedge fund activism is 
likely to be materially beneficial to human investors. Section IV.C discusses 
how the current corporate governance debate imperfectly addresses these po-
tential harms to human investors. 
The Feature finishes in Part V with some modest policy proposals to ame-
liorate the risks that hedge fund activism poses while still retaining its potential 
benefits. Notably, these proposals do not involve ascribing to the hedge fund 
industry itself any opprobrium; rather, as to the hedge fund industry itself, 
they mostly rest on the proposition that when economically powerful forces are 
acting on important societal institutions like public companies and taking 
funds upon which human investors and institutions like charities and universi-
ties depend, they should be required to disclose accurate and timely infor-
mation about their operations and interests. Most fundamentally, this Feature 
recognizes that it is not hedge funds themselves that pose the major risk to 
human investors, it is the failure of our overall corporate governance system to 
represent faithfully the rational, long-term perspective of ordinary American 
investors who can only gain if public corporations make money the old-
fashioned way, by implementing sustainable strategies to sell products and ser-
vices and not through edgy practices, accounting gimmickry, or never-ending 
cycles of spin-offs and mergers. 
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i  
Human investors are the least-discussed participants in our corporate gov-
ernance republic, a reality made more important by the menacing valence the 
term “wolf pack” takes on when the prey might be human—investor, worker, 
or otherwise. In this context, the term “wolf pack” was, I suppose, not one 
adapted by environmentalists who dabble in corporate governance and are 
seeking to advance their desire to reintroduce a viable population of wolves into 
the American wild by associating them with a popular group of activist inves-
tors. Rather, the term calls on a scarier lineage, in which wolves are seen as 
dangerous predators capable of ruthless and concerted action to bring down 
and devour their prey. Visions of cowering children, vulnerable livestock, and 
half-eaten chickens come to mind,
3
 or sailors forced to fight for survival in the 
great deep.
4
 
But, when we talk of wolf packs in the sense of activist hedge funds and 
their fellow travelers that seek to propose changes in policies at public compa-
nies, much of the academic consideration has a bloodless quality, in which the 
reality that how public companies manage their businesses has an effect on ac-
tual human beings is obscured. Lost in the regressions
5
 and the rote references 
to stockholder democracy
6
 are the people most affected by our corporate gov-
ernance system, in no small part because those people mostly have to live with 
the outcomes of a system of corporate governance in which they have almost 
no direct voice. 
 
3. Actual wolf packs menaced travelers in the American north before the twentieth century. See, 
e.g., JACK LONDON, WHITE FANG 34 (MacMillan Co. 1906) (“[H]e was not destined to enjoy 
that bed. Before his eyes closed the wolves had drawn too near for safety. . . . He kept the fire 
brightly blazing, for he knew that it alone intervened between the flesh of his body and their 
hungry fangs.”). A single wolf can be scary enough, as Little Red Riding Hood could attest. 
See JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, GRIMM’S COMPLETE FAIRY TALES 96-99 (2011). 
4. Wolf packs of German U-boats, i.e., groups of attack submarines, prowled the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean during World War II to tremendous effect. See, e.g., Robert P. Post, British 
Sink Three U-Boats, Save Convoy, Lose 4 Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1942, at 1 (heralding the 
successful arrival of a British convoy stalked by a German wolf pack after “a five-day run-
ning battle”). 
5. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1085 (2015); Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset 
Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2753 (2015). 
6. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
837 (2005) (“The U.S. corporation can be regarded as a ‘representative democracy’ . . . .”); 
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 605-06 (2016) (“[T]here is no alternative to share-
holder democracy.”). 
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In this back and forth, terms like “owner” are used as appellations by those 
who control the capital of others—the money managers at institutional invest-
ment firms—and use vehicles to acquire ownership of equity securities.
7
 These 
“owners” are not sole proprietors responsible financially for all the costs and 
risks of a business, nor are they even “owners” in the sense of bearing all the 
risks of a human being who owns a share of stock in a public company. Money 
managers’ incentives and risks are materially different than those whose capital 
they control. Claiming to be an owner may just be the money manager speak 
equivalent of a wolf putting on sheep’s clothing. Therefore, if the focus when 
considering the effect of activist hedge funds is on the relative gain sharing 
among corporate managers, activist hedge funds, and other forms of institu-
tional investors, something fundamental will inevitably be slighted, which is 
that these inquiries involve a summing up among the agents of the real human 
beings whose wealth and well-being is supposed to be the focus of our society’s 
economic policies. The real humans get lost in the shuffle. 
If we are to consider in a prudent fashion how our corporate governance 
system should regulate activist hedge funds or address other analogous mat-
ters, we must humanize our lens and remind ourselves of the realities of who 
living, breathing investors are, the ways in which they are allowed to partici-
pate in the system, and the effect these realities have on what corporate govern-
ance system would be best for them. 
Most essential in this humanizing process is realizing that most Americans 
owe almost all of their wealth to their ability to hold a job and to secure gains 
in wages. This is not simply true among the poorer half of Americans; it is true 
of 99% of Americans. On average, Americans derive 64% of their income from 
wages and another 15% from either retirement payments or other transfer 
 
7. E.g., Press Release, California State Teachers’ Retirement System, CalSTRS Achieves  
Shareholder Victory at Freeport-McMoran (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.calstrs.com/news-re 
lease/calstrs-achieves-shareholder-victory-freeport-mcmoran [http://perma.cc/S94D-9874] 
(quoting Anne Sheehan, CalSTRS director of corporate governance, as saying “[w]hile we 
applaud the company’s willingness to engage, we as shareholders and owners have the right 
to give input on strategic decisions and to debate the appropriateness of deals that impact 
the long-term performance of the company”); Apple Stock Rated Best of Worst, CNET (Feb. 
11, 1997, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/apple-stock-rated-best-of-worst [http://
perma.cc/FF6A-8MBB] (quoting CalPERS general counsel as saying that “[a]s sharehold-
ers—and owners of this company—we believe that dedication of all of Apple’s directors and 
personal incentives are critical to recovery”); see also Meena Krishnamsetty, Transcript of Bill 
Ackman’s Super Fast Speech at the Ira Sohn Conference, INSIDER MONKEY (June 6, 2011, 7:05 
AM), http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/transcript-of-bill-ackmans-super-fast-speech 
-at-the-ira-sohn-conference-3793 [http://perma.cc/9QD9-FTLC] (“By the way, I never 
consider any bid on something I [through Pershing Square] own hostile. You’re welcome to 
make an offer.”). 
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payments.
8
 For the middle and upper-middle class, jobs are even more im-
portant, as wages comprise 70% or more of income.
9
 But the importance of la-
bor does not stop there. Those in the eightieth to ninetieth percentiles derive 
over 75% of their income from their labor, and those in the ninety-fifth to nine-
ty-ninth percentiles still get over 60% from their labor.
10
 Importantly, the ex-
tent to which transfer payments—such as food stamps, unemployment insur-
ance, and the like—comprise an important percentage of ordinary Americans’ 
annual income underscores the points because it illustrates that in many cases 
the employment that workers get is not enough to provide for their families, 
and that others lack consistent employment at all.
11
 Jobs, jobs, jobs—they still 
drive American wealth creation for all but the super-rich. 
Now, it is also true that many Americans are now “forced capitalists”
12
—
forced by public retirement policies and market developments to turn over a 
portion of their paycheck every month to the money management industry.
13
 
 
8. Joseph Rosenberg, Measuring Income for Distributional Analysis, URB.-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y 
CTR. 4-5 (July 25, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/pub
lication-pdfs/412871-Measuring-Income-for-Distributional-Analysis.PDF [http://perma.cc
/C2SJ-AE5B]. The Urban-Brookings study classifies taxable distributions from IRAs and 
both taxable and nontaxable distributions from pension plans as retirement income. Id. at 4. 
Social Security benefits are classified as transfer payments. Id. 
9. Id. at 5. Compensation constitutes 70% of income for those in the middle quintile and 73% 
for those in the fourth, i.e., second-to-top, quintile. Id. “Compensation is the largest source 
of income for all but the highest income group.” Id. at 4. Only 11% of Americans’ expanded 
cash income came from investments. Id. at 5. 
10. Id. 
11. Transfer payments constitute 40% of income for those in the bottom quintile and 22% for 
those in the second quintile. Id. at 5. 
12. See Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
13. See Peter Brady et al., The Success of the U.S. Retirement System, INV. CO. INST. 30 (2012), 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BG6-82LP] (de-
scribing an increase in the number of active participants in 401(k) plans from seventeen mil-
lion in 1989 to fifty-one million in 2010); John Broadbent et al., The Shift from Defined  
Benefit to Defined Contribution Pension Plans—Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Man-
agement, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 13-17 (2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/wgpapers
/cgfs27broadbent3.pdf [http://perma.cc/X2GG-SP7N]; Frequently Asked Questions About 
401(k) Plans, INV. CO. INST. (Sept. 2014), http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k
/faqs_401k [http://perma.cc/6YDW-DPJP] (describing an increase in 401(k) plan assets 
from $0.7 trillion in 1994 to $4.4 trillion in the second quarter of 2014); see also JOHN C. BO-
GLE, THE CLASH OF THE CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS. SPECULATION 226-38 (2012) (praising 
the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, but arguing for reforms to the 
defined contribution system); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-408, RETIRE-
MENT SECURITY: LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES 2 (2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676942.pdf [http://perma.cc/KVT6-P8NR] (finding that 
40% of all U.S. households had some savings in a defined contribution plan). 
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Under the predominant approach, though, American workers are not able to 
buy securities in public companies directly. Instead, they are given an option to 
invest in the funds of whatever mutual fund families with which their employ-
er contracts.
14
 Although these families may have a seeming breadth of options 
because the investment choices are numerically diverse, those choices in reality 
consist only of the menus of funds of the fund families their employer has se-
lected.
15
 The workers’ version of the Wall Street rule
16
 involves not being able 
to sell one stock in the Russell 3000 and buy another, or to move into particular 
bonds. Instead, it involves being able to move from one fund to another, often 
of the same fund family. And yes, of course, there is a kind of liquidity, in the 
sense that the worker is entitled to withdraw her money at any time at the 
fund’s net asset value.
17
 But this is not liquidity that allows a worker to live off 
the proceeds. Rather, for most Americans, once funds are invested in a 401(k) 
plan, the funds are out of their effective reach until they reach age fifty-nine 
and a half.
18
 To withdraw before that time subjects the worker to Castro-like 
 
14. Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and 
“Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 (2015) (“The most common type 
of investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment vehicles that 
pool funds managed by a professional fund manager.”). One important reason investment 
options are restricted is the structure of the liability safe harbor that plan sponsors can take 
advantage of by offering only certain investments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012); 29 
C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2015). Thus it is perhaps not surprising that 43% of American house-
holds own mutual funds. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Investor 3 (2016)  
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2853506 [http://perma.cc/D8QV 
-MZBM]. Mutual funds also constitute a large proportion of household wealth—the median 
mutual-fund-owning household holds two-thirds of its financial assets in mutual funds. Id. 
Most of those mutual funds are held in defined-contribution retirement accounts or IRAs. 
Id. at 4. 
15. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 14, at 1485 (“The menu of mutual funds from which employees 
choose is ultimately constructed by the employer . . . .”). “In the largest 200 defined-
contribution plans, the average number of funds on the menu is twenty-two.” WILLIAM A. 
BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 143 (2016). 
16. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 553 (defining the “Wall Street Rule” under which, if institu-
tional investors were dissatisfied with management, they sold their stock and moved on); see 
also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
FIN. 1729, 1734 (2008) (“[T]he ‘Wall Street Rule’ often becomes the default form of institu-
tional shareholder activism.”). 
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2015). An open-end fund must sell its shares based on the net asset 
value, which must be calculated at least once daily. Id. 
18. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2012). This is also true for IRAs. Id. § 408A(d)(2)(A)(i). 
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expropriation in the form of confiscatory taxes.
19
 For this reason, most workers 
have a substantial interest in the durable appreciation of their portfolio, and do 
not benefit in any way from stock bubbles arising from gimmicks or unsustain-
able strategies because these gains will go away and if those bubbles result in 
economic recessions and diminutions in economic growth, the worker will 
suffer both at the time of retirement, and perhaps more importantly, during 
their working careers, as economic slowdowns that result in job losses and 
wage stagnation threaten their most important source of wealth. 
I admit to focusing on 401(k) funds,
20
 and I do so for good reason. Most 
Americans are not wealthy enough to buy a lot of securities
21
 outside of retire-
ment and college savings accounts under 26 U.S.C. § 529.
22
 In fact, most Amer-
 
19. Id. § 72(t)(1) (“If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualified retirement plan . . . the 
taxpayer’s tax under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received shall 
be increased by an amount equal to 10 [%] . . . .”). 
20. By 401(k) investors, I also include workers who, by virtue of their employment by a gov-
ernment agency or non-profit, invest in analogous 403(b) and 457(b) plans. See id. 
§§ 403(b), 457(b); IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans, I.R.S. (July 28, 2016), http://
www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/irc-457b-deferred-compensation-plans [http://perma.cc
/4DEA-QZWA]; Plan Feature Comparison Chart: Choose a Retirement Plan, I.R.S. 4 (Feb. 
2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4484.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3BZ-E8AM] (com-
paring plans); Publication 571: Tax-Sheltered Annuity Plans (403(b) Plans), I.R.S. (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p571 [http://perma.cc/MF5H-FXTG] (describing 403(b) 
plans for employees of public schools and certain tax-exempt organizations). Many, but not 
all of these investors, can be said to have a defined contribution or “DC” plan in the sense 
that the employer puts an amount into the plan on their behalf each paycheck but does not 
guarantee a future set pension (a defined benefit such as in a traditional pension plan). 
Some 401(k) investors, however, get an employer contribution and, of course, it must be 
remembered that whether the plan is called a defined contribution or defined benefit plan, it 
comprises one element of the employees’ compensation for their labor. IRAs are also closely 
linked to what happens with 401(k)s because the bulk of IRA money comes from rollovers 
from employer plans, not direct contributions. Palmiter, supra note 14, at 4 (“Defined-
contribution plans and IRAs are intricately linked, as most of the money flowing into IRAs 
comes from rollovers from employer-based retirement plans, not direct IRA contribu-
tions.”). 
21. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 5. 
22. Like 401(k) plans, most 529 plans provide participants with a choice of mutual funds in 
which to invest and, if those funds are withdrawn except for specific purposes set forth in 
the tax code, they are subject to tax penalties. See An Introduction to 529 Plans, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMMISSION (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/intro529.htm [http://
perma.cc/9BRD-ZQ3X] (“Investment options often include stock mutual funds, bond mu-
tual funds, and money market funds . . . ”); Common 529 Questions, C. SAVINGS PLANS  
NETWORK, http://www.collegesavings.org/common-529-questions/#question15 [http://
perma.cc/CCH9-88ZC] (“Earnings in a 529 plan grow tax-deferred and are free of federal 
income tax when used for qualified higher education expenses under Internal  
Revenue Code Section 529.”); What Is a 529 Plan?, C. SAVINGS PLANS NETWORK, http://
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icans are not wealthy enough to come near hitting the annual limits for what 
they may set aside in a 401(k) retirement account. That annual limit is $18,000 
per worker,
23
 or 32% of the median household income in 2015.
24
 For most peo-
ple, savings outside of college savings and retirement accounts have to be avail-
able in liquid and non-risky form to meet events of life like house and car down 
payments, air conditioners that need to be replaced, auto catastrophes not cov-
ered by warranty, children getting married or needing help, school tuition, or 
other issues in the general category of “stuff happens.” 
And for most Americans, how much they have to invest is singularly a 
function of how much they can make from their labor. The equity and debt 
capital they acquire comes originally from sweat. Because most of us don’t have 
a large surplus, it is not surprising that a majority of Americans have relatively 
little saved for retirement in the form of an ownership interest in funds invest-
ed in equity securities.
25
 “[N]early half of all working-age families have zero 
retirement savings . . . .”
26
 This results in dire aggregate savings rates: the me-
 
www.collegesavings.org/what-is-529 [http://perma.cc/R7X6-UY5X]. As a result, most 529 
investments go ultimately into the same kinds of mutual funds as workers’ 401(k)  
plans. Simona Hannon et al., Saving for College and Section 529 Plans, BOARD GOVERNORS  
FED. RES. SYS. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes 
/2016/saving-for-college-and-section-529-plans-20160203.html [http://perma.cc/WW7W 
-L2CK] (“529-college-savings-plan administrators typically offer a selection of investment 
portfolios to their clients. Each portfolio includes either one or several mutual funds.”). I say 
ultimately because many 529 plans market target date funds based on the age of the child for 
whom the funds are invested and when that child is likely to go to college. Those target date 
funds invest in specific blends of equity and debt funds that move from a more equity-based 
approach when the child is more distant from college and into a more liquid, debt-based 
fund approach as the child nears college and is likely to need the funds in the near term for 
tuition. See Common 529 Questions, supra (“The most common investment option is the age-
based allocation strategy in which the age of the beneficiary determines the specific mix of 
investments.”). 
23. Press Release, IRS, IRS Announces 2016 Pension Plan Limitations; 401(k) Contribution 
Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2016 (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.irs.gov 
/uac/newsroom/irs-announces-2016-pension-plan-limitations-401-k-contribution-limit 
-remains-unchanged-at-18-000-for-2016 [http://perma.cc/969T-KH6R]. The contribution 
limit for an IRA for 2016 remained unchanged at $5,500. Id. 
24. Real Median Household Income in the United States, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Sept. 13, 2016), 
http://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N [http://perma.cc/K8RF-6DMW]. 
25. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 13 n.30 (“[T]he overall median 
balance of DC savings for all working, prime-age (age 25-64) households in 2013 was just 
$3,000.”). 
26. Monique Morrissey, The State of American Retirement: How 401(k)s Have Failed Most Ameri-
can Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. 15 (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.epi.org/files/2016/state-of 
-american-retirement-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/QB7Y-CQ2D]. There is some variation by 
age. In a 2015 report, the Government Accountability Office noted that 52% of households in 
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dian family with a head of household between the ages of thirty-two and thir-
ty-seven has $480 across all of its retirement accounts.
27
 If households without 
any retirement savings are excluded, the picture is a little better: working-age 
households that do save have a median retirement account balance of 
$41,900.
28
 Even among households whose members are retirement age and 
have retirement savings, those savings are capable of generating only a modest 
annuity.
29
 Not surprisingly, these balances largely track family income.
30
 But, 
even the comfortably middle class—American households earning between 
$88,100 and $133,900 annually—have median account balances of only 
$60,900.
31
 Only when looking at the top quartile of American households—
earning more than $135,000—do median account balances exceed six figures, 
demonstrating how critical it is to continue to make good wages through access 
to a quality job.
32
 Yet, even for more affluent Americans well above the median, 
these savings produce a relatively small amount of their total income.
33
 And re-
grettably, the wealth gap between white and black Americans that has resulted 
 
the fifty-five and older category have no retirement savings in 401(k)s or IRAs. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS AP-
PROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680
/670153.pdf [http://perma.cc/BG7Y-SUCQ]. About half of those in households aged sixty-
five and up are mostly dependent on Social Security. Id. 
27. Morrissey, supra note 26, at 11. The situation is slightly better for older households: median 
retirement savings rises to $4,200 for ages 38-43, $6,200 for ages 44-49, $8,000 for ages 50-
55, and $17,000 for ages 56-61. Id. 
28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 13 n.30. This study used the 25-64 age 
range to stand for working-age people. Id. On that broader measure, the median household 
balance including those with no retirement savings at all is $3,000. Id. 
29. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26, at 15 (noting that the median retirement 
savings amount for the 48% of households age 65-74 with retirement savings is $148,000, 
which is “comparable to an insured, inflation-protected annuity of $649 per month for a 70-
year-old”). 
30. Morrissey, supra note 26, at 5; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 
13 (low-income households had less savings in retirement plans than other income groups). 
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 14 (measuring working households 
that have at least some retirement savings). 
32. Id. It is worth reiterating that when looked at from the perspective of income, the im-
portance of wages for almost all Americans cannot be overstated—only the top 1% of Ameri-
cans derive less income from wages than from other sources. See supra text accompanying 
notes 8-11. 
33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 15 (showing that the top quarter of 
retirement-age households have retirement savings sufficient to generate less than $2,000 a 
month in an insured, inflation-protected annuity for a 70-year old); id. at 18 fig.3 (indicating 
that for even those retirement-age households with retirement savings, retirement savings 
constitute only a quarter of retirement income). 
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from our society’s history of racial oppression shows up in a huge way in 
401(k) savings assets.
34
 For starters, black and Hispanic households are less 
likely than households generally to have access to a 401(k)-type plan through 
their workplace.
35
 Where plans are available, black and Hispanic workers have 
lower account balances.
36
 
A declining but still sizable number of Americans have their wealth invest-
ed indirectly in equity and debt capital markets through a more traditional 
means—a pension plan.
37
 Every paycheck, part of their effective wage is put 
toward a supposed guarantee of a defined pension based on years of work and 
other factors such as salary level. These other factors underscore the im-
portance of wages as driving the pension payments a worker will receive, thus 
linking the worker’s ability to live comfortably in retirement with her access to 
good wages during her working career.
38
 For pensioners, in contrast to 401(k) 
savers, no investment choices typically must be made. Rather, the trusting pen-
sioners find themselves in the hands of their pension fund and dependent upon 
considerations such as whether the pension fund is annually funded in an actu-
arially sound manner and whether the pension fund is investing its assets in a 
prudent manner that will enable it to meet its promises to its beneficiaries. 
Even more obviously than 401(k) investors, workers who have been promised a 
pension should rationally want a corporate governance system focused on sus-
tainable wealth creation. Investments must grow durably and be there when it 
counts. Not only that, unless the approach to economic growth is one that ben-
efits workers, by generating good jobs and wage growth, the prospective pen-
sioner risks unattractive fates like non-vesting if a job is lost, or minimal 
growth in pension prospects if promotions and other wage growth options that 
will generate a higher pension are limited. 
Precisely because human investors save for college and retirement, they are 
also likely to have substantial investments in debt securities and not just equi-
 
34. Id. at 52 tbl.5. 
35. Id. at 18.  
36. Morrissey, supra note 26, at 6. Account balances for black and Hispanic workers also de-
clined more than for whites in the 2007-13 period. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, su-
pra note 13, at 19-20. 
37. Brady et al., supra note 13, at 28-29 fig.7; William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry 
Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 fig.1 (Dec. 2012) (describing the over-
all decline in defined benefit pensions and noting that only around 20% of workers had de-
fined benefit pension plans by 2011). 
38. Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement
/typesofplans [http://perma.cc/RNR4-HZ53] (noting that defined benefit plans “common-
ly” have a benefit calculated based on amount of salary and length of service). 
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ties.
39
 Why? Because as college and retirement loom, it is prudent that more of 
your portfolio be in a form less vulnerable to losses in principal.
40
 For this rea-
son, human investors are particularly vulnerable if the corporate governance 
system allows excessive leverage, which can threaten jobs through insolvencies, 
economic shocks such as financial crises, and a reduction in the value of debt 
securities. 
These realities are buttressed by corporate finance theory itself. The main-
stream of that theory teaches that the current value of an asset should be based 
on its expected future cash flows.
41
 It also teaches that when assets such as 
stocks are traded in a liquid market with a rich information flow about corpo-
rate prospects, an active trading strategy dependent on outguessing the collec-
tive judgments of the market is unlikely to succeed.
42
 That does not mean that 
you can’t guess right sometimes or over some period, but that the ability to do 
so durably and consistently over time is slim to non-existent.
43
 
 
39. Palmiter, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that bond funds constitute almost a quarter of mutual 
fund assets). 
40. E.g., Retirement Portfolio Allocation, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/sch
wab/investing/retirement_and_planning/retirement_income/portfolio_allocation [http://
perma.cc/Y22Z-7894] (advising a shift from stocks to debt securities and cash as investors 
age or want greater stability). 
41. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 653, 693 (2010) (“The corporation is a collection of assets and its value is the 
free cash flow that those assets are expected to generate into the indefinite future.”). See gen-
erally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 115 (9th ed. 2008) 
(observing that net present value is the preferable metric for investment decisions and con-
cluding, “[g]uess what? NPV, properly interpreted, wins out in the end”). 
42. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 41, at 692 (noting that one implication of the semi-strong 
form of the efficient capital market hypothesis is that “no trading strategy based on public 
information can regularly outperform the market” (footnote omitted)); see also BREALEY ET 
AL., supra note 41, at 358-63 (describing the three forms of the efficient market hypothesis 
and observing that “in competitive markets easy profits don’t last”); id. at 373 (stating that 
“in an efficient market, there is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior 
rates of return”). 
43. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 361 (“Tests of the strong form of the hypothesis have exam-
ined the recommendations of professional security analysts and have looked for mutual 
funds or pension funds that could predictably outperform the market. Some researchers 
have found a slight persistent outperformance, but just as many have concluded that profes-
sionally managed funds fail to recoup the costs of management.”); Burton G. Malkiel, The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 77 (2003) (“A remarkably 
large body of evidence suggests that professional investment managers are not able to out-
perform index funds . . . .”); see also BOGLE, supra note 13, at 301-07 (arguing that attempts 
to outguess the market are irrational and showing that even eight actively managed funds 
considered to be highly successful had returns that tended to revert to that of the market 
overall and to have poorer returns, when their higher costs were considered); BREALEY ET 
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For human investors, these aspects of theory seem to counsel in favor of a 
corporate governance system that encourages investment in the development of 
useful products and the delivery of useful services because it is the purchase of 
products and services that must ultimately be the source of sustainable profits. 
Over the long term, you must sell something customers need or want. Whether 
you are a pure play or have a strong stock buyback program won’t matter if you 
can’t do that. Simply squeezing the corporate lemon to get the most juice right 
now at the expense of growing future lemons does not help human investors 
build wealth, as they risk employment opportunities and cuts in long-term 
portfolio growth. Offshoring jobs to nations with pitiful wages and little pro-
tection for labor as shortcuts to more immediate profits, rather than making 
profits in an ethical, sustainable manner that does not involve externalizing the 
real costs of business, hurts human investors. Corporate finance gimmicks 
won’t generate jobs or a retirement fund for workers outside the industry space 
coming up with the gimmicks, and gimmicks have a way of getting found over 
time. And over time is how human investors build wealth. 
This is not to say that human investors do not want to hold corporate man-
agers accountable. Of course they do. Human investors don’t want self-dealing 
that diverts profits from the corporation unfairly to insiders. They don’t want 
empire building that simply makes a corporation larger for its own sake, and 
does not make it more profitable in the long term. But what human investors 
are concerned with is not quarter-to-quarter earnings. Rather, they are also 
concerned when managers and others with power to influence corporate poli-
cies can gain substantially if corporations show paper profits that are not indic-
ative of economic reality or leverage themselves up to make immediate pay-
ments at the cost of future insolvency or lower returns. If the very economy 
that human investors count on to provide them with jobs is hollowed out at the 
insistence of those who wield the power that comes with managing human in-
vestors’ equity capital, human investors will likely end up less wealthy in the 
long run. 
In sum, human investors are creatures with special attributes, distinct (as 
we shall see) from other participants in our corporate governance system. Spe-
cifically, human investors are true Benjamin Graham-style long-term inves-
tors.
44
 Their time horizon is the twenty-some years from the birth of a child 
until college or the even lengthier period from entering the workforce until re-
tirement. The vast majority of human investors are also not primarily inves-
 
AL., supra note 41, at 362 fig.14.5 (showing that “mutual funds underperform the market in 
approximately two-thirds of the years” from 1962-2006). 
44. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 188-207 (HarperCollins Publishers 
2005) (1949) (espousing a long-term buy-and-hold philosophy). 
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tors—most of their wealth is derived from labor and wages, not capital appreci-
ation and dividend income. These two attributes distinguish what is in the best 
interest of human investors from what is in the best interest of other market 
participants. Bubbles disproportionately harm human investors because their 
time horizon means they not only ride the bubble up, but they also ride it back 
down to a bottom that may be lower than would have been the case but for the 
inflated egos that caused it. Human investors are also likely to have invest-
ments in both equity and debt and so are sensitive to value transfers from debt 
to equity. Most materially, human investors are exposed to the broader real 
world consequences of changes in corporate behavior influenced by stock mar-
ket forces such as hedge fund activism: a short-term increase in productivity 
and stock price at the expense of long-term reinvestment and wage growth will 
likely harm the overall “portfolio” of the human investor.
45
 The point of this 
Feature is not to vilify hedge funds but to ask questions about basic assump-
tions by using the perspective of the too-often-ignored human beings for 
whom the system is supposed to work. If you were one of the many—the aver-
age or above average below the ninety-fifth percentile—how would you want 
the corporate governance system designed? Even if you were way more fortu-
nate than the many, in the ninety-fifth to ninety-ninth percentile, how would 
you want it designed? 
Keeping a close eye on these flesh-and-blood investors, it is time to clarify 
what exactly terms like “hedge fund” and “wolf pack activism” mean in this 
context and begin to explore how activists’ incentives and strategies act on the 
real-world companies they target. 
i i  
The term “hedge fund activism” is an odd one. Hedge funds were originally 
associated more with the tempering, the “hedging,” of risk.
46
 And that remains 
true. Many, if not indeed most, hedge funds are involved in trading strategies 
that do not involve the subject of this Feature.
47
 Many of them still focus on 
 
45. See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
46. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1382-83 
(2007) (summarizing traditional hedge fund strategies). 
47. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1046 (2007) (stating that only around 5% of all hedge fund assets are 
used for activism); Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www
.economist.com/news/briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong 
-activists-are-rampant-they-will-change-american [http://perma.cc/H7UW-G54Z] (“[O]f 
about 8,000 hedge funds activists number just 71 . . . .”). Of the fifty largest hedge funds as 
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strategies combining leverage, “long” equity investments, and “short” down-
side-protecting hedges that gave hedge funds their name.
48
 But, for purposes 
of this Feature, I focus on the more oxymoronic part of the industry, which ra-
ther than primarily acting to hedge risk, takes an aggressive investment interest 
in the stock (and other securities and more exotic interests tied to the value of 
that stock) of a public company and seeks to make returns by influencing the 
corporation to change its capital structure or business plan. The funds that do 
this make up a minority of the overall hedge fund industry,
49
 but they have an 
outsized role in the debate about corporate governance because they have had 
an important effect on the manner in which public companies operate. And 
however attractive it is for politicians to talk about small business being the en-
gine for job growth, the reality remains that public companies are the most vi-
tal source of jobs in our economy. Directly, they provide employment for more 
than 22% of Americans.
50
 That understates their effect because countless small 
 
measured by equity assets, only nine are also on FactSet’s SharkWatch 50 list of “significant 
activist investors.” Hedge Fund Ownership, FACTSET (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.fact 
set.com/websitefiles/PDFs/hedgefund_ownership/hedgefund_ownership_8.23.16 [http://
perma.cc/2QKZ-H7UA]. Only one of the SharkWatch 50, Icahn Associates, is in the top ten 
hedge funds by equity assets. Id. This probably overstates the actual prevalence of activist 
funds because the report looks at firm-level equity assets, and some of the SharkWatch 50 
firms engage in multiple strategies. See, e.g., Philosophy, CARLSON CAP., http://www.carlson
capital.com/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/4CVN-4BAU] (“We believe that superior risk-
adjusted returns can be achieved by the use of thoughtful, targeted hedging strategies and 
diversification, across multiple strategies and multiple decision makers.”). 
48. Of the 100 top performing hedge funds, based on a three-year measurement, forty were 
pure equity long-short funds; more used some variation of that strategy. Barron’s 2016 List: 
Best 100 Hedge Funds, BARRON’S (June 18, 2016), http://www.barrons.com/articles/best 
-100-hedge-funds-1466223924 [http://perma.cc/S4UE-2MGJ]; see also Sebastian Mallaby, 
Learning To Love Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424052748703302604575294983666012928 [http://perma.cc/8F36-85LQ] (de-
scribing Alfred Winslow Jones, the founder of the first hedge funds, and his first funds that 
had a long-short structure). But, the term “hedge fund” is applied to a broad set of invest-
ment strategies. See Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Finan-
cial Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
POLICY CHALLENGES 114 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (observing that 
“[t]here is no generally agreed-upon definition of a hedge fund”); id. at 115 (setting out four 
characteristics of hedge funds, none of which relate to investment strategy other than a gen-
eral focus on public, rather than private, markets). 
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
50. The companies comprising the S&P 500 employ approximately twenty-four million people, 
which is approximately 70% of the overall workforce employed by Russell 3000 companies. 
See Justin Fox, Big Companies Still Employ Lots of People, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr.  
20, 2016, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-04-20/big-companies 
-still-employ-lots-of-people [http://perma.cc/VSG3-GGMN]. That results in an overall 
public company employment figure of around thirty-four million. The civilian labor force is 
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businesses are profitable because they operate in communities where public 
company operations exist; they play a role in acting as suppliers of goods and 
service providers to the public company and its employees. 
The information that is available regarding hedge funds is much more lim-
ited than about investment firms registered under the Investment Company 
Act, also known as the “40 Act.”
51
 Until recently, hedge funds were not regis-
tered
52
 and could only take investments from “accredited investors,”
53
 also 
sometimes known by the moniker of “sophisticated investors.” Because of the 
lack of disclosure required of hedge funds,
54
 less-than-ideal information exists 
 
approximately 157 million people. Economic News Release, The Employment Situation – July 
2016, BUREAU LAB. STAT. tbl.A-1 (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit
.nr0.htm [http://perma.cc/8DQL-MP6V]. Thus, public company employment as measured 
using the Russell 3000 as a proxy constitutes approximately twenty-two percent of  
the labor force. Twenty-two percent is likely both underinclusive and overinclusive. For  
one thing, that uses the Russell 3000 index as a proxy for U.S. public companies. The index 
measures the performance of the 3,000 largest companies, which represent 98% of the  
investable U.S. stock market. Russell 3000 Index Fund Institutional Shares (VRTTX),  
VANGUARD, http://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/investments/productov
erview?fundId=1854 [http://perma.cc/99Y8-ZBNZ]. This both excludes a small portion of 
the U.S. market and includes companies that may have a relatively large proportion of em-
ployees outside the U.S.—for example, Yum! Brands, the corporate owner of Kentucky Fried 
Chicken among other brands, with over half of revenue coming from China alone in recent 
years. Yum! Brands, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 12 (July 19, 2016). At the same 
time, of course, many public companies from other nations—who increasingly face hedge 
fund activism in their own corporate domiciles—employ many American workers. See Mich-
eline Maynard, A Lifeline Not Made in the U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/business/18excerpt.html [http://perma.cc/EXS6-TBGY]. 
51. Institutional investors such as mutual funds are required to provide in depth disclosure of 
their holdings on a semiannual basis, among other disclosure requirements. See Investment 
Company Act of 1940 § 30(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e)(2) (2012); Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 47, at 49-50. 
52. Frank Partnoy, U.S. Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POW-
ER 104 (2015) (describing new reporting requirements promulgated by the SEC in response 
to Dodd-Frank’s mandate). In fact, lack of registration was often used as all or part of the 
definition of hedge fund. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1024 n.1 (explaining that “in 
general, hedge funds are funds exempt from regulation under the Investment Company 
Act” and citing the definition used in an SEC report on hedge funds (citation omitted)). 
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016) (defining “accredited investor”); Brian R. Cheffins & John 
Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 
51, 88-89 (2011) (describing the SEC safe harbor, which allows funds exempt from the In-
vestment Company Act such as hedge funds to skip determinations of investor suitability 
beyond confirming that they are “accredited”). 
54. Even though the SEC receives more information through hedge fund registration and Form 
PF than it used to, this information is not available to the public other than in summary 
form. Partnoy, supra note 52, at 104. 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1888 
about how the hedge fund industry has performed in comparison to traditional 
mutual funds or market indices. Hedge fund track records are notoriously diffi-
cult to assess because the survival rates of hedge funds are much lower than for 
traditional mutual funds,
55
 and it is not clear that studies assessing hedge fund 
performance consistently capture the negative returns of funds that have gone 
out of business for lack of positive returns.
56
 The lack of reliable information 
 
55. MARK J.P. ANSON, CAIA LEVEL I: AN INTRODUCTION TO CORE TOPICS IN ALTERNATIVE IN-
VESTMENTS 241 (2009); Mila Getmansky, The Life Cycle of Hedge Funds: Fund Flows, Size, 
Competition, and Performance 34 (May 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2084410 [http://perma.cc/A336-CRXJ] (“Compared to mutual funds, hedge 
funds have a very large probability of liquidation.”); Getmansky, supra, at 1 (“[A]longside 
the tremendous growth, there has also been a significant attrition in the industry.”); id. at 4 
(“25% of funds have been in business between 5 and 7 years. Only 5% of funds survived past 
15 years, and over 35% of funds did not make it after 3 years of operation.”). If the initial per-
formance of a fund is poor, it is to the managers’ advantage, if it is able to do so, to termi-
nate the fund and start a new one rather than to try and dig out of its bad performance, 
Robert C. Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensa-
tion, GOVERNANCE STUD. BROOKINGS 7 (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/re
search/files/papers/2014/05/06-pozen/brookings_shorttermismfinal_may2014.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6TZB-FL2C], and, according to market participants, often with the same inves-
tors. 
56. See ANDREW W. LO, HEDGE FUNDS: AN ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 31 (2010) (citing studies find-
ing that survivorship bias affects measurement of hedge fund returns); Hedge Fund Survivor 
Bias and the Flaws of Blind Fund-Following Strategies, ALPHABETAWORKS INSIGHTS (Mar.  
26, 2015) http://abwinsights.com/2015/03/26/hedge-fund-survivor-bias [http://perma.cc
/9JZT-JA47] (analyzing hedge fund portfolios and performance statistics and finding 
“[h]istorical performance of surviving hedge funds overstates actual average returns by a 
fifth,” and “survivor bias boosts 10-year nominal returns by 26%”); see also William Fung & 
David A. Hsieh, Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases, 58 FIN. ANALYST J. 
22, 25 (2002) (“When the fund’s track record is satisfactory, the fund manager markets the 
fund to investors, which often includes asking to be in a hedge-fund database.”); id. at 23 
(“Survivorship bias . . . arises when a sample of hedge funds includes only funds that are 
operating at the end of the sampling period and excludes funds that have ceased operations 
during the period.”). Fung and Hsieh also observe that, assuming funds cease operation be-
cause of poor performance, the “historical return performance of the sample is biased up-
ward and the historical risk is biased downward relative to the universe of all funds.” Fung & 
Hsieh, supra, at 23; see also Vikas Agarwal et al., Hedge Funds: A Survey of the Academic Litera-
ture 91-92 (Founds. & Trends in Fin., Working Paper, Aug. 25, 2015), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2650919 [http://perma.cc/3F63-K3DK] (describing biases in databases of hedge 
fund performance). Other biases associated with hedge fund performance reporting are se-
lection bias, ANSON, supra note 55, at 241 (finding that better-performing hedge funds are 
less likely to report results), backfilling bias, id. (describing a practice of databases that cre-
ates an “instant history of hedge fund returns” dating back to the beginning of a fund’s op-
eration that may be based on a particularly high-performing time period), liquidation bias, 
id. (explaining that hedge funds which are about to shut down will not report their poor 
performance), and stale price bias, Agarwal et al., supra, at 95 (describing how rarely priced 
illiquid assets can skew performance measures). 
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about hedge fund performance and its effect on the ability of pension funds 
and other fiduciary investors to protect their beneficiaries also extends to pri-
vate equity, leading to calls for legislative action to increase the disclosure of is-
sues like the terms of private equity funds’ contracts with investors.
57
 Of special 
concern to human investors is the reality that nonregistered funds can strike 
different deals with different investors, and that those funds most likely to be 
acting on behalf of human investors may be, on balance, those less likely to 
benefit from, and thus most likely to suffer from, preferential arrangements.
58
 
Like their tactics, the targets of hedge fund activism cannot be put in one 
category.
59
 Scholars and commentators may underestimate the effect that in-
dustry growth has in considering this issue in particular. Some of the examples 
used as characterizing hedge fund success involved companies with rather seri-
 
57. See Gretchen Morgenson, Private Equity Funds Balk at Disclosure, and Public Risk Grows, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/private-equity-funds 
-balk-at-disclosure-and-public-risk-grows.html [http://perma.cc/34R5-FU4J]. 
58. Co-investment—where an investor is able to invest more money alongside the hedge  
fund but not through the hedge fund’s own structure—is one such special deal. See Aligning 
Interests: The Emergence of Hedge Fund Co-Investment Vehicles, J.P. MORGAN 6-7 (2014), 
http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/JPMorgan_PB_Perspectives
-Co-Investment_1Q2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q74P-646L] (describing types of co-
investment structures); id. at 5 (describing benefits for investors). Some investors may also 
negotiate fee terms for the money invested in the hedge fund directly than the traditional 2 
and 20. See Down to 1.4 and 17, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.economist
.com/news/finance-and-economics/21595942-cost-investing-alternative-assets-fallingslowly
-down-14-and-17 [http://perma.cc/CKG6-EP8Y] (describing negotiating power of certain 
hedge fund clients to obtain better fee terms). Sovereign wealth funds are known to be 
adept at using their bargaining position granted by large amounts of capital ready to  
deploy to extract favorable fee terms. Id. The story for American public pension funds is  
varied. Certainly, some of the larger funds are sophisticated hedge fund consumers and  
have reportedly been able to obtain favorable terms for themselves. Darrell  
Preston, Hedge Funds Leave U.S. Pensions with Little To Show for the Fees, BLOOMBERG (Dec.  
9, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/hedge-fund-rout-leaves 
-pensions-with-little-to-show-for-the-fees [http://perma.cc/EHV2-D6NS] (citing a market 
participant’s observation that “some pensions have used the lackluster returns [of recent 
years] to push for lower fees and more information about investment strategies”). But, more 
often than not, it seems likely that public pension funds, particularly the many with fewer 
assets than the few heavyweights, have not been able to negotiate with fund managers from 
a position of strength. 
59. For a reader who wants an excellent summary of the existing academic research regarding 
the impact of activist hedge fund investing, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance by Professors John C. Coffee, Jr. and Darius Palia is a thor-
ough, evenhanded overview. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6. I am grateful to its authors and 
do not intend to replicate their impressive distillation of the existing data, but do draw heav-
ily on their balanced conclusions about overall trends because of their commitment to objec-
tivity. 
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ous ethical and legal difficulties, which were dealt with on account of unrest by 
investors (and aid from regulatory revelations).
60
 This sort of activism is not 
typical, however, and has become even less so as the industry has grown.
61
 Alt-
hough scholars are not in full agreement about how to characterize the compa-
nies targeted by hedge funds, with some calling them underperforming,
62
 and 
others calling them profitable companies undervalued by the market,
63
 some 
common characteristics have emerged. In contrast to when activist hedge funds 
first emerged as a force, hedge funds now tend to target companies that are 
profitable, not ones that are not.
64
 But the companies that they target tend to 
 
60. One prominent example is the role Cardinal Value Equity Partners played in drawing atten-
tion to wrongdoing at Hollinger International, Inc., including its suit against Hollinger’s 
controlling stockholder and CEO for breach of his fiduciary duties. See Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 47, at 1032-33; Elena Cherney, Cardinal Suit Against Hollinger Details Payments to Execu-
tives, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107314585612540700 
[http://perma.cc/9HBW-X967]. Third Point targeted heat-oil distributor Star Gas, in part 
due to suboptimal governance practices that included the CEO’s 78-year-old mother serving 
as a member of the board. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1029. The fund successfully 
caused both the CEO and his mother resign. Judy McDermott, What Now for Star Gas?, 
LEVERAGED FIN. NEWS (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.leveragedfinancenews.com/issues/2005
_11/154579-1.html [http://perma.cc/3YLH-DDRP]. An activist investor was also one of the 
first to finger Enron for accounting misdeeds. Bratton, supra note 46, at 1384-85. 
61. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 (summarizing study of activists’ stated goals that suggest a 
little over 5% of campaigns demand “[m]ore information disclosure/potential fraud” and 
about the same proportion look to unseat the CEO or chairman, as compared to 12-16% of 
campaigns that seek to improve operational efficiency, sell the target to a third party or im-
prove the target’s capital structure); see also Bratton, supra note 46, at 1398 (observing that 
an activist intervention at Sovereign Bancorp—a firm engaged in ethically dubious related-
party dealing—stood out in a sample of activist interventions because the activist’s reasons 
to intervene were purely predicated on edgy practices, not firm performance); id. at 1401 
(summarizing the findings and listing four typical attributes of activist targets, none of 
which involved dubious management practices). 
62. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1090 (“[A]ctivists tend to target companies that are under-
performing relative to industry peers . . . .”). 
63. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1730 (“Hedge fund activists tend to target companies that are 
typically ‘value’ firms, with low market value relative to book value, although they are 
profitable with sound operating cash flows and return on assets.”); id. at 1752 (“[I]n about 
two-thirds of our cases, the hedge fund explicitly states that it believes the target is under-
valued . . . .”); Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 57 (“Hedge funds that engage in offen-
sive shareholder activism typically rely on the ‘value approach’ when identifying tar-
gets . . . .”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 582 (summarizing studies and noting targets 
tend to have relatively high book-to-market ratios). 
64. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 582 (activist targets are more profitable than control sample); 
see also Bratton, supra note 46, at 1398-99, 1399 fig.IV (studying a sample of hedge fund in-
terventions from 2002-2006, showing that targets were heavily weighted toward firms un-
derperforming the market in 2002 and less so by the end, and that the interventions overall 
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pay out less of their profits than the industry average and have strong cash 
flows and balances.
65
 Some might view the typical target of a hedge fund to 
therefore be a “value buy,” the kind of fundamentally profitable, but underval-
ued, firm that someone like Benjamin Graham might have said was a good part 
of a solid portfolio.
66
 When going active against these firms, hedge funds will 
commonly argue that the firms are engaging in excessive expenditures (using 
 
resulted in above market returns—”poor performance ma[de] for a better target”); April 
Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private In-
vestors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 189 (2009) (hedge funds target more profitable firms); Klein & Zur, 
supra at 226; Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1754 (target firms are profitable and enjoy hand-
some cash flows); cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 554 (“Historically hedge fund activism 
focused on smaller cap companies . . . [b]ut this has changed. In 2013, for the first time, al-
most one third of activist campaigns focused on companies with a market capitalization of 
over $2 billion.”); id. (considering the tremendous increase in activist campaigns and funds 
and articulating the possibility that “more and more hedge funds are pursuing fewer and 
fewer legitimate opportunities”); id. at 573 (observing that underperforming companies are 
easier to identify than simply undervalued companies); Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, su-
pra note 47 (“Given the size of activist funds and their pace of intervention, they collectively 
need to find 100 large target companies over the next three years. Only 76 firms in the S&P 
500 are currently showing persistently poor returns on equity . . . and only 29 trade at below 
their liquidation value . . . .”). As a sophisticated practitioner indicated: 
[A]ctivists have had to turn to better run companies given that there are fewer 
targets overall for them. There are very few conglomerates for them to after and 
break-up (like Fortune Brands). And the market no longer gives much credit to 
buy-backs and return of capital—many institutions, like Blackrock, have said they 
prefer investing in the business. I have never thought buy-backs did anything, 
and the return of capital platform is a lot less credible now. Activists then are left 
with “sell the company”—not the most actionable plan. The fact is that the so-
called activists are now just stock pickers, and they are not good at it. Bill Ack-
man’s investment in Valeant [which was initially done to facilitate a tax inversion 
transaction by which Valeant would have moved its tax domicile to low-tax Ire-
land] had nothing to do with activism. I said over a year ago I would short the ac-
tivist asset class—too much money chasing too few ideas. 
E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:08 PM) (on file with author). But see C.N.V. 
Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, 
and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 299 (2016) (“On average, the targets in our sample were 
not profitable before intervention.”). 
65. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1730, 1753-57 (hedge funds target value firms that tend to have 
low market to book value, “sound operating cash flows and return on assets,” are actually 
“profitable,” and “enjoy handsome cash flows,” but have relatively low dividends or relatively 
high CEO pay); Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 188-89, 203-05 (hedge funds target profitable 
firms with cash on hand); see also Bratton, supra note 46, at 1395 (“As more money flows into 
more funds pursuing double-digit gains from activist strategies, the funds relax their finan-
cial standards, pursuing less appropriate targets.”). 
66. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 44 (describing a long-term approach to investing based on 
a deep analysis of company fundamentals). 
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executive compensation when possible as a high-saliency example).
67
 The ac-
tivists argue that, instead, the firms could reorganize their capital structure to 
provide higher payoffs to stockholders in the near-term, without long-term 
cost, because they are merely targeting slack unnecessary to future growth.
68
 
What is commonly accepted about activist hedge funds is that they do not 
originally invest in companies they like and only become active when they be-
come dissatisfied with the corporation’s management or business plan.
69
 Ra-
ther, activist hedge funds identify companies and take an equity position in 
them only when they have identified a way to change the corporation’s opera-
tions in a manner that the hedge fund believes will cause its stock price to rise. 
The rise that most hedge funds seek must occur within a relatively short time 
period, because many activist hedge funds have historically retained their posi-
tions for only one to two years at most.
70
 As shall be discussed, there is some 
evidence that the more successful activist funds are the ones more likely to take 
a fiduciary position, by seating a representative on the target board and hold 
their investments for five to ten years.
71
 There is also some evidence suggesting 
 
67. See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 (noting that close to 5% of hedge fund interventions in 
their sample specifically targeted excess executive compensation); supra note 63 and accom-
panying text. But see Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 582-83 (summarizing studies and noting 
that while a minority support the idea that activists are in fact cutting back on wasteful ex-
penditures, the “majority do not report evidence of changes in real variables consistent with 
this free cash flow hypothesis”). 
68. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 (finding that close to 20% of hedge fund interventions spe-
cifically focused upon the target firm’s payout policy and capital structure). 
69. Compare Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1069 (observing that “activist hedge funds usually 
accumulate stakes in portfolio companies in order to engage in activism”), with id. at 1042-45 
(describing “activism” by traditional institutional investors). 
70. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1749 (noting that the median holding period for activist funds in 
their database was 556 days by one measure, and twenty-two months by another); Coffee & 
Palia, supra note 6, at 567 (summarizing studies showing that most interventions do not last 
for long); id. at 572 (“Few activist hedge funds have held their stock for anything approach-
ing three years . . . .”); see also Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge Funds: Crea-
tors of Lasting Wealth? What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say?, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE 
PRIV. & PUB. ORGS. 15 (2014) http://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/IGOPP
_Article_Template2014_Activism_EN_v6.pdf [http://perma.cc/9E4V-UU39] (noting that 
half of activist investments last slightly less than nine months). 
71. Nelson Peltz, cofounder of Trian Partners—an activist fund with a reputation for construc-
tive engagement—observed that Trian’s average investment lasts five years, but “[a]t Fidelity 
it’s 18 months.” Kerry A. Dolan, Trian’s Nelson Peltz on Why He’s a Nicer Investor than People 
Think, FORBES (June 21, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan
/2016/06/21/trians-nelson-peltz-on-why-hes-a-nicer-investor-than-people-think [http://
perma.cc/6MG8-Q9AK]. But see Julie Jargon, A Bite at a Time, Peltz Reshapes Food  
Industry, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119439562423884571 
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that hedge fund holding periods overall have lengthened in recent years.
72
 One 
major reason that most hedge funds have relatively short holding periods is 
that hedge funds have contracts with their investors that allow investors to get 
their money back after lock-up periods of typically six months to two years.
73
 A 
useful contrast is private equity’s typical five- to ten-year lock-up.
74
 The com-
pensation system for hedge fund managers, which has been the focus of much 
public debate
75
 and is not the obsession of this Feature, also creates an incen-
 
[http://perma.cc/HG6Y-2MN9] (noting that compensation arrangements for Trian-
affiliated directors, including Peltz himself, at some of Trian’s targeted companies have come 
in for criticism); Leslie Patton, Wendy’s Paid Chairman Peltz $657,514 for Security in 2012, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013 
-04-11/wendy-s-paid-chairman-peltz-657-514-for-security-in-2012 [http://perma.cc/LW4H 
-42JG] (citing less favorable views of Peltz’s effect on one of his target companies). 
72. In 2012, hedge funds’ portfolio turnover was the slowest it has been for ten years, although 
this takes into account hedge funds as a whole, not just activist funds. See Tabinda Hussain, 
Hedge Fund Portfolio Turnover at Record Low of 29%: Goldman, VALUEWALK (Nov. 21, 2012, 
11:30 AM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/11/hedge-fund-portfolio-turnover-at-record 
-low-of-29-goldman [http://perma.cc/FL3Y-HL2A]. Generally, hedge fund holding periods 
have gradually increased since 2008. See Matt Turner, Hedge Fund Managers Are Waiting for 
the World To Change, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/hedge-fund-manager-turnover-and-concentration-2016-8 [http://perma.cc/7GPW 
-9NS5] (reviewing a recent Goldman Sachs research report on hedge fund behavior). It is 
worth noting that other investors trade even more frantically. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti 
Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 3329, 3344 (2009) (finding that the portfolio turnover for the average mutual 
fund is 95% per year). By some measurements, annualized turnover in U.S. stock markets as 
a whole is well above 100%. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: 
The Empirical Evidence 5 (Oct. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1292403 [http://perma.cc/QE43-GE82]. 
73. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573 (hedge funds are constrained by a short-term horizon 
because investors “can withdraw their funds at regular intervals,” and will switch to fund 
managers who have recently earned above-market returns if a current fund lags). 
74. Bratton, supra note 46, at 1384 (“Contracts governing private equity investment tend to lock 
up investments for five years, with some contracts going as far as ten years . . . . In contrast, 
the hedge funds’ shorter durations, when coupled with the large, illiquid positions, invite 
aggression and impatience.”); see also id. at 1383-84 (contrasting typical hedge fund re-
strictions on investors removing money to private equity); Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 
1063-64. 
75. E.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Now That’s Rich, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/krugman-now-thats-rich.html [http://perma.cc/BP3W
-T7VX] (calling hedge fund managers “oligarchs” and criticizing hedge fund managers’ ar-
guments that it is unfair and socially unproductive to make them pay the same tax rates as 
workers do); Rich Managers, Poor Clients, ECONOMIST (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www
.economist.com/news/leaders/21568740-investors-have-paid-too-much-hedge-fund-expert
ise-better-focus-low-costs-star [http://perma.cc/SK69-R8DZ] (noting that hedge fund fee 
structures make it more likely the managers will get rich than that their clients will). 
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tive for a near-term focus.
76
 The so-called “2 and 20”
77
 approach provides a 
great deal of benefit to a hedge fund manager that can lock in a lucrative gain, 
and is not designed to compensate the manager for a mere market rate of re-
turn.
78
 The high fees are supposed to be justified by the delivery of far superior 
returns than a buy-and-hold strategy. 
Although it is, of course, true that wealthy individuals are the source of a 
material amount of capital invested in the hedge fund industry, the industry’s 
growth cannot be attributed solely to the super-wealthy. Rather, institutions 
upon which ordinary Americans rely—such as pension funds, university en-
dowments, and charitable foundations—have entrusted large amounts of capi-
tal to the hedge fund industry. By way of example, institutional investor money 
constituted 25% of hedge fund assets in 2001, and pension funds were poised 
to raise their allocations to hedge funds sharply.
79
 By 2015, one source estimat-
 
76. See Pozen, supra note 55, at 7 (describing how incentive fees—the “20” in “2 and 20”—can 
reward a short-term outlook inasmuch as big gains early in the measurement period are dis-
proportionately beneficial to the manager, even if investors might be indifferent or even pre-
fer gains distributed differently); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1064-66 (describ-
ing typical compensation structures for hedge fund managers). 
77. The phrase “2 and 20” refers to the traditional hedge fund compensation structure in which 
fund managers earned 2% of assets under management as well as 20% of profits. See Brat-
ton, supra note 46, at 1384. Although investors have had some success in decreasing the per-
centage “take,” the basic structure of charging a percentage of total assets and a higher per-
centage of performance seems untouched. See, e.g., Tom DiChristopher, CalSTRS CIO: The 
2 and 20 Hedge-Fund Model Is Dead, CNBC (May 2, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://www.cnbc.com
/2016/05/02/calstrs-cio-the-2-and-20-hedge-fund-model-is-dead.html [http://perma.cc
/7UXT-CS4V] (quoting the chief investment officer of a large pension fund saying the per-
centages have come down in many cases); Down to 1.4 and 17, supra note 58 (fee trend mov-
ing closer to 1.4% on assets and 17% on profits for all but the highest performing funds). 
Apparently Alfred Winslow Jones, the founder of the first hedge funds, picked 20% “invok-
ing the Phoenician sea captains who kept a fifth of the profits from successful voyages.” Mal-
laby, supra note 48. 
78. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573 (in exchange for the “generous” 2 and 20 structure, 
“hedge fund investors expect quick returns that outperform the market”). Although  
many hedge fund managers cannot treat their income as “carried interest,” as many  
private equity managers can (because hedge fund profits, unlike private equity profits, are 
typically short-term capital gains), other tax deferral strategies are available, including ones 
that can transform hedge fund profits into long-term capital gains. See Victor Fleischer,  
Why Hedge Funds Don’t Worry About Carried Interest Tax Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May  
14, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/why-hedge-funds-dont-worry-about 
-carried-interest-tax-rules [http://perma.cc/YLY3-6KGS]. 
79. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 90, 97; Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge 
Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 657, 666 (2008) (“Before the year 2000, most 
hedge fund investors were wealthy individuals. Since then, institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, endowment funds, and sovereign wealth funds, have invested in hedge 
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ed that pension funds constituted about 40% of the capital invested in hedge 
funds.
80
 At the same time as the composition of hedge fund investors has 
changed, so too have activist hedge funds developed a distinct investment 
strategy. 
In recent decades, hedge fund activism has increased considerably. Alt-
hough hedge fund activism campaigns display some diversity, basic patterns 
have emerged. First, the hedge fund must secure an equity position that allows 
it to make sizable gains if its activism succeeds in whole or in part. It can be ex-
pensive to get active, particularly if the fund ultimately has to get its way 
through a proxy fight or similar battle, and the fund must secure enough equi-
ty not just to have credible influence, but more importantly to make gains justi-
fying its risky investment with material upfront expenses. Using the antiquated 
disclosure regime under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act, hedge funds 
can acquire as much equity as they want, so long as they disclose their interests 
within ten days of reaching a 5% ownership threshold.
81
 Even then, though, 
the disclosure regime is incomplete and does not capture all the derivative posi-
tions the hedge fund can take.
82
 These positions must be understood if one is 
 
funds.”); see also LO, supra note 56, at 1 (“Long the province of foundations, family offices, 
and high-net-worth investors, alternative investments are now attracting major institutional 
investors such as large state and corporate pension funds, insurance companies, and univer-
sity endowments, and efforts are underway to make hedge fund investments available to in-
dividual investors through more traditional mutual fund investment vehicles.”); Cheffins & 
Armour, supra note 53, at 89 (changes to the Investment Company Act facilitated institu-
tional investor participation in hedge funds); Summer A. LePree, Taxation of United States 
Tax-Exempt Entities’ Offshore Hedge Fund Investments: Application of the Section 514 Debt-
Financed Rules to Leveraged Hedge Funds and Derivatives and the Case for Equalization, 61 TAX 
LAW. 807, 810-12 (2008) (describing investments by pensions in hedge funds). 
80. 2015 Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, PREQIN 10 fig.6.23 (2015), http://www.pre 
qin.com/docs/samples/2015-Preqin-Global-Hedge-Fund-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6ASF-XVUF]. 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015). 
82. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 65-67 (describing situations where activists have used 
derivatives such as total return swaps to build positions while avoiding reporting); Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 47, at 1063 (noting that options and derivatives are excluded from hedge 
fund quarterly reporting requirements as well as the fact that no disclosure is required at all 
if the hedge fund’s 13(f) securities are under $100 million). Even so, one recent study found 
call options used in 6.6% of its sample of interventions and put options used in 3.1% of its 
sample. Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 300 tbl.1. Another potentially relevant reporting 
requirement, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, requires, assum-
ing the jurisdictional bases are satisfied, filings and waiting periods before acquiring voting 
securities in excess of approximately $200 million. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(2)(A) (2012); 16 C.F.R. 
§ 801.1(h) (2016) (defining notification thresholds). It is, however, the acquisition of the 
right to vote that counts. 16 C.F.R. § 801.13 to .14. Obtaining a right to acquire shares does 
not count until the actual voting rights are obtained. 
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able to tell just how “long”—exposed to increases in equity value—the hedge 
fund is on the public company.
83
 Although in some instances a lead hedge fund 
has come public with ownership stakes of 20% or more—such as in the J.C. 
Penney situation in 2010 when activist Pershing Square, working with Vornado 
Realty Trust, surfaced owning 26.4% of J.C. Penney
84
—the median ownership 
interest of a lead hedge fund when it goes public has been reported at 6.3% in 
one study
85
 and 8.3% in another, more recent study.
86
 
The wolf pack imagery comes in at this stage. There is evidence that when 
an alpha wolf—the primary moving hedge fund—has begun accumulating 
shares but has not yet gone public with a Schedule 13D filing, other wolves 
move into the stock.
87
 Thus, when the alpha wolf emerges with its teeth into a 
good-sized piece of its prey, other wolves are also grabbing chunks for them-
selves.
88
 This, naturally, has led to suspicion that the alpha wolf has been or-
 
83. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, 13(d) Reporting Inadequacies in an Era of Speed and 
Innovation; Corporate Governance, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 24, 2015) (arguing that current disclosure 
of derivatives and synthetic positions is inadequate); Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Beneficial 
Ownership of Equity Derivatives and Short Positions—A Modest Proposal to Bring the 13D Report-
ing System into the 21st Century, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ (Mar. 3, 2015), http://
www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.15395.08.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2XBJ-QBVM] (arguing that current disclosure of derivatives and synthetic posi-
tions is inadequate). Although the Dodd-Frank Act did authorize measures to increase re-
porting by private funds, the ultimate rulemaking had little effect on public position report-
ing. A Closer Look: The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Impact on 
Alternative Asset Managers, PWC 15-18 (Aug. 2010), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial 
-services/regulatory-services/publications/dodd-frank-closer-look.html [http://perma.cc
/7PZQ-U6RS]. 
84. See Michael J. de la Merced, J.C. Penney Gives Board Seats to Roth and Ackman, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/penney-to-give-board-seats-to 
-pershing-and-vornado [http://perma.cc/BB33-JCTM]; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, 
at 567 n.79 (“Much attention earlier focused on the acquisition of 26.7% in J.C. Penney by 
Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust, most of which occurred during the ten-day 
window period after they crossed 5%.”). 
85. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Poli-
cy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5, 15 (2013). 
86. Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 300 tbl.1. 
87. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 562-64; see also Alon Brav et al., Wolf Pack Activism 4-7 (Rob-
ert H. Smith Sch. Research Paper No. RHS 2529230, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2529230 [http://perma.cc/MPR8-WJB5] (modeling wolf pack behavior). 
88. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 565 (noting that unusual trading volumes suggest “many 
other institutional investors” buy target company stock before the lead activist files a Sched-
ule 13D); see also id. at 567 n.79 (collecting instances where insurgents collectively acquired 
material amounts of target stock in a short period). 
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ganizing the hunt with the other wolves.
89
 Professors Coffee and Palia summa-
rize other studies by observing that “tipping and informed trading appears to 
characterize both the formation of the ‘wolf pack’ and transactions during the 
window period preceding the filing of the Schedule 13D.”
90
 
Understanding wolf pack behavior is further complicated because hedge 
funds are not subject to some important market regulations. Hedge funds are 
not subject to Regulation FD—a regulation requiring issuers to disclose mate-
rial non-public information broadly to the market, if the information is dis-
closed at all.
91
 Moreover, stockholders do not normally have duties to compa-
nies in which they invest and that is almost always true of hedge funds in the 
stake-building period itself because they typically had no ownership position 
before and no representation on the board.
92
 Thus, so long as they are not dis-
closing nonpublic information which they obtained as a result of an insider’s 
breach of duty, hedge funds are  normally free to tip third parties about their 
own plans or intentions without running afoul of Rule 10b-5.
93
 Thus, as a re-
sult of the inapplicability of Regulation FD and Rule 10b-5,
94
 there is often the 
potential for entirely legal tipping that accompanies activists investing in a tar-
get company. The failure of the disclosure laws to demand a full accounting of 
all interests compounds the complexity of understanding the economic inter-
ests of the various activist hedge funds who simultaneously or concurrently 
move into the target’s stock with the alpha wolf.
95
 Not only may some wolves 
own fewer than 5%, so too may disclosing wolves have additional interests not 
captured by an outdated disclosure regime. 
Whether the alpha wolf consciously forms a pack or the other wolves are 
just good at sniffing blood and being present to get their share of the kill is also 
not so much the focus of this Feature. But the reality is that, given the lack of 
 
89. See id. at 565-66. 
90. Id. at 565. 
91. See General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2015) (“Whenever 
an issuer . . . discloses any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securi-
ties . . . the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
92. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (“Un-
der Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or 
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.” (citation omitted)). 
93. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 566 & n.75. 
94. SEC Rule 10b-5 is “the federal securities laws’ principal antifraud prohibition.” Donald C. 
Langevoort, Theories of Liability—Principal Theories Under the Federal Securities Laws—Abstain 
or Disclose, in 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 1:8 
(Westlaw 2016).
 
95. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 562-64. 
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stringency in Section 13(d) and its limited reach to concerted activity, it is not 
uncommon for a public corporation to find itself with a sudden change in in-
vestment profile that involves 10 to 25% or more of its stock ending up in the 
hands of various activist hedge funds without prior public disclosure.
96
 
When viewed from an objective perspective, and not through the lens of 
anti-activist zealotry, the wolf pack in the more important, high-salience activ-
ist campaigns is likely to include not just fellow hedge funds, but actively trad-
ed mutual funds. Many sophisticated practitioners note that the fund managers 
of actively traded mutual funds, who are frustrated with corporate managers 
who do not listen to their input, share their frustrations and their ideas about 
improving the corporation with activists whom they find credible.
97
 Even more 
commonly, active long-only funds often provide voting and, as important, pri-
vate (in terms of communicating to the target’s management and board that 
advisability of listening to the activist) and public support to activist initia-
tives.
98
 Without the support of these mainstream funds, the activist hedge fund 
 
96. See id. at 567-68. 
97. For understandable reasons, market participants and practitioners are reluctant to be quoted 
to this effect. But it is commonly understood to be true. Many leading practitioners have 
commented to me that, generally, there is a great deal of communication among actively 
traded mutual fund managers, stock analysts, and activists, which includes mutual funds di-
recting activist hedge funds to good targets for intervention. That communication happens 
in both directions. An experienced practitioner noted that Nelson Peltz, the leading activist 
behind Trian, once said he could control a company with five phone calls to traditional 
money managers, including mutual funds. This phenomenon has received some wider at-
tention. E.g., David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-ally-big 
-mutual-funds-1439173910 [http://perma.cc/M5Q2-8ZPD] (describing activist intervention 
at Microsoft involving discussions between activist and long-only mutual fund families that 
already held a material amount of the target’s stock). In fact, one market participant indicat-
ed that because actively traded mutual funds have been underperforming—resulting in a 
shift of asset allocation to passive index funds—actively managed funds are now beginning 
to act more like activists themselves to try to generate higher returns. 
98. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572 (activists have the potential to increase their influence 
over target boards by partnering with pension funds and mutual funds); Benoit & Grind, 
supra note 97 (describing situations where activists were backed with “serious muscle” in the 
form of large mutual funds); see also William D. Cohan, Starboard Value’s Jeff Smith: The In-
vestor CEOs Fear Most, FORTUNE (Dec. 3, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/12/03
/starboard-capitals-jeff-smith-activist-investor-darden-restaurants [http://perma.cc/ZA7L 
-M6R2] (describing evidence that the mutual fund and long-only fund family Capital Re-
search “work[ed] hand and glove” with Starboard during its intervention at Darden). Long-
only mutual funds may provide more subtle support to activists in the form of an unwill-
ingness to back efforts by the managers of public companies to undertake potentially very 
value-enhancing, but risky transitions in business strategy when an easier M&A sale option 
is available. As one experienced practitioner related: 
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leader would not have the clout to extract favorable concessions in a settlement, 
much less to prevail in a contested proxy fight.
99
 
The strategies that hedge funds advocate are not diverse. In a few situa-
tions, hedge funds have claimed to have innovative strategies to improve the 
operations of companies in challenging industries, such as department 
stores.
100
 As will be discussed, there are not many stories of this sort of opera-
tional innovation systematically creating value. An example of an unusual story 
along these lines involves Starboard Value’s intervention at Darden Restau-
rants. Its three-hundred page presentation identified numerous operational 
improvements including practice changes to ensure only fresh breadsticks came 
to the table at Olive Garden and to decrease table wait times.
101
 Some evidence 
is emerging that when longer-term hedge funds succeed in seating experi-
enced, successful corporate executives on target boards as a result of a settle-
 
In three [situations] companies were trying to deal with technology changes . . . 
and were led by founders who . . . wanted to try and turn the company around in 
the public markets. In each case the CEOs went to their largest institutional inves-
tors, and essentially sought the guidance of these investors, who were long-term 
investors in the company, and asked would they support a risky transition that 
might or might not succeed—although of course management and the CEOs be-
lieved it would succeed and had a track record of success—and lead to a stronger 
company and higher stock price in 3-5 years or would they prefer to sell the com-
pany now for a certain premium. The answer in all three cases was the same—sell. 
  E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Oct. 18, 2016, 12:14 PM) (on file with author). 
99. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572. (“Thus, [activist hedge funds] will need allies among 
traditional institutional investors, who are largely indexed and have held their investments 
in most companies for multiple years.”). 
100. See infra notes 127, 261, 276 (describing interventions at J.C. Penney, Macy’s, and Sears, re-
spectively). Pershing Square’s intervention at Target Corp. was another notable attempt, al-
beit heavy on financial engineering objectives such as placing Target’s land (on which its 
stores sit) into a separately traded real estate investment trust and selling credit card receiva-
bles to third parties. Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly Reject Dissident Slate, End-
ing Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29
/business/29target.html [http://perma.cc/TM5P-K6W7]. 
101. Transforming Darden Restaurants, STARBOARD VALUE (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www
.shareholderforum.com/dri/Library/20140911_Starboard-presentation.pdf [http://perma.cc
/BW9E-6XWN]. In the two years following the start of Starboard’s intervention, Darden’s 
stock price rose around 47%. Julie Jargon & David Benoit, How a Shareholder Coup at Olive 
Garden’s Owner Sparked a Turnaround, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/activists-reap-olive-garden-bounty-1459902161 [http://perma.cc/Z6UR-4HLS]. 
Whether or not this intervention was successful, what can at least be said is that Starboard 
focused on specific business strategy changes that were rationally designed to draw in more 
customers and thus increase revenue. 
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ment or election, the target’s performance improves.
102
 But, many of the gains 
from even these longer-term funds have come from putting targets into a sale 
in whole or in part,
103
 and, what is missing is a matching of a number of actual 
stories about management improvement at specific high-salience targets to the 
overall data in the samples they study. 
Thus, what remains more common is that a hedge fund will argue that a 
corporation with healthy profits is not returning enough of those profits to its 
investors.
104
 The hedge fund will argue that the corporation, by dint of exces-
 
102. See Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 296 (arguing that the success of certain hedge fund ac-
tivists appears to result more from board representation, improved performance, and moni-
toring management than from capital structure or dividend policy changes). 
103. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588 (summarizing studies that tend to suggest “expected 
takeover premium, more than operating improvements” constitute the majority of stock 
price gain found in both short-term and long-term studies of shareholder activism); Activist 
Investing: An Annual Review of Trends in Shareholder Activism, ACTIVIST INSIGHT & SHULTE 
ROTH & ZABEL 11 (2016) [hereinafter Activist Investing], http://www.activistinsight 
.com/amp/issues/The%20Activist%20Investing%20Annual%20Review%202016._260.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WXD7-9E7F] (“[I]n a bumper year for M&A, activists both pushed for 
deals and higher valuations.”); see also Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe 3 
(Corp. Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 283/2010, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract
_id=1616340 [http://perma.cc/DW98-WR5B] (studying returns from hedge fund activism 
in Europe and finding similar results). Indeed, in one of the purest forms of this strategy, 
many notable funds have built stakes in two companies and pushed them to merge. 
    Mitel Networks’s acquisition of Polycom was the product of an activist taking a stake 
in both. Anne Steele, Mitel Networks To Acquire Polycom for Nearly $2 Billion, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mitel-networks-to-acquire-polycom-for-1-8 
-billion-1460718185 [http://perma.cc/W7HL-J7ZM]. 
    Another fund took stakes in Baker Hughes and Halliburton to encourage their merger, 
a merger that was later halted on antitrust grounds. David Benoit, U.S. v. ValueAct: A Law-
suit To Define Activism, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice 
-department-sues-valueact-over-baker-hughes-halliburton-disclosures-1459794637 [http://
perma.cc/D29B-RLY2]. 
    Still another fund built stakes in competitors Staples and Office Depot and pushed for 
them to merge, but largely was out of the stocks by the time the merger collapsed, also on 
antitrust grounds. David Benoit, Starboard Avoids the Staples-Office Depot Shredder, WALL  
ST. J. (May 12, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/05/12/starboard-avoids-the 
-staples-office-depot-shredder [http://perma.cc/4KA6-M4G4]. 
104. See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742-43 tbl.I (summarizing stated objectives of activist inter-
ventions in sample, finding that 19% of interventions involve arguments in favor of capital 
return but only 1% involve arguments in favor of pursuing growth strategies); Cheffins & 
Armour, supra note 53, at 60 (“Hedge funds often lobby for finance-oriented changes, such 
as having a target company squeeze value from the balance sheet by spinning off underper-
forming non-core assets and by using share buy-backs or a sizeable one-off dividend to dis-
tribute ‘excess’ cash to shareholders.”); Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 189, 203-05. But see 
Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 310 (finding that more successful interventions in terms of 
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sive costs, is operating inefficiently, and that if it cut its spending or took on 
more debt, it could pay out more gains to its investors immediately. Thus, ar-
guments to reduce capital and other spending (including headcount) and to 
increase dividends or do a large stock buyback program are de rigueur.
105
 Even a 
giant and massively profitable company like Apple has not been immune from 
these pressures for short-term increases in returns, as its capitulation to Carl 
Icahn’s demand for an increased stock buyback program demonstrates.
106
 Cor-
porate finance plays of another kind are also common, with the hedge fund ar-
guing that if the company is broken into pieces, its value will increase as pure 
plays.
107
 As suggested, with arguments for all these strategies is an almost al-
 
market reaction involved activists whose interventions were characterized by growth in re-
search and development spending, sales, and return on assets, but that the bulk of interven-
tions in the sample involved activists whose interventions were characterized by meaningful 
drops in those metrics, resulting in a material percentage of targets delisted for reasons other 
than merger activity); Activist Investing, supra note 103, at 11 (describing the high frequency 
of “balance sheet activism”). 
105. See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741, 1742 tbl.I (noting that 19% of interventions involve di-
rect calls to address excess cash or change capital structure); see also Klein & Zur, supra note 
64 at 226 (“Hedge funds address the free cash flow problem by frequently demanding the 
target firm to buy back its own shares, cut the CEO’s salary, and initiate dividends.”); Vipal 
Monga et al., As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend More on Buybacks than Factories, WALL ST. J. 
(May 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-share
holders-1432693805 [http://perma.cc/6YKK-PJSL] (describing activist investors advocating 
for increased buybacks and dividends). 
106. Icahn took a stake in Apple in 2013, and urged the company to raise capital in the debt mar-
kets to buy back its stock. Ian Sherr & David Benoit, Icahn Pushes Apple on Buyback, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324085304579010971
386703480 [http://perma.cc/GL2G-GXB8]. Apple later did just that. Michael J. De La 
Merced, Icahn Ends Call for Apple Stock Buyback, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/icahn-backs-off-apple-buyback-proposal [http://perma.cc/ZL4K
-CJHA]. Although Icahn claimed that “[t]here is nothing short term about my intentions 
here,” he exited his Apple investment within three years of that statement. John Lanchester, 
How Should We Read Investor Letters, NEW YORKER (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/jeff-gramms-dear-chairman-boardroom-battles-and-the
-rise-of-shareholder-activism [http://perma.cc/8PSN-9X4G]. DuPont was another recent 
activist target that otherwise “had consistently outperformed all relevant benchmarks for 
corporate performance.” Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 555; see infra notes 263–264 and ac-
companying text. 
107. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741-42 (identifying approximately 9% of activist interventions 
in the authors’ dataset where the goal is enhancing target focus through spinoffs or restruc-
turing). For example, Trian advocated a restructuring of DuPont spinning off aspects of its 
business. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 579 (describing Trian’s DuPont intervention as fit-
ting the “paradigm” of the kind of campaigns activists prefer); see also Jacob Bunge &  
David Benoit, DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board Fight, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015),  
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ways present hint that a sale of the company should also be considered.
108
 That 
sale will not involve a purchase by the hedge fund or its fellow wolves. 
Hedge funds, unlike private equity funds, will not buy a company’s entire 
equity and arrange their own financing, as is typically required when a full 
change of control happens.
109
 Rather, hedge funds will not bear that kind of 
risk and wish for the option of trading out of the company’s equity. If a hedge 
fund can push a target into a merger with a lucrative target-side premium, that 
will facilitate the hedge fund’s exit, but the hedge fund has no desire to be the 
acquirer in that kind of transaction. And when a hedge fund succeeds in chang-
ing the target’s business plan in other ways through pressure strategies, the 
hedge fund typically will make no commitment to remain as a long-term 
stockholder.
110
 
How hedge funds succeed in their campaigns vary.
111
 For the most part 
now, they win by coming public, not so subtly suggesting a willingness to 
scuffle, and by reaching an accommodation with the target’s management that 
involves the hedge fund gaining board seats.
112
 Once inside the boardroom, the 
 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-appears-poised-to-win-over-peltz-1431521564 [http://
perma.cc/AJK5-SNVQ] (describing Trian’s attempted intervention). 
108. See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741-44 (noting that most activism calls for increasing cash 
flows for near-term payouts, encouraging restructurings such as spinoffs, encouraging a sale 
of the target, or targeting firm governance). 
109. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 60 (noting that hedge funds typically do not wish to 
own the firms that they seek to fix). 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74 (discussing relatively short hedge fund holding pe-
riods). 
111. What constitutes “success” is far from clear. For example, a simple uptick in the target’s 
stock price following the announcement that an activist has taken a position in the target’s 
stock can create a profit on paper for the activist. Obtaining minority representation on the 
target’s board through an election or settlement is often argued to constitute “success,” alt-
hough that is no guarantee that the board will adopt the activist’s program. Regardless, 
“success” on either of those definitions does not guarantee that the company is better off in 
either the short- or long-term. Furthermore, there is at least some evidence that there is no 
difference in abnormal returns in target company stock regardless of who wins a proxy con-
test—the theory is that management tends to implement the kinds of changes insurgents 
want even if they stay in control. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572 (describing the re-
sults of a study confirming this conclusion). DuPont’s resistance to Trian and later spinoffs 
and potential merger with Dow is a high-profile example of this phenomenon. See infra text 
accompanying notes 262-264. But see Bratton, supra note 46, at 1420 (suggesting that when 
the activist funds stay invested in the target over time, better results ensue); Krishnan et al., 
supra note 64, at 309-10 (same). 
112. See Elizabeth Judd, Let’s Make a Deal: A Look at Recent Activist Settlements, CORP.  
SECRETARY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/proxy-voting-sha 
reholder-actions/12868/lets-make-deal-look-recent-activist-settlements [http://perma.cc
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activists press for their particular variety of corporate change. In the past few 
years, most activist hedge fund campaigns resulted in the hedge fund gaining 
at least some degree of representation on the company’s board,
113
 and in most 
of these situations, the victory resulted from a settlement.
114
 But these settle-
ments would not occur at their current high rate without the industry’s will-
ingness to engage in high-profile proxy fights, “withhold vote” contests, and 
other pressure strategies.
115
 High-salience wins by the hedge fund industry in-
volving major corporations
116
 and the demonstrated willingness of key proxy 
 
/6RAE-XHDQ]; see also Hedge Fund Activism in Technology and Life Science Companies, LAT-
HAM & WATKINS LLP 10, 14 (Mar. 2012), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf
/pub4723_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/TQ8Z-HECD] (discussing the practice of settlements and 
ways companies may defend against hedge fund activists). 
113. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1744 (finding that “hedge funds achieve success, or partial suc-
cess, in nearly two-thirds of the cases”). 
114. See 2016 US Activism Review: Stabilization, INST. SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 1 (2016) (noting that 
although activists gained twenty-seven board seats through contested elections in 2016 
through September, they gained “substantially” more seats through settlements); Gregory 
H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) (manuscript at 7), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2833399 [http://perma.cc/2YVX-AXSJ] 
(describing a “dynamic” of “boards and activists . . . edging unmistakably towards collabo-
ration” and noting a trend whereby 40% of announced proxy contests result in settlement); 
Michael Flaherty, Big Funds Push Back Against Activist Investor Settlements, REUTERS (Jul. 18, 
2016, 3:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-activist-investors-idUSKCN0ZY2DP 
[http://perma.cc/2DBT-HFYG] (describing the “historically high number” of settle 
ments); Judd, supra note 112 (noting that 33% of proxy fights in 2014 settled); see also Mi-
chael Flaherty & Anjali Athavaley, U.S. Companies Quicker To Give Board Seats to Activists, 
REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2015, 7:41 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefunds 
-activists-insight-idUSKCN0RP0D020150925 [http://perma.cc/XKY9-WJWH] (describ-
ing a decrease in the number of days from initial disclosure of activist position to settle-
ment). 
115. See, e.g., Che Odom, Quick Settlement Times Show Power of Activist Investors, BLOOMBERG 
CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (June 22, 2016), http://www.bna.com/quick-settlement 
-times-n57982074550 [http://perma.cc/W5V8-C2GC] (quoting Marc Weingarten of Shulte 
Roth & Zabel, LLP as observing that companies “think it’s more prudent to settle than to go 
through the distraction and expense of a proxy fight they’re likely to lose anyway”). 
116. In one case, ailing internet giant Yahoo agreed to add board members, including the  
chief executive of the hedge fund agitating for a new board. Douglas Macmillian &  
David Benoit, Yahoo Reaches Deal With Starboard To Add Board Members, WALL ST. J.  
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-reaches-deal-with-starboard-14617623
87 [http://perma.cc/FC22-FDVB]. Other high-visibility wins include board shakeups at 
Pentair PLC, Intuit Inc., and Adobe Systems Inc. David Benoit, Activism’s Long Road From  
Corporate Raiding to Banner Year, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/activisms-long-road-from-corporate-raiding-to-banner-year-1451070910 [http://
perma.cc/GCR8-BBBX]. 
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advisors like ISS, Glass Lewis,
117
 and mainstream mutual funds to support and 
vote for activist hedge fund campaigns have made clear to public company 
boards that activist hedge funds can beat them at the ballot box. 
Commonly, these wins arrive well before the ballot box.
118
 Settlements typ-
ically involve a combination of business policy strategy changes, usually involv-
ing some increase in immediate returns to investors through dividends or buy-
backs, and agreement to put directors proposed by the hedge fund (which can 
include hedge fund managers themselves) on the board of directors to help 
oversee the policy changes or a determination to sell the company.
119
 The 
 
117. Don Duffy, CEOs Need a ‘Healthy Paranoia’ of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 12, 2015, 3:05 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/12/ceos-need-a-healthy-paranoia-of-activist-investors
-commentary.html [http://perma.cc/5KFH-LNHG] (noting increasing support proxy advi-
sory firms give to activist positions); Anthony Garcia, Does ISS Pull the Strings in a Proxy 
Fight?, FACTSET (Mar. 11, 2015), http://insight.factset.com/does-iss-pull-the-strings-in-a 
-proxy-fight [http://perma.cc/5KFH-LNHG] (analyzing disclosed ISS recommendations in 
activist interventions and finding that “in the last three years [ISS support] was more often 
for the dissident than management”). That support can come indirectly as well, through 
proxy advisor advocacy for corporate governance rules more conducive to shareholder direct 
democracy. As a very current example, ISS indicated that starting in the 2017 proxy season, it 
will recommend no or withhold votes for board members on governance committees where 
the company restricts shareholder direct democracy in companies’ bylaws. Americas: U.S., 
Canada, and Latin America Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates, INST. SHAREHOLDER  
SERVS. 1 (2016), http://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/2016-policy-information 
[http://perma.cc/M358-G5V8]. 
118. See Activist Investing, supra note 103, at 12 (observing that board representation is more likely 
to come through settlement than a contested election). 
119. See id. at 13 (“Without having board representation, an activist investor may find it difficult 
to ensure their ideas and strategies are being properly implemented.” (quoting Bruce Gold-
farb, CEO of proxy solicitation firm, Okapi Partners)). In the case of ValueAct’s intervention 
with Microsoft, the two sides reached a settlement on August 28, 2013, including a provision 
where Mason Morfit, ValueAct’s CEO, would get a seat on Microsoft’s board. Within a 
month, Microsoft announced an increased dividend and stock buyback plan—measures it 
had previously resisted. See OWEN WALKER, BARBARIANS IN THE BOARDROOM: ACTIVIST IN-
VESTORS AND THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL COMPANIES 150-
55 (2016). When art auction house Sotheby’s settled with Dan Loeb’s Third Point fund, the 
activist investor received three board seats. David Benoit & Sara Germano, Sotheby’s, Third 
Point Reach Settlement, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702303647204579543581203051454 [http://perma.cc/6HL6-N3LL]. Less than a 
year later, Sotheby’s tapped an unconventional (for an art company) new CEO— 
a Harvard Business School MBA with more experience in branding and technology  
than art, who some regarded as “a safe pair of hands who can deliver on operational efficien-
cies and help Sotheby’s transition” to new owners. Katya Kazakina, Art Degree Not Needed: 
New Sotheby’s CEO Offers Technology Savvy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:00 AM  
EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/art-degree-not-needed-new 
-sotheby-s-ceo-offers-technology-savvy [http://perma.cc/7CS6-TXUY]. 
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placement of one of a hedge fund’s managers on the board does not mean that 
the fund is likely to commit to remain permanently invested, but it admittedly 
does subject the hedge fund to regulations like prohibitions on short-swing 
profit taking and insider trading.
120
 For this reason, settlements that involve a 
target implementing the policy changes the hedge fund advocates, but denying 
the hedge fund board seats, might be attractive to the hedge fund because its 
liquidity will be considerably enhanced. Nonetheless, it is increasingly common 
for settlements to involve the hedge fund placing one or more of its key em-
ployees directly on the board,
121
 and there is some emerging evidence that 
when hedge funds are willing to invest long-term, the outcomes for all are 
more positive.
122
 
 
120. There are multiple paths for an activist hedge fund to fall within Section 16 short-swing 
profit liability. E.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 563 & n.67 (describing how an activist 
becomes subject to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act after acquiring 10% of a 
company’s shares, and therefore may be forced to surrender “short swing profits”). But, ap-
pointing one or more directors to a company board is one way—and a way that is not predi-
cated on the hedge fund remaining a greater-than-10% stockholder. Cf. Carol Anne Huff & 
Elisabeth Martin, Corporate Governance: Director Equity Awards to PE Fund Representatives on 
Public Company Boards, 26 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 18, 19-22 (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Insights%20(Director%20Equity%20Awar
ds_%20Huff%20byline).pdf [http://perma.cc/WND7-GDXX] (discussing the concept of 
“director by deputization” in the private equity context where funds placing directors on 
corporate boards may be brought within Rule 16b—short swing profit liability for insiders—
depending on the relationship and interaction between the fund and the director). Depend-
ing on the arrangement between the director and investor, the investor also may be restrict-
ed from trading if she is receiving information about the company from the director.  
See Francis J. Aquila, Selecting Directors Designated by an Investor, PRACTICAL L.J. 20, 24  
(Feb. 2015), http://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Feb15_InTheBoardroom.pdf [http://
perma.cc/H2LE-5HR7]. 
121. 2015 broke the previous record for campaigns resulting in board seats for investors or their 
designees. Benoit, supra note 116. 
122. For example, a new study suggests that activists with a proven capacity to take a very large 
stake, gain board seats, and influence business strategy over a long period generate more 
gains. See Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 310-12. The study implies this by showing that 
interventions by certain activists—a minority of the overall interventions and activists in the 
study—with those characteristics had better results, not simply in terms of stock price, but 
on growth in metrics like research and development spending, sales, and return on assets. 
Id. at 298. In contrast, those metrics all materially decreased in the majority of interventions. 
Notably, the more successful minority made materially larger investments, in terms of dol-
lars, and so the difference in performance on a value-weighted basis could be even greater 
than the authors’ data allow them to conclude. Id. at 298, 302. The authors of that study 
have not fully linked together their story, but the case they seem to make is that activists ca-
pable of bringing in genuine managerial skill over a longer time period and who act as long-
er-term owners will generate better results for stockholders and other constituencies. See 
Bratton, supra note 46, at 1420 (finding that the best performing subset of portfolios con-
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Even when activists obtain seats on the board, their strategies may not be 
adopted, or the strategies may not succeed. In some high-profile situations, this 
has led to the payment of what traditionally was called “greenmail” as the price 
of getting a hedge fund to exit.
123
 This arguably happened in interventions tar-
geting General Growth Properties, Yahoo, and ADT.
124
 These buyouts have 
been understandably controversial because the corporation’s willingness to buy 
the hedge fund’s block arguably confers upon the fund a premium over the 
block discount it would have suffered if it tried to unload its position in the 
market while complying with the legal constraints on its selling flexibility at-
tributable to its fiduciary role in the corporation.
125
 These situations have not 
been common, however, and it seems likely that most hedge funds exit through 
the public markets from which they acquired ownership and do so after a peri-
od that is brief in terms of the life cycle of a corporation or an ordinary human 
investor.
126
 Even when hedge funds exit through public markets, it is some-
times with a helping hand from their former target—when the activist agitating 
for change at J.C. Penney reached a strategic dead end,
127
 the board struck a 
 
structed from a sample of 104 hedge fund interventions from 2002-2006 was the one involv-
ing companies where the intervening hedge funds continued to hold a substantial owner-
ship block). 
123. See Liz Hoffman & David Benoit, Activist Funds Dust Off ‘Greenmail’ Playbook, WALL ST. J. 
(June 11, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-funds-dust-off-greenmail-playbook 
-1402527339 [http://perma.cc/UG6H-SJ24]. Unlike the “greenmail” of the 1980s, the share 
buybacks today are priced slightly below market—avoiding the 50% tax levied on profits 
from greenmail enacted in 1987. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1082 (discussing the possibility of such a conflict); see 
also Hoffman & Benoit, supra note 123 (quoting a market participant who characterized such 
buybacks as “inappropriate” and argued that “[m]anagement owes the shareholders an ex-
planation”). 
126. See sources cited supra note 72. 
127. When Pershing Square intervened in J.C. Penney, it brought in a new CEO with retail, ra-
ther than financial, experience; pushed changes in how products were promoted and put on 
sale; and focused on changes to bring in relatively higher end brands. See Think Big, PER-
SHING SQUARE CAP. MGMT., LP (May 16, 2012), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/files/2012/05/ira 
-sohn-pershing.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3GC-8KVD] (presenting these changes to inves-
tors). The new CEO lasted less than a year, until the board replaced him with his predeces-
sor, and J.C. Penney’s sales continued their slide. See Emily Glazer et al., Penney Backfires on 
Ackman, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873245
04704578412440293890624 [http://perma.cc/D9PA-WV4P]. The new team nixed the 
“JCP” branding, which had been one of the hedge fund team’s innovations, and brought 
back coupons. Id. 
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deal with the fund, allowing its board designee to resign and providing the 
fund with help to enable it to sell the fund’s stake cost effectively.
128
 
Charles Nathan, a distinguished practitioner, has rightly argued that what 
matters is not that an activist has a short-term holding period but whether the 
strategy it advocates is sound.
129
 But, what he slights in his current thinking, 
which is somewhat different from his past thinking,
130
 is that if the proponent 
of a strategy with long-term effects has no intention to hold and suffer the risks 
of that strategy, there is naturally less reason for that proponent to concentrate 
on the long term.
131
 And Nathan is right that activists cannot be held responsi-
ble “if shareholders are predisposed to favor shorter-term programs for extra-
neous reasons (such as concern for quarterly and annual performance rankings 
on the part of active money managers).”
132
 But that makes my primary point. 
Shareholders predisposed to do that are not shareholders in the original sense 
of being the risk bearers of the equity they control. Shareholders predisposed 
to make trades out of a concern for Morningstar ratings are conflicted agents, 
whose incentives are different and not rationally aligned with the human inves-
tors whose capital they possess. If it is the case that these money managers are 
acting for their own short-term motives and if most hedge funds themselves 
have no incentive to think long term, that illustrates that we are relying on the 
law of unintended consequences to drive important elements of decision mak-
ing in a context critical to human investors’ wellbeing. 
 
128. Emily Glazer et al., Ackman Moves To Dump Entire Stake in J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J. (Aug.  
26, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324591204579037251135114142 
[http://perma.cc/C5EV-4P2P]. 
129. Charles Nathan, Seven Deadly Fallacies of Activist Investing’s Critics, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 29, 2016), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/29
/criticism-of-activist-investing [http://perma.cc/26TL-3VJK]. 
130. Earlier in his career, as a corporate lawyer, Nathan was less generously disposed toward 
hedge fund activism. In one instance, he described activism as “an alternate universe” sepa-
rate from value creation and warned of “the large and growing agency costs” that activism 
imposes on the ultimate owners of public companies. Charles M. Nathan et al., Corporate 
Governance Commentary: Corporate Governance Activism: Here To Stay?, LATHAM & WATKINS 
LLP 1 (June 2012), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/CorporateGovernanceActivism 
-HereToStay [http://perma.cc/Z47G-XR5Z]. He also referred to wolf packs as “destabiliza-
tion campaign[s].” Charles M. Nathan, Recent Poison Pill Developments and Trends, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 12, 2009), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2009/05/12/recent-poison-pill-developments-and-trends [http://perma.cc/4Z6H-W4PF]. 
131. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 46, at 1393 (describing how companies arguably experiencing 
conglomerate discounts are enticing activist targets because the activist can, if successful, ex-
perience the appreciation from a rerating of the stock without being concerned with any 
long-term implications from the breakup). 
132. Nathan, supra note 129. 
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Studies of the impact of activist hedge fund investing are emerging month-
ly, and it is hazardous to summarize them. But, there is some emerging evi-
dence suggesting that activist hedge funds prepared to take a long-term posi-
tion and work as fiduciaries to improve the performance of the companies they 
target achieve a better market reaction.
133
 There is also some evidence that 
hedge funds with a longer-term outlook are less likely to pursue cuts in long-
term growth drivers like research and development, when compared to hedge 
funds looking for a quick pop.
134
 This is also the space where practitioners say 
there is genuine symbiosis between traditional active mutual fund managers 
and activist hedge funds. It is these companies where mutual fund managers 
who feel their input over the years has been ignored suggest to an activist 
hedge fund with proven clout that company X might deserve examination. In 
this context, the activist can go into the fight with more confidence that the ex-
isting investors are frustrated and likely to support an alternative to the present 
regime. This evidence suggests that hedge fund activism is perhaps most valu-
able when it involves a somewhat rougher form of relationship investing of the 
kind for which Warren Buffet is known.
135
 The activist may need to knock a bit 
loudly, but once let in, assumes the duties and economic consequences of be-
coming a genuine fiduciary with duties to other stockholders and of holding its 
position for a period of five to ten years, during which it is a constructive par-
ticipant in helping the rest of the board and management improve a lagging 
company. Nelson Peltz and his Trian Fund Management might be thought of 
in this manner. Peltz is not a recent business school graduate without manage-
 
133. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. One example of this might be Pershing Square’s 
intervention at Canadian Pacific. Termed “one of the great corporate turnarounds in recent 
memory,” Pershing Square’s strategy involved bringing in a new CEO with extensive  
railroad industry experience who had already turned around another railroad. Antoine Gara,  
By Selling Canadian Pacific, Billionaire Bill Ackman Is Planning To Invest Again, FORBES  
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/08/03/by-selling-canadian 
-pacific-bill-ackman-is-planning-to-invest-again [http://perma.cc/6NHL-HF65].  
134. See Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 298, 309-10 (observing that targets of the high per-
forming hedge funds—funds which also tended to take large stakes in their dataset—not on-
ly performed well but experienced growth in research and development spending as com-
pared to targets of other funds); cf. Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, supra note 47 (analyzing 
the fifty largest activist positions in public company targets and finding an increase in 
profits, capital investment, and R&D after the intervention begins). 
135. Warren E. Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2015 Annual Report, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 33 
(Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2015ar/2015ar.pdf [http://perma.cc
/7M4Q-G8LB] (describing Berkshire Hathaway’s allocation of authority where business 
managers make operating decisions and capital allocation decisions are made centrally); id. 
at 32 (describing Berkshire Hathaway’s acquisition criteria); id. at 6 (“At Berkshire, we go 
only where we are welcome.”). 
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ment experience. Rather, he has been a successful CEO of several businesses for 
decades,
136
 and has been applauded for his willingness to get into the thicket of 
important work when serving on target boards.
137
 Precisely because in this sto-
ry the hedge fund is not really short-term, at least in comparison to the rest of 
the participants in our short-term markets,
138
 whatever business ideas it has are 
likely to be ones that have to consider long-term effects more closely. 
In this regard, a caution flag should be noticed by both zealots for and 
against hedge fund activism. If pro-hedge fund zealots point to evidence that 
the more successful hedge funds are not in fact short-term, but commit to in-
vest for five to ten years, then they should be far less passionate to defend all 
hedge fund activism as useful when the results from activism overall seem to be 
more problematic for other stockholders and society as a whole. Meanwhile, 
anti-hedge fund zealots should not paint with spray cans and suggest that all 
hedge fund activists are the same. Rather, they should be less worried about 
activists who 1) bring genuine managerial expertise to bear; 2) are willing to 
serve as fiduciaries of the target company; and 3) are willing to hold the target’s 
stock for a lengthy period. 
This point, of course, raises another important issue, which relates to the 
question of scale: namely, whether this sort of activism, which represents a mi-
nority numerically, can grow to be the predominant form, with the more com-
mon and less successful hit-and-run approaches going away. Right now, actual 
companies face both, and that is problematic, especially if the hit-and-run ap-
proaches induce companies to take shortcuts that harm long-term perfor-
mance, leading to those companies being targeted later by other relationship 
activists as a result of poor performance resulting from managing the company 
to the market rather than in a sound long-term way. 
To conclude, whether the corporations that activists leave behind are better 
or worse positioned to generate sustainable profits in the future is still debata-
ble, as shall be discussed. But what is certain is that the fundamental premise of 
 
136. Peltz was chairman and CEO for a decade of the company that owns the Wendy’s restau-
rants; he also spent five years as CEO of a conglomerate manufacturer and another eight 
years as CEO of a specialty chemical company. Nelson Peltz, TRIAN PARTNERS, http://www
.trianpartners.com/team-members/nelson-peltz [http://perma.cc/8YGB-73RQ]. 
137. David Benoit, Trian’s Nelson Peltz: What Happens When Activist Comes on Board, WALL  
ST. J. (May 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/trians-nelson-peltz-what-happens-when 
-activist-comes-on-board-1430991002 [http://perma.cc/AKN8-MG7H] (describing Peltz’s 
engagement while he was a board member at H.J. Heinz Co., including considerable re-
quests for information, and quoting board members who praised Peltz’s analytical strength 
and preparation). But that is not to say that Trian is without critics. See supra note 71. 
138. See Dolan, supra note 71. 
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an activist hedge fund campaign is that the target corporation is able to and 
should make material changes in the way it does business that will make the 
corporation more valuable. Nothing genuinely valuable is cost-free, and there-
fore all commentators likely can agree that the corporations successfully target-
ed by activist hedge funds, as well as those corporations who preemptively tai-
lor their business plans to fit the typical hedge fund demand for corporate 
management changes, will be differently positioned to seize the opportunities 
and weather the risks of the future. Those changes have the potential to affect 
human investors in multiple ways, as will be taken up in Part IV of this Fea-
ture. 
Although this Feature focuses on hedge fund activism and its effects on 
human investors, it is first necessary to consider the system within which 
hedge funds exert influence over public companies, their stockholders, and 
other constituencies including human investors. Part III, therefore, discusses 
the features of this strange corporate republic we have today. 
i i i  
The corporate governance system to which human investors are now sub-
ject and within which activist hedge funds act was in fact built for humans. 
Although the history is not in a straight line, it can be safely assumed that 
when for-profit corporations were first chartered under general, not special, 
legislation, the underlying assumptions of lawmakers were straightforward. 
Within the corporate polity, the stockholders were the citizens, and they held 
the managers, the elected officials, accountable through a system of checks and 
balances, involving republican election principles and elements of direct de-
mocracy to deal with certain particularly important subjects. Corporations were 
originally seen as having identities that were intensely geographic, and their 
operations, management, and stockholder bases tended to be concentrated.
139
 
Stockholders were mostly human beings, and they invested for the long term, 
options for trading were limited, and they made their own voting decisions.
140
 
 
139. By way of example, in our early history, corporations’ ability to do business outside the 
domicile that created them was dubious. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, 
Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 30 & n.105 (2013). See generally Ralph Gomory 
& Richard Sylla, The American Corporation, 142(2) DAEDALUS 102 (2013) (describing the his-
torical evolution of corporations in America). 
140. In a 2009 speech, John Bogle, the famed low-cost fund innovator, observed the change be-
tween the “old ownership society” where individuals held over 90% of stocks and “today’s 
agency society” where institutional ownership dominates. John C. Bogle, Building a Fiduciary 
Society, BOGLE FIN. MKTS. RES. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.vanguard.com/bogle
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Perhaps most fundamentally, as the corporation concept expanded and 
larger corporations with diverse stockholders and large-scale operations 
emerged, corporations began to take on a national importance and identity.
141
 
Gain sharing among corporate constituencies was for the most part assumed, 
and it was thought, particularly after the New Deal, that the stockholders and 
workers of a corporation were in a symbiotic relationship, where profits for the 
corporations would translate into gains for both constituencies and for the 
communities in which the corporation operated.
142
 Even though this was the 
 
_site/sp20090313.html [http://perma.cc/5AYE-XSDD]; see also Marshall E. Blume & Don-
ald B. Keim, The Changing Nature of Institutional Stock Investing 4 (Nov. 12, 2014)  
(unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06
/ChangingInstitutionPreferences_12Nov2014_CFR.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LXX-RGVE] 
(“The proportion of equities managed by institutional investors hovered around five percent 
from 1900 to 1945.”). Even in 1965, the “holdings of the three groups of traditional institu-
tional investors amounted to a relatively small fraction of the stock market: 5% for mutual 
funds, 6% for pension funds, and 3% for insurance companies.” Sharon Hannes, Super 
Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 170 (2015) (footnote omitted). By 2010, some measures 
put institutional ownership of equities at 67%. Blume & Keim, supra, at 4. A few veteran 
scholars and practitioners—by which I mean seasoned ones who have experienced the mar-
kets since the 1960s—made the point that ordinary investors in the past were not particular-
ly active in voting their shares when they had direct ownership. I do not quibble with that 
point. But, even if true, it does not contradict my central point. Investors in the past largely 
bought stocks because they liked the company’s management and its prospects, and they 
held their shares for much longer periods. Because they liked the companies, they tended to 
support the inertial direction of the company’s managers, and it was much harder for an in-
tervening investor to galvanize the market forces necessary to disrupt company policy. Per-
haps even more importantly for human investors, because the momentary pressures of the 
stock market on companies were less potent, managers were more free to pursue long-term 
approaches that involved gain sharing with other constituencies. Not only that, other  
constituencies, particularly workers in the form of labor unions, had greater power in previ-
ous eras, for both market and legal reasons. See Chattanooga Shoo-Shoo, ECONOMIST (Feb.  
22, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21596997-union-movement-misses 
-big-opportunity-halt-its-decline-chattanooga-shoo-shoo [http://perma.cc/SR6C-92SS]; 
Neil Shah & Ben Casselman, ‘Right-To-Work’ Economics, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732429660457817960313686013 [http://perma.cc
/6H6Y-VJ7D]. 
141. This growth inspired the classic, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
142. Charles Erwin Wilson, General Motors’s CEO, exemplified the period when he  
observed, when questioned at a Senate confirmation hearing about his GM stock: “I cannot 
conceive of [a conflict of interest] because for years I thought that what was good for our 
country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.” Wilson, Charles E., GM HERITAGE  
CTR., http://history.gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Wilson,_Charles_E [http://
perma.cc/Q69Q-5X7Y]; see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Pri-
macy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 136 
(2008) (observing that Adolf Berle, one of the important mid-twentieth century corporate 
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thought, it was also understood that for the most part, the worker and investor 
class would not overlap and that workers were unlikely to hold much stock. 
Rather, stock would tend to be held by wealthy individuals or by corporate 
pension funds responsible for paying pensions to retired workers.
143
 
But from the standpoint of those forced to save for retirement through 
401(k) investments, our so-called system of stockholder democracy now works 
very differently from these original assumptions. Money managers, controlling 
other people’s money, not human investors, now dominate direct stock owner-
ship. As a human investor, you turn your capital over every paycheck to funds 
available among fund families chosen by your employer.
144
 Those funds are 
effectively available to you only when you hit fifty-nine-and-a-half years old. 
Thus, for decades or even generations, the money is not available to you to 
meet your expenses. During that time, you do not get to pick the shares of 
stock bought on your behalf or to express any view about how those shares are 
voted. Rather, you are a direct stockholder of a mutual or index fund, a status 
that in essence means you have no real voice at all. Derivative suits, proxy 
fights, and all the things that self-proclaimed stockholder advocates believe are 
 
theorists, articulated a framework of “benign equipoise amongst strong organizations, an 
equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus that empowered the central government 
in the role of welfare maximizer”). Berle articulated an “American Economic Republic” that 
was “interdependent,” where companies did the producing, “incentivized by the profit mo-
tive” and government intervention happened to ensure stability. Id. at 136-37 (footnotes 
omitted). Private actors “moderat[ed] their conduct” and thus greater government interven-
tion was avoided. Id. at 137. “As a wielder of power in the interdependent system, a [corpo-
rate] manager would be held to responsibilities to suppliers, customers, employees, and 
shareholders, along with other, more peripheral constituents.” Id. at 141. The public would 
make demands, much as they would of politicians, and managers would need to respond. 
Id. Berle was an influential member of FDR’s “Brains Trust,” id. at 109, and his articulation 
of a “new” individualism fit into the ascendant stream of corporatist thinking in the New 
Deal and post-New Deal time period, id. at 111-12; see also William W. Bratton, Berle and 
Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 737 (2001) (describing Berle’s 
landmark book as “the basis of a paradigm that dominated the field” for fifty years). 
143. See supra note 140. 
144. The open-ended funds that are the main choice for human investors putting money into 
retirement accounts now dominate the U.S. market with over $16 trillion in financial assets. 
Palmiter, supra note 14, at 1. Many are passive; at the end of 2014, “382 index funds managed 
total net assets of $2.1 trillion.” 2015 Investment Company Fact Book, INV. COMPANY INST. 45 
(2015), http://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/CGH8-4NM6]. Of 
that, the majority were equity funds, and the proportion of indexed equity funds to actively 
managed funds continues to increase. Id. By summer 2015, index-tracking ETFs alone con-
stituted close to 30% of U.S. equities trading. Elizabeth MacBride, Watch Out for this $1 Tril-
lion Stock Bubble, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/14/watch
-out-for-this-1-trillion-stock-bubble.html [http://perma.cc/9757-JART]. 
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too scarce, basically do not exist at the mutual fund level.
145
 Exit is your only 
option, and that exit is to another fund in the same mutual fund family or an-
other family selected by your employer, most of which will look the same as the 
one you exited.
146
 
The funds in which you invest will not vote in a way that is fund specific. If 
you invest in a fund that is supposed to be “socially responsible,” it is likely to 
vote on issues in exactly the same way as the other funds in the fund family, 
however inconsistent that is with the fund’s stated purpose.
147
 If you are a ra-
tional index fund investor and your fund will not exit until the portfolio stock 
leaves the index,
148
 you will find you get no independent thinking at all or any 
separate voice.
149
 Rather, your index fund will vote the same way as the actively 
 
145. For an excellent overview of how limited the tools that mutual fund investors have to hold 
their fund managers accountable are, see Lyman Johnson, Protecting Mutual Fund Investors: 
An Inevitable Eclecticism (Univ. of St. Thomas Minnesota, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
16-17, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2814214 [http://perma.cc/HS9N-R5LZ]. See also 
Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Deriva-
tive Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 
1032 (2005) (“Institutional shareholder voice does not exist in the fund area.”); Eric D. 
Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 13-17 (2016) (noting that redemption is the key governance tool). 
146. Johnson, supra note 145, at 7 (citing the statistical reality that, although there are many mu-
tual funds, there are comparatively few fund families, and the choice for ordinary investors 
involves moving from one fund family to another). 
147. Ying Duan & Yawen Jiao, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from 
Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, 51 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 489, 
498 n.13 (2016) (“Less than 7% of our sample deviates from unanimous family vot-
ing . . . .”); Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES (May  
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant 
-is-quietly-stirring.html [http://perma.cc/ZD7V-A679] (describing BlackRock’s centralized 
decision-making process for voting its shares across all funds, in which the central team pre-
vails “regardless of the views of the firm’s portfolio managers or even [CEO] Mr. Fink”); see 
also Johnson, supra note 145, at 7 (“[P]roblems with conflicts between one company and its 
advisor likely plague all funds in the same family.”). 
148. “[A]n index fund buys all (or a representative sample) of the securities in a specific index, 
like the S&P 500 Index. The goal of an index fund is to track the performance of a specific 
market benchmark as closely as possible.” Index Funds Could Help Lower Long-Term Costs, 
VANGUARD GROUP, INC., http://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/index-funds [http://
perma.cc/V4EG-YHPL]. “[T]he ultimate goal in this type of fund is simply to replicate an 
external and independent phenomenon [the fund’s market benchmark], therefore compara-
tively little human judgment is involved . . . .” BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 15, at 26. Even when 
the actively managed funds in a fund complex are heading for the exits because they smell 
Enron-level fraud, that complex’s index funds will stay in the stock until the stock is taken 
out of the index. Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground, supra note 2, at 17. 
149. See Craig, supra note 147 (describing how Blackrock’s centralized governance team deter-
mines how all of Blackrock’s funds will vote); see also Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 48, at 
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traded funds in the fund complex,
150
 regardless of the fact that the active funds 
do not hold long term,
151
 and regardless of key factors such as whether the is-
sue on the table is a stock-for-stock merger in which the index fund holds both 
the acquirer and the target.
152
 
Interestingly, a study that focused intensively on mutual funds exiting 
companies that are the subject of controversy never focused on what the index 
funds at the same fund families did after their actively traded fund cousins exit-
ed.
153
 If those funds exited because of dangers of insolvency or other serious 
 
133-34 (observing that ETFs, one of the main instruments that investors use to hold entire 
indexes, typically have voting policies that indicate their managers believe that “their in-
volvement in corporate governance and voting is not worth the cost”). 
150. See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript 
at 11) (noting how almost all mutual fund families voted all their funds identically on social 
proposals, regardless of fund purpose); supra notes 147-149; see also, e.g., Statement of Addi-
tional Information, VANGUARD GROUP, INC. B-45 (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.vanguard.com
/pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4GA-GLX7] (“For most proxy proposals, particu-
larly those involving corporate governance, the evaluation will result in the same  
position being taken across all of the funds and the funds voting as a block.”). The same 
guidelines do allow that “a fund may vote differently, depending upon the nature and objec-
tive of the fund, the composition of its portfolio, and other factors.” Id. Although  
Vanguard is best known for its low-cost index funds, it also has twenty-one actively  
managed funds focused on the U.S. market alone. Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD  
GROUP, INC., http://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/home [http://
perma.cc/CE7Y-JCKQ] (follow “Investment Products: Mutual funds: U.S. stock” hyper-
link; then select “Active” under “Mgmt style/Benchmark” dropdown). BlackRock, another 
large index fund manager through its iShares unit, has an overarching proxy policy,  
although it also allows deviation on a case-by-case basis. Proxy Voting Guidelines for  
U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK (Feb. 2015), http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/about 
-us/investment-stewardship/voting-guidelines-reports-position-papers [http://perma.cc
/8G7M-WZZ8]. Other index fund managers such as State Street Global Advisors, Invesco 
Powershares, Charles Schwab, and Guggenheim Investments rely to varying degrees on the 
general advice provided by one of the big two proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, 
and apply the advice consistently. See Ari I. Weinberg, How Activist Is Your Index Fund?, 
FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ariweinberg/2012/04/25/how-activist
-is-your-index-fund/#327afa6218b0 [http://perma.cc/6DKZ-QN5M]; Rydex ETF Trust, 
Registration Statement (Form N-1A), at 30 (Aug. 5, 2015). 
151. E.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
561, 579 (2006) (“The average turnover rate among stock mutual funds was 117[%] in 
2004.”). 
152. The reason for this is that mutual fund complexes tend to come to a position based on how 
the stock of a particular public company should be voted. All funds in the family, including 
index funds, vote the same way, regardless of whether a fund owns the other stock affected 
by the transaction. Cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 558 (observing that many mutual fund 
families compete on cost and thus find it more efficient to outsource vote decisions to proxy 
advisors like ISS). 
153. Duan & Jiao, supra note 147. 
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risks, what did the fund family do for those of its index investors who still 
faced the risk? Did they voice concerns on behalf of their stuck-in investors? Or 
just do nothing? The latter seems more likely given the data on mutual fund 
family behavior. 
Regardless of fund, those who manage active funds are likely to have com-
pensation arrangements more based on the fund family’s profits or short-term 
returns than the long-term returns of the funds they manage.
154
 Fund manag-
ers will not be the ones who make most voting decisions. Because fund manag-
ers find most voting a waste of time,
155
 the fund family will, at best, establish a 
centralized voting unit comprised of comparatively less expensive employees, 
who will develop voting policies and make sure government mandates for vot-
ing are satisfied.
156
 In a materially important way, many fund families tend to 
 
154. A study looking at over 3,400 U.S. open-end mutual funds found that manager pay is often 
tied to the performance of the fund advisor and that “[t]he performance evaluation window 
ranges from one quarter to ten years, and the average evaluation window is three years.” 
Linlin Ma et al., Portfolio Manager Compensation and Mutual Fund Performance 2 (Finance 
Down Under 2014 Building on the Best from the Cellars of Finance, 2016), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2024027 [http//perma.cc/9SYW-JTSX]; see also Cheffins & Armour, supra note 
53, at 74 (identifying prohibitions on tying manager compensation to fund performance in 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1050 (highlighting 
regulatory obstacles to basing management fees on performance). Although mutual fund 
manager pay may not be as closely aligned with human investors’ needs as would be ideal, 
hedge fund manager pay structures, especially incentive fees, look worse in comparison. See, 
e.g., Pozen, supra note 55, at 7. 
155. This is especially true for managers of index funds whose incentives are to achieve a return 
matching the index at low cost, not outperformance over time. Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, 
at 1051. 
156. See, e.g., Proxy Voting and Shareholder Engagement FAQ, BLACKROCK (2014), http://www
.blackrock.com/corporate/en-is/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-faq-global
.pdf [http://perma.cc/3BS6-FD4E] (“BlackRock’s proxy voting process is led by our Corpo-
rate Governance and Responsible Investment team . . . .”); Statement of Additional Infor-
mation, supra note 150, at B-45 (“For most proxy proposals, particularly those involving cor-
porate governance, the evaluation will result in the same position being taken across all of 
the funds and the funds voting as a block.”). In 2012, BlackRock’s Corporate Governance 
and Responsible Investment team globally had twenty individuals, determining votes for 
15,000 shareholder meetings. Letter from Robert E. Zivnuska, Head of Corp. Governance & 
Responsible Inv., Americas, BlackRock, to B.C. Sec. Comm. et al. 1 (Sept. 20, 2012). This is 
the best case and is more true at larger funds than smaller ones. The general trend is that 
smaller firms with more limited resources tend to rely more on proxy advisory services. See, 
e.g., Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10
/s71410-167.pdf [http://perma.cc/JDD5-RSBV] (“[Certain] funds—such as those that are 
part of smaller fund families with more limited resources—may rely more heavily on proxy 
advisory firms to guide their votes.”); see also David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder 
Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 177 n.4 (2015) (“[Based on 2011 data on 
 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1916 
defer to proxy advisory firms
157
 on votes, because this gives them a way to say 
they have made an informed vote—and thus satisfy federal regulatory require-
ments
158
—on the thousands and thousands of votes they have to cast each 
year.
159
 Even though fund managers may believe the number of votes is waste-
ful and not good for them or their investors, they remain silent and go along 
with those, to be discussed, who press for corporations to be governed on a di-
rect democracy, corporate California model—where there is always an oppor-
tunity for immediate market sentiments to be heard and where there is no at-
tempt to establish a rational system of periodic votes on issues like executive 
compensation or to ensure that certain stockholders with trifling amounts of 
equity do not burden corporate performance with constant precatory pro-
posals, which involve no cost to them and great cost to corporations. The chain 
separating actual human beings from voting shares in corporations can be long 
indeed. 
None of the participants in this lengthy chain can be meaningfully thought 
of as anything other than agents, and the ties of their agency tend to be thicker 
as to the interests of the money manager fund family seeking profit than to the 
human investors the power of whose capital is being wielded.
160
 In 2016, the 
 
say-on-pay votes,] SEI Investment Management; Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo; Ever-
green Investment Management; Dimensional Fund Advisors; Wells Fargo Funds Manage-
ment; and Nuveen Asset Management voted more than 99 percent of the time with the In-
stitutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendation when this recommendation differed 
from that of management. Similarly, Charles Schwab, Neuberger Berman, Loomis Sayles, 
and Invesco explicitly disclose that they follow Glass, Lewis & Co. (GL) SOP recommenda-
tions.”). 
157. Really, just two firms—Glass Lewis and ISS—have 97% market share in the United States. 
Bryce C. Tingle, The Agency Cost Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms, 49 U.B.C. L. REV. 
725, 743 (2016). 
158. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2016) (requiring investment advisers to “[a]dopt and imple-
ment written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that [the in-
vestment advisers] vote client securities in the best interest of clients”). 
159. Duan & Jiao, supra note 147, at 501 (summarizing research that found that 29.6% of mutual 
funds in the sample always voted consistently with ISS and all funds in the sample were 
more likely to vote against the recommendation of corporate management or sell the stock 
when ISS was recommending action different from management). 
160. Johnson, supra note 145, at 4-6 (observing that advisors hold the most power in the mutual 
fund context and describing conflicts of interest between investors and advisors); Memo-
randum from Chester Spratt, Chief Economist, Office of Econ. Analysis, SEC, to Inv.  
Co., File S7-03-04, at 4-10 (Dec. 29, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304
/oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf [http://perma.cc/RP9D-HLJD] (describing agency con-
flicts between fund managers and investors); see also Ma et al., supra note 154, at 2 (review-
ing mutual fund manager compensation and finding that, in half of their sample, a manag-
er’s bonus was linked to the fund complex’s performance, rather than the manager’s own 
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concept of “superdelegates” playing a material role in the presidential nomina-
tion process faced renewed criticism,
161
 and the voice of superdelegates is being 
turned down substantially.
162
 In the corporate governance system, however, we 
have moved to a system almost exclusively comprised of layers of superdele-
gates, who have the chance to use the delegated power of ordinary human in-
vestors to influence public corporations. 
Even worse than 401(k) investors who have (limited) ability to vote with 
their feet, workers who look to pension funds for their retirement have no in-
vestment choice at all, much less any voice over how the power conferred by 
their capital is exercised. The pension fund decides where the funds taken from 
the workers’ checks are invested. Although most human investors are locked 
out of investing in private equity funds or hedge funds or other unregistered 
investments, pension funds get to do so on their behalf, because of their sup-
posed sophistication. Thus, when unregistered investment advisers fail, it is 
human investors who have no choice in the matter, who bear the costs. Like-
wise, pension funds have been active
163
 in proliferating litigation over mergers 
and acquisitions that involve no conflict of interest, that were overwhelmingly 
supported by most institutional investors (often including the pension fund’s 
own investment managers), and where the litigation delivered no benefits to 
 
fund); Tingle, supra note 157, at 12 (observing that the size of assets under management 
plays a materially greater role in fund manager compensation than the fund’s performance 
for its investors). If one turns one’s gaze to the hedge fund industry, rather than more con-
ventional money managers, the incentives are arguably even harder to rationalize. Simon 
Lack, The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It’s Too Good To Be True, 
C.F.A. INST. 14, 18-19 (2012) (noting that since 1998, 98% of net real profits derived from 
hedge funds have gone to hedge fund and fund-of-fund managers rather than to the inves-
tors). But see Ma et al., supra note 154, at 2 (“[T]he bonus component of compensation is 
explicitly tied to the fund’s investment performance for 79.2% of sample funds.”). 
161. E.g., Laura Meckler, Bernie Sanders Makes a Last Push: To Change Party Rules, WALL ST. J. 
(June 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bernie-sanders-makes-a-last-push-to-change
-party-rules-1466202267 [http://perma.cc/PQ56-39K7]; Diane Russell, Opinion, Abolish 
Superdelegates. It’s Only Democratic, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/07/23/opinion/campaign-stops/abolish-superdelegates-its-only-democratic.html 
[http://perma.cc/ZAG3-446D]. 
162. See Evelyn Rupert, Democrats Vote To Overhaul Superdelegate System, HILL (July  
23, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/288989-democrats-vote-to 
-reform-super-delegate-system [http://perma.cc/8B32-KAUP]. 
163. David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of In-
stitutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 
960-61 (2014) (noting the prevalence of pension funds as lead plaintiffs in mergers and ac-
quisition litigation in Delaware). 
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investors as a class,
164
 but only to the law firms with whom the pension funds’ 
board had developed an unusually close and not easily explicable relation-
ship.
165
 As one learned practitioner said to me, the role of pension funds affili-
ated with labor unions has been disheartening in this story.
166
 I agree with that 
point. Labor unions felt burned by their experience when they believed their 
support of management in fights over constituency statutes and anti-takeover 
statutes were not rewarded with a commitment by management to address 
global competition in a way that involved investment in and nurturing of 
American workers. Instead, unions saw managers using the statutes to give 
them leverage for higher pay and severance packages. So, pension funds affili-
ated with labor then joined forces with others to push for an elimination to 
structural defenses, to push for options-based executive pay, and in general to 
push for corporate governance changes that make companies immediately sus-
 
164. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 475 tbl.1, 476 tbl.2 (2015) (highlighting the 
precipitous rise in the incidence of merger litigation and number of suits generated by a sin-
gle transaction); id. at 478-79 (noting that well over half of merger litigation settlements on-
ly result in enhanced disclosure); id. at 485-86 (noting that shareholders are unlikely to 
change their votes in light of settlement-driven disclosure); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor 
Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
829, 835-36 (2014). Certain pension funds act as lead plaintiff so frequently it attracts op-
probrium. Inst. for Legal Reform, Bayou State Fund Is a Voracious Frequent Filer, U.S. CHAM-
BER COM. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/bayou-state 
-fund-is-voracious-frequent-filer [http://perma.cc/3BGC-WCJW] (identifying the Louisi-
ana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System pension fund as the “most prolific filer 
of shareholder litigation in U.S. history”); Inst. for Legal Reform, Frequent Filers: The  
Problems of Shareholder Lawsuits and the Path to Reform, U.S. CHAMBER COM. 11-14  
(Feb. 2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Frequent_Filers
_Final_Version.pdf [http://perma.cc/UX8M-JR4A] (discussing the Mississippi Public Em-
ployees’ Retirement System’s frequent filing of securities class actions). 
165. Cain & Solomon, supra note 164, at 478 tbl.3 (reporting mean attorneys’ fees for disclosure-
only settlements at $749,000); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 164, at 841 (describing acute 
conflicts of interest between securities plaintiff litigators and the plaintiffs (quoting Janet 
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 
STAN L. REV. 497, 535 (1991))); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 164, at 857 (“[T]he plaintiffs’ 
attorney has the strongest financial stake in the claim, virtually always far outweighing that 
of any individual stockholder.”); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A 
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 535-36 (1991) (“Class ac-
tions . . . are characterized by high agency costs: that is, a significant possibility that litiga-
tion decisions will be made in accordance with the lawyer’s economic interests rather than 
those of the class.”); Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 48, at 111 (observing instances of plain-
tiffs’ law firms being accused of making campaign contributions to elected officials who 
make pension fund decisions). 
166. E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Sept. 4, 2016, 10:25 AM) (on file with author). 
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ceptible to influence by the stock market.
167
 At the same time, labor funds did 
little to encourage companies to improve risk management practices, to em-
brace sustainable approaches to value creation, or to manage their businesses in 
ways that involved good treatment of their human capital.
168
 Rather, they add-
ed their voices to the choir of voices that most fervently pushed for stock mar-
ket direct democracy.
169
 This is a complicated story, and it is evolving, but this 
simple rendering regrettably has the ring of truth. 
 
167. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United 
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (2007) (describing the rising prevalence of union-fund 
sponsored shareholder proposals in the mid-1990s); id. at 63 fig.3 (showing the increase in 
proposals by union funds in the 2004-05 period compared to 1987-94 period and decreases 
in proposals by other groups over same comparison periods); Andrew K. Prevost et al., La-
bor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?, 47 FIN. REV. 327, 329-31 (2012) 
(summarizing studies showing labor unions’ high level of activity in submitting shareholder 
proposals related to corporate governance—and relatively high levels of success); Prevost et 
al., supra, at 333-36, 334 tbl.1 (reviewing a sample of union-sponsored shareholder proposals 
and finding them concentrated in efforts to remove antitakeover devices, repeal classified 
boards, and increase board independence); Paula Tkac, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, One 
Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through Shareholder Proposals, 91 ECON. REV. 1, 6 
(2006) (“In the years since 2002 the unions have withdrawn from social advocacy and fo-
cused entirely on corporate governance proposals.”); see also John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Fed-
eralization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing 
Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2011) (“Paradoxically, the legal recognition of non-
shareholder interests served only to entrench and empower management . . . . Managerial 
interests and organized labor spearheaded the political support for constituency stat-
utes . . . . Labor, however, occupied a subordinate position in the antitakeover alliance . . . . 
Labor . . . served as a legitimating fig leaf for managerial power.”). 
168. Prevost et al., supra note 167, at 334 tbl.1 (showing relatively few union proposals remotely 
related to firm operations); Tkac, supra note 167 at 10, 11 n.13 (summarizing a sample of 
proposals and finding that, historically, unions sponsored at least some proposals seeking 
higher wages or enhanced working conditions overseas—arguably in at least partial service 
of maintaining labor unions’ relevance—but also finding that since 2002, “unions have 
switched their shareholder activism strategy to sponsor corporate governance proposals ra-
ther than call for socially responsible firm behavior” (emphasis added)); cf. STEPHEN M. BAIN-
BRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 247 (2012) (describing the 
vulnerability of public pension funds to “being used as a vehicle for advancing politi-
cal/social goals unrelated to shareholder interests generally”). 
169. E.g., AFL-CIO Proxy Voting Guidelines: Exercising Authority, Restoring Accountability, AM. 
FED’N LAB. & CONG. INDUS. ORGS. 7 (2012), http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch
/Capital-Stewardship/Proxy-Voting [http://perma.cc/8KV5-YSUK] (discouraging classi-
fied boards and encouraging a majority, rather than plurality standard for director elec-
tions); id. at 7-8 (encouraging proposals easing shareholder ability to elect their own direc-
tors); id. at 18 (opposing reincorporation in states with stronger antitakeover protections 
and poison pills that do not require a routine shareholder vote); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for 
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term, 66 BUS. L. 1, 13 
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Relatedly, certain pension funds have been consistent advocates for turning 
the American corporate governance system into a direct democracy, with con-
stant agitation for referenda and frequent stockholder votes on a variety of top-
ics. The symbiotic relationship activist hedge funds have with pension funds 
that engage in corporate governance activism is well understood.
170
 At times, 
scholars have called the changes wrought by corporate governance activism 
“small,”
171
 but the large company-specific changes activist hedge funds have 
made have been facilitated by those governance changes. By making target cor-
porations susceptible to immediate market pressures through the elimination 
of staggered boards, proliferating stockholder votes on proposals, the move to 
turn a decision not to vote into a “no vote,” and similar changes in governance, 
corporate governance activists have made it much easier for activist hedge 
funds to prevail in a contest with management. Thus, although putatively ar-
guing that corporate executives should be paid in a way that aligns their inter-
ests with those of pensioners,
172
 pension funds have pushed for annual say-on-
 
n.44 (2010) (examining corporate governance activism after the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals and concluding the evidence “does not suggest that institutional investors changed 
their focus to concentrate more on issues of fundamental risk, fraud avoidance, and effective 
risk and leverage management practices,” but instead focused on takeover defenses and mak-
ing corporations more subject to direct stockholder action). 
170. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572 (observing the increased power that activists can gain 
through partnership with pension funds and other traditional money managers); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897-99 (2013) (describing the 
“complementary” specializations of institutional investors and activist investors, where ac-
tivist investors specialize in monitoring company strategy and institutional investors special-
ize in assessing activist ideas). 
171. Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1044; see also id. at 1042-45 (describing the types of govern-
ance changes historically sought by pension funds). 
172. E.g., Press Release, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., CalPERS Approves Plan To Crack Down on 
Executive Compensation System; Believes that Fat Cat Pay Is out of Control (June 17,  
2003), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030617005632/en/CalPERS-Approves
-Plan-Crack-Executive-Compensation-System [http://perma.cc/7CCM-FG7U] (“Poorly 
designed compensation packages are having a disastrous impact on companies and share-
owners by emphasizing short-term or self interested behavior . . . . This plan will help curb 
the abusive practices by aligning corporate management with its owners and enhancing 
long-term superior performance.”); Press Release, Controller of the State of Cal., CalPERS 
Adopts Westly Executive Pay Proposals (Feb. 14, 2006), http://www.sco.ca.gov/Press-Re
leases/2006/pr017execPay0214.pdf [http://perma.cc/74XN-X8QM] (heralding CalPERS’s 
adoption of executive compensation clawbacks as a criterion in its proxy voting guidelines 
and arguing that “[o]ur retirees pay the price when companies misrepresent their perfor-
mance. Clawbacks make executives accountable”); see also Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Stake-
holder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation 37 (1997) (unpublished man-
uscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=41780 [http://perma.cc/WA2P-JARV] (finding that 
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pay votes that overwhelm the capacity of voting institutions to vote thought-
fully,
173
 that are clearly inconsistent with any prudent and rational way of con-
tracting with executives, and that result in the views of proxy advisors being 
the key determinant of outcomes.
174
 Pension funds vote yes on the same pay 
 
stakeholder pressure, including that by institutional investors, resulted in short-term com-
pensation becoming more sensitive to firm performance); id. at 12-13 (discussing calls by in-
stitutional investors for moderation of CEO pay). For a more recent example, see Athanasia 
Karananou & Olivia Mooney, Integrating ESG Issues into Executive Pay, Principles for Responsi-
ble Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. 6 (2016), http://www.unpri.org/download
_report/8534 [http://perma.cc/M2DD-LP5W], which analyzes ways to tie executive pay to 
environmental, social, and governance issues in the name of “sustainable value creation” and 
long-term business strategy. Principles for Responsible Investment is an organization advo-
cating for various ESG-related concerns on behalf of a group of signatories including ninety-
some pension funds (including CalPERS). Signatory Directory, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INV., http://www.unpri.org/signatory-directory [http://perma.cc/W5DX-KVZT]. 
173. Tkac, supra note 167, at 11 fig.2 (showing that pensions and unions constituted the bulk of 
the proponents of pay-related ballot measures in the 1992-2002 sample period); see also 
James F. Cotter et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis 
and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 979 (2013) (noting that the 2011 proxy sea-
son, the first year of required say-on-pay voting, entailed votes at over 2,200 companies); 
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1036-37 (1999) (describing the historical focus of la-
bor pension-related shareholders on executive compensation issues); Randall S. Thomas et 
al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Gov-
ernance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2012) (observing that the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees submitted the first shareholder proposal seeking a 
say-on-pay vote). 
174. Evidence exists that ISS’s views are the most important determinants of the outcomes in 
say-on-pay votes. Cotter et al., supra note 173, at 981 (summarizing findings that ISS rec-
ommendations had a “significant” effect on say-on-pay votes); id. at 989 (observing that an 
“against” recommendation from ISS “overshadow[s]” other performance factors such as the 
growth of CEO pay); id. at 1001 (describing trends suggesting ISS’s influence on say-on-pay 
votes is increasing); Holly J. Gregory, Lessons for the 2015 Proxy Season, PRAC. L. (Sept. 1, 
2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-578-4485 [http://perma.cc/8XRK-A4YL] (“It appears 
that ISS negative vote recommendations based on the perceived lack of board responsiveness 
to shareholder concerns (as evidenced by the failure to implement a successful shareholder 
proposal) was the leading factor associated with directors who failed to receive a majority of 
votes cast in an uncontested election in 2014.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 16 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050
.pdf [http://perma.cc/DT2J-P7P3] (describing studies suggesting that “proxy advisory firm 
recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcomes in the context of mandatory 
‘say-on-pay’ votes”). Even a study that purports to show that proxy advisor recommenda-
tions are not as influential as some contend finds that the advisors drive 6 to 10% of the 
vote. See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 
869, 906 (2010). Tellingly, negative recommendations by ISS often do not reflect changes in 
the pay plan—which ISS would have supported in prior years—but rather the company’s 
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plan for four years, and then vote no in the fifth year, because that year was a 
poor year economically for the company, signaling either that the prior four 
votes were uninformed or that say-on-pay is being used as a way to express 
general unhappiness when that spirit moves the market. 
Little apparent effort has flowed from pension funds to rationalize the cor-
porate governance republic, or to consider how pushing for corporate Califor-
nia and therefore for corporations to be subject to the immediate influences of 
stock market sentiment at all times would affect pensioners, most of whose 
funds should be rationally invested through index funds, who should have 
parts of their portfolio in debt, and who need continuing access to quality jobs 
and wage growth to live a dignified and secure life. For them, pension fund ac-
tivism would have been far better spent on issues like ensuring that corpora-
tions have appropriate risk management structures, fundamentally sound ac-
counting and business practices, and proper capitalization to handle the risks of 
their business plans. For that reason, the obsession of pension funds over re-
cent decades with causes like reducing takeover defenses, shifting executive 
compensation from cash to stock options, and other issues more directed to the 
extraction of short-term gains, rather than ones involving more fundamental 
questions of sustained long-term performance, seems to reflect the fact that 
those involved in corporate governance policymaking at pension funds have in-
terests quite different from those who are depending on a pension to fund their 
retirements.
175
 
 
current performance, making the vote less about the pay plan and more about expressing 
general unhappiness with the company’s stock price. See Ryan Kraus et al., When Do Share-
holders Care About CEO Pay?, CONF. BOARD 4 (2013), http://www.conference-board.org
/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB_DN-V5N16-131.pdf&type=subsite [http://perma.cc/LK6V
-SGDV] (“Our results provide clear evidence that shareholders, even those acting in the role 
of institutional shareholders, only weigh their own losses when deciding whether to approve 
a SOP ballot.”). There is evidence that the influence proxy advisors have over say-on-pay 
votes extends more broadly. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra, at 15 (“Recent 
studies, market participants, and other stakeholders agree that proxy advisory firms have 
influence on shareholder voting and corporate governance practices, but had mixed views 
about the extent of their influence.”). 
175. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS 
AND REGULATION 2 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015) (“Public sector 
pension funds and labour unions take the lead roles, acting through agents incentivised by 
prospects of reputational advancement. These actors target companies and challenge their 
managers with shareholder proposals and ‘just vote no’ campaigns. They thereby register 
their voice and affect outcomes, but from a secondary position and on an occasional basis. 
The cumulated governance activity is impressive, but none of it assures or very often results 
in constructive engagement by shareholders in the formulation of business policy at indi-
vidual firms. As to that, collective action problems and the problems of separation of owner-
ship and control persist.”); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism a 
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In this corporate republic, human investors are basically witnesses to a 
clash of agents. At best, the human investors can hope that their direct agents 
(the institutional investors) and their indirect agents (the managers of the 
public companies) will reach some constructive accommodation when push 
comes to shove. Focusing on just these layers of agency actually simplifies the 
typical situation. If a corporation makes a bid for another, the human investor 
will find the layers of agency compounded, because the institutional investors 
they directly invest in will often own both stocks. Likewise, when a hedge fund 
launches a proxy contest in support of its expressed desire for a corporation to 
change policies, a pension fund may well be invested in the hedge fund, at the 
same time as it is more heavily invested in an index fund committed to holding 
the target’s stock until it leaves the benchmark index. The pension fund may 
also own corporate debt securities of the target. And mutual fund families are 
not immune from these realities. The 2020 target retirement fund may well 
own the stock of the target and debt securities of the target. In this mix, of 
course, will be the proxy advisory firms that can tip the balance in even high-
salience cases. 
If those who get to suit up on behalf of human investors tended to act like 
human investors would seem to want, the bystander status of human investors 
might be less a source of concern. But, in the corporate governance game, the 
most vocal and powerful of the electorate will be those with investment hori-
zons the least aligned with human investors. This is true not just of hedge 
funds themselves, but even more importantly true of the pension funds and 
mutual funds. The pension funds making the most noise are often not the 
most prudently financed or invested.
176
 And the actively managed mutual 
funds—that is to say, the ones most likely to underperform as they depend on 
outguessing the market—and proxy advisors like ISS drive the voting out-
comes, not the index funds. 
Within this system, the voice of traditional lenders and other creditors has 
also gone down.
177
 With the increasing securitization of corporate debt, many 
 
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 231-32 (2001) (describ-
ing the private benefits that accrue to pension fund investors from sponsoring shareholder 
proposals, including enhanced political reputations and advancements in personal employ-
ment); sources cited supra note 169 (showing the paucity of stockholder proposals related to 
issues of fundamental risk and the plethora of proposals to tear down defenses, making it 
easier to remove directors and tie executive pay to market prices). 
176. David H. Webber, Is “Pay-To-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class 
Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2035, 2072-74 (2010) (finding that “the degree of the funds’ 
underfunding correlates positively with lead plaintiff appointments”). 
177. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist 
Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 706-08 (2008) (“An investor can pur-
 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1924 
companies do not have a traditional lender.
178
 And outside of distressed situa-
tions, the voice of creditors in monitoring corporate financial practices and lev-
erage is comparatively minor.
179
 A variety of factors, from low interest rates to 
competition among banks for lucrative underwriting opportunities, has con-
tributed to an easing of terms for companies seeking new loans. With the ad-
vent of terms like “covenant lite” to describe diminution in credit protection, 
reason exists to suspect that the risk-taking voice of equity has been amplified 
in part because the voice of creditors has reduced its volume.
180
 
 
chase the debt of a financially troubled company and then try to influence corporate matters 
by exercising or threatening to exercise its contractual and statutory rights as a debthold-
er . . . . Institutional investors increasingly are looking to the distressed debt market not only 
to make a quick profit, but also to create value by proactively influencing corporate govern-
ance.”). 
178. Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications 
for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, 1 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV.  
27, 27-28 (July 1995), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/95v01n2/9507edwa.html  
[http://perma.cc/LCA9-KUEF] (describing decrease in importance of commercial banks as 
source of funds for commercial borrowers); id. at 31 (attributing that decrease in part to in-
creased securitization); Taylor D. Nadauld & Michael S. Weisbach, Did Securitization Affect 
the Cost of Corporate Debt?, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 332, 332 (2012) (explaining that the market for 
collateralized loan obligations underpinned by corporate loans reached $540 billion in 
2007). 
179. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 
103 NW. U.L. REV. 281, 314 (2009) (noting that traditional investors in corporate debt such 
as mutual funds and insurance companies do not act aggressively even when their contrac-
tual rights are violated and only act if bond values plummet suddenly); id. at 294 (observing 
that traditional investors hold the vast majority of corporate bonds and engage in very little 
activism); see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Cor-
porate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1995) (summarizing the general corporate 
governance approach as viewing “managerial agency problems through the lens of equity in-
terests”). 
180. Covenant-light (or “cov-lite”) loans—loans where the covenants are tested much less fre-
quently than traditional loans—have been issued in increasing volume, passing their pre-
2008 peak in 2012. Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Co-
ordination 1-2 (Swedish House of Fin. Research Paper No. 16-09, 2016) http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2756926 [http://perma.cc/NHV3-UZSR]. The authors point out that this phe-
nomenon is a creature of the leveraged loan market, where loans are sliced up—syndicated—
and held by a broad set of investors. Id. at 2. The dynamics of this market are in flux in part 
due to relatively new leverage regulation from the Federal Reserve leading new nonbank  
actors to enter the market, competing with traditional banks. Christine Idzelis & Craig 
Torres, Risky Loans Shunned by Banks Are Booming in Wall Street’s Shadow, BLOOMBERG  
(May 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-22/wall-street-flouts 
-fed-standards-to-fund-high-risk-loans [http://perma.cc/399V-RKHF]; see also Tracy Al-
loway, Growth of ‘Cov-lite’ Loans Sparks Debate, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.ft
.com/content/723dfb5c-b0f8-11e3-9f6f-00144feab7de [http://perma.cc/4QFF-9Z76] (de-
scribing issuer pressure for less-restrictive covenants and incentives for banks to comply to 
 
who bleeds when the wolves bite? 
1925 
I am not revealing some undiscovered, obvious reality about our corporate 
governance system. This fundamental fact—that human investors are now 
largely spectators to the game—is known and occasionally kept in mind. Most 
prominently, it has been reflected in trying to address the reality that who we 
think of normatively as “owners” in the real sense do not exist. The most high-
profile of those efforts was to get CEOs to think like owners rather than as 
highly, but reasonably, paid salaried workers. Instead of steady captains of safe, 
stable ships, money managers wanted American CEOs to be risk takers, going 
hell-bent for equity gains, even if that meant hurting or compromising constit-
uencies like workers through downsizings or communities through plant clos-
ings and offshoring.
181
 Money managers, activists of many kinds, and other in-
terests called for management to get paid in equity, with the growth of stock 
options being among the first results of that advocacy—to align them with the 
so-called “owners,” those who hold corporate stock.
182
 These owners in turn 
called for more and more independent directors—fiduciaries with no prior ties 
to the company or its indirect competitors, suppliers, or customers—to check 
management even more.
183
 To make them think like owners, independent di-
 
avoid another bank acting as underwriter and because banks rarely hold the loans they orig-
inate for long); Michelle Davis, Borrowers Take Charge of Leveraged-Loan Market, BLOOMBERG 
(June 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-07/borrowers-take 
-charge-of-leveraged-loan-market-as-returns-shrink [http://perma.cc/9EL9-N5SB] (de-
scribing strong investor demand for loans). 
181. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 138, 138 (May-June 1990), http://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not 
-how-much-you-pay-but-how [http://perma.cc/FG6G-6W57] (observing in 1990 that 
CEOs were paid like bureaucrats and calling for CEO compensation to be more sensitive to 
corporate stock price because “[i]s it any wonder then that so many CEOs act like bureau-
crats rather than the value-maximizing entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their 
standing in world markets?”); Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, Bosses’ Pay: How Stock 
Options Became Part of the Problem, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2006), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB116718927302760228 [http://perma.cc/GJ2L-BD7T] (describing the effort by 
“[a]cademics, politicians and investors” to get CEOs’ pay shifted to stock-based compensa-
tion from cash). 
182. See LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 72 (2004) (describing the push by investors, econo-
mists, and regulators for increased use of performance-based compensation). See generally 
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in HAND-
BOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211 (2013) (surveying shifts in executive compensation 
and the theories for what drives those changes). 
183. TESSA HEBB, NO SMALL CHANGE: PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE ENGAGEMENT 47 (2008) 
(noting that demands for independent directors were at the forefront of CalPERS’ Focus 
List corporate governance campaigns from 1990 to 2000, during which 42% of the share-
holder resolutions put forward by CalPERS called for more independent boards and com-
mittees). 
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rectors were supposed to be paid in equity.
184
 The compensation of these inde-
pendent directors has grown enormously.
185
 And it creates strong incentives for 
directors to support transactions that involve a sale of the company and will 
therefore unlock the capital that they would otherwise be required to keep in-
vested.
186
 Not only that, because of the influence of proxy advisors and certain 
vocal institutional investors, independent directors who wish to remain on the 
independent director circuit—which likely comprises almost all of them—are 
highly sensitive to resisting institutional campaigns at any company on whose 
board they serve, for fear that they will be targeted for withhold campaigns at 
all companies with which they are affiliated. That fear is rational because the 
leading proxy advisory firms look at director performance at other companies 
when voting at particular companies, and so do the largest investment fund.
187
 
 
184. David A. Katz, Dealing with Director Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (May 22, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/22/dealing-with 
-director-compensation [http://perma.cc/8TSB-DWXN] (“As with executive pay, the theo-
ry is that full-value awards create closer alignment of leadership and shareholder inter-
ests.”); U.S. Executive Compensation 2015 Recap, Key Developments & Notable Trends, SIMPSON 
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC. 4, 21-22 (Mar. 31, 2016) [here-
inafter 2015 Executive Compensation Recap], http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source
/memos/firmmemo_fwcook_03_31_16.pdf [http://perma.cc/CS5D-N95W] (describing the 
institutional investor’s expectation that directors hold a substantial block of equity until they 
depart and be compensated primarily in equity during their service). 
185. Alice Lee & Herman Yang, 2014 Board & Committee Fees Report, 16 CSUITE INSIGHT 11 (2015) 
(“Among S&P 1500 boards, 38% are paying retainers of $200,000 or more, compared  
to just 18.4% five years ago.”). Other studies have yielded slightly different numbers but  
the same upward direction. 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, SPENCERSTUART 7 (Nov.  
2015), http://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20files/research%20and%20insight
%20pdfs/ssbi-2015_110215-web.pdf [http://perma.cc/63Y7-9D55] (reporting a 98% increase 
in average annual retainer from 2005 to 2015). 
186. See 2015 Executive Compensation Recap, supra note 184, at 4, 21 (describing how director com-
pensation tends to be at least half stock, if not closer to 60%, and the increasing use of stock 
ownership guidelines requiring directors to maintain company stock ownership at a mini-
mum of five times their annual cash retainer). 
187. E.g., Proxy Paper Guidelines 2016 Proxy Season: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to 
Proxy Advice, GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC 7 (2016) [hereinafter Glass Lewis 2016 Proxy  
Guidelines], http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2016_Guidelines
_United_States.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ARP-QWLX] (listing director “bad acts” prefaced by 
the observation that “[w]e believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a 
record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have 
held a board or executive position”); see also, e.g., Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities, 
BLACKROCK 2-3 (Feb. 2015), http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/literature/fact 
-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2G5-XTG2] (re-
porting that the firm “generally supports board nominees in most uncontested elections” but 
also “may withhold votes from certain directors” if, for example, “it appears the director has 
acted (at the company or at other companies) in a manner that compromises his or her relia-
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Less focus, oddly, was on those who claimed to be owners, i.e., the money 
managers who controlled the funds that held human investors’ wealth, than on 
the managers and directors of public companies. And the alignment between 
the interest of fund managers and human investors is, at best, imperfect, and at 
worst, out of sync.
188
 Funds under management, short-term performance 
benchmarks not aligned with fund investors’ horizons, and other factors drive 
their compensation. Nothing close to a serious attempt to subject fund manag-
ers to the risks of truly stuck-in 401(k) investors has been made. Pervading all 
efforts at alignment is the fundamental question: ultimately, are we good 
enough at creating efficient and reliable incentives that hold the full chain of 
agents accountable for representing the interests of the long-term investor to 
whom they ultimately owe the duties of loyalty? Ordinary people’s wages and 
wealth have stagnated, while the take of the financial classes—who control or-
dinary people’s capital—have soared.
189
 So far, acting as if alignment can be 
created by giving agents some form of instant, Tang-like ownership—which 
turns them after-the-fact into what an owner in the traditional sense would al-
ready be—has generated big picture results that have been less than outstand-
ing for human investors.
190
 
In this complicated design process, have we lost something? We have spent 
all kinds of time trying to make managers—a form of worker—have the incen-
tives the stock market wants. But have we forgotten that most Americans would 
rather the system generate the most wealth for workers? Have we aligned on 
the wrong dimension? And is this misalignment because of a prior shared sense 
 
bility in representing the best long-term economic interests of shareholders” (emphasis add-
ed)). Glass Lewis also uses a database to track directors’ performance across companies as a 
basis for their voting recommendations. Glass Lewis 2016 Proxy Guidelines, supra, at 6-7. 
188. See supra notes 75-78, 154-156, and accompanying text. 
189. See sources cited infra notes 243-244 . 
190. A prominent practitioner, who has represented many of the leading corporate boards in the 
United States, commented on the independent director class we now have in an incisive, 
not-for-attribution way: 
[Directors] don’t care enough. Boards are now overloaded with directors with ze-
ro ties to the company, financial or personal. They are not just disinterested. They 
are uninterested. They have no skin in the game at all. They didn’t participate in 
building the enterprise. They don’t know the key employees. They have no rela-
tionship with the history or story of the company. They are robotic in fearing per-
sonal embarrassment. They are there as part of a sea change responding to the 
problems of the past and only invite the problems of the future. They are the re-
sult of best practice visionaries who seem to always be looking backwards. 
  E-mail to Leon E. Strine, Jr. (Sept. 14, 2016, 9:08 PM) (on file with author). 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1928 
that “what was good for GM” was good for America,
191
 when it was thought 
that with jobs came growth, and as profits grew so did wages? 
Into this republic sliding toward full direct democracy, we must connect the 
role of the hedge fund activists. Now, this corporate republic has a concept of 
citizenship that is truly remarkable in its liberality. There is no waiting period 
or application process to be a citizen, or even to be elected to the highest office 
of this republic; buying stock is all that is required, and you can come and go 
largely as you please. In the case of activist hedge funds, the evidence of their 
behavior as corporate citizens is clear. As explained in Part II, activist hedge 
funds are not dissatisfied stockholders who decide to become active in chang-
ing policies of the corporation. Rather, they become stockholders for the first 
time to act on the corporation, change its business plans, and reap a profit over 
a period that can be as short as a handful of months, but is typically no longer 
than two to three years.
192
 Although the hedge fund will argue to other inves-
tors that its plans are durably valuable and maximize long-term returns, the 
hedge fund will itself not stay and reap the long-term gains for its beneficence. 
Rather, it will exit, take whatever gains have been baked into the stock price, 
and leave the actual upside and downside of the change it wrought to others. In 
fairness to the activist investors, they may actually hold the stock longer than 
the horizon of the traditional money manager whose votes will determine the 
outcome of any showdown vote on the proposal. Yes, index funds will also 
vote, but not using their own “brains” or independent investment perspective. 
Instead, the actively traded funds’ proxy advisor unit will drive the votes, and if 
the funds vote on long-term metrics, they will be voting in a way that does not 
match their investment horizon. Turnover rates reflecting their actual behav-
ior—buying and selling—would suggest they are looking to outguess market 
movements short-term and to reap gains off price movements in the immediate 
year or so, not off long-term growth as buy and hold investors—i.e., human 
investors. 
The actual holding strategies of both hedge funds and actively traded mu-
tual funds also act as a real world check on the issue of a key academic model—
the shareholder primacy model espoused by advocates of corporate California, 
which justifies a focus on stockholders’ best interests within corporate govern-
ance on the normative ground that it is best for everyone because the stock-
holders can only win as residual claimants if everyone else, including workers 
 
191. See supra note 142. 
192. See sources cited supra note 70. 
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and creditors, have their legitimate claims paid.
193
 This conception, of course, 
acts as if there is an ultimate reckoning of accounts, and that stockholders can 
only gain if that final accounting is one where everyone else is treated as they 
are entitled.
194
 But that is not how the world works. Certain stockholders can 
come in and reap trading profits, even if the underlying corporation’s ability to 
create value is compromised to the detriment of continuing stockholders, com-
pany workers, and creditors.
195
 In fact, those speculative profits do not come 
out of residue in any but a momentary sense, and because they do not come out 
of anything like a long-term summing up, those active traders who seek to reap 
them have no rational incentive to seek to maximize the ultimate residual value 
of the target firm, just its ability and willingness to generate gains for those 
who hold its equity over the active trader’s short-term horizon. And the ration-
alization that they can only exit favorably if the rest of an actively speculating 
market believes the target’s discounted cash flow value is attractive is less assur-
ing when the range of company trading prices over short-term periods is far 
more expansive and shifting than can plausibly be explained by fundamental 
changes in the company’s earnings prospects.
196
 
 
193. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other ‘constitu-
encies’ automatically. . . . A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods and services 
for consumers. The more appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit (and jobs). . . . 
Wealthy firms provide better working conditions and clean up their outfalls . . . .”); see also 
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 36 (2012) (describing assumptions for 
the “standard” model of the economic structure of a corporation, including that 
“[s]hareholders are the residual claimants in corporations, meaning they receive all profits 
left over after the company’s contractual obligations to its creditors, employees, customers, 
and suppliers have been satisfied”). 
194. STOUT, supra note 193, at 38-39. 
195. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Mor-
phable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828-35 (2006) (describing the use of equity de-
rivatives, complex ownership structures, and other techniques that have the effect of giving 
certain shareholders interests at odds both with other shareholders and their theoretical role 
as residual claimants); Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1071 (noting that hedge funds’ use 
of sophisticated strategies, including hedging and arbitrage, means that hedge funds are able 
to make money “without regard to whether the strategies they follow benefit shareholders 
generally”). 
196. Market studies have found a long-term increase in overall market volatility when measured 
on a daily basis. See generally Kenneth M. Washer et al., The Increasing Volatility of the Stock 
Market?, 19 J. WEALTH MGMT. 71 (2016). Some have found that financial innovations like 
high frequency trading and ETFs are associated with increased stock price volatility. See 
Itzhak Ben-David et al., Do ETFs Increase Volatility? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20071, 2014); X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, 
and Price Discovery 1-3 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691679 
 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1930 
If most of the intermediaries influencing corporate policies are in fact acting 
with a short-term perspective, why is it likely that the things that they advocate 
for will be wise for human investors? Active trading strategies are unlikely to 
beat the market.
197
 In fact, those who purport to advocate for stockholder di-
rect democracy tend to tout the semi-strong form of the efficient market hy-
pothesis in favor of their argument. But they ignore that the claim of the effi-
cient market hypothesis is not that a corporation’s stock price at any time is a 
reliable estimate of fundamental value, but rather that it is not possible to de-
sign a trading strategy that will outguess the guesses of the market as a 
whole.
198
 Stockholder direct democracy advocates then compound that by ar-
guing to place more and more immediate power behind the views of marginal 
traders—i.e., those traders who are most likely to be engaged in active, specula-
tive trading strategies dependent on their ability to outguess the market. 
Hedge funds, at least of the kind we are focused upon here, argue that their 
deviation from passivity can result in higher than market returns because they 
assume non-diversifiable risks and acquire attributes of control from which 
they can influence corporate policies and extract alpha.
199
 They also argue pas-
 
[http://perma.cc/EHT3-UHXR]. Others have attributed increased volatility to regulatory 
factors. Emily Glazer, J.P. Morgan’s James Dimon Says Increased Volatility Here To Stay,  
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jpmorgans-james-dimon-says 
-increased-volatility-here-to-stay-1459983813 [http://perma.cc/RG6C-EH2L]. Although by 
some measures market volatility is no higher today than before the financial crisis, after a 
heightened period from late 2007 through 2011, the likelihood of quick swings from low 
volatility to high volatility has increased markedly. Tracy Alloway, Market Volatility Has 
Changed Immensely, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2015-09-08/market-volatility-has-changed-immensely [http://perma.cc/7H39-CU4X]. 
Market participants attribute this, in part, to an increase in direct speculation on volatility 
indices. Id. 
197. See generally Malkiel, supra note 43 (collecting studies suggesting financial markets are effi-
cient enough that investors can’t earn above-average risk adjusted returns). 
198. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 41, at 692; cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573 
(“[O]utperforming the market as a passive [i.e., non-activist] stock picker is hard to do con-
sistently (and impossible if we assume the market to be efficient).”). 
199. See, e.g., About Us, TRIAN PARTNERS (2016), http://www.trianpartners.com/about-us 
[http://perma.cc/5JLP-DZGA] (“Trian’s strategy involves investing in public companies 
with attractive business models that Trian believes trade significantly below intrinsic value 
due to operating underperformance. Trian believes that its core competency is its ability to 
optimize the profitability of the companies in which it invests by working constructively 
with management and the board of directors to execute Trian’s operational and strategic ini-
tiatives designed to increase the company’s overall value.”); Our Company, THIRD POINT 
(2013), http://www.thirdpoint.com/our-company [http://perma.cc/RZY4-8RYF] (“Third 
Point employs an event-driven, value-oriented investment style. The Firm seeks to identify 
situations where we anticipate a catalyst will unlock value.”); Overview, STARBOARD 
VALUE (2016), http://www.starboardvalue.com/overview [http://perma.cc/MD4D-E9L6] 
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sionately for the right to secure a big stake before coming public because it is 
precisely the nonpublic information they possess—their plans to influence the 
target’s business strategy—that is not baked into their pre-13D disclosure pur-
chase price. The reason, therefore, that activists can supposedly beat a market 
return is that they can keep post-purchase gains based on their ability to 
change the company’s earnings potential in a way that will increase its share 
price. The industry’s ability to claim success in that regard is compromised, 
however, by a few realities. Even at the most optimistic of estimates, the re-
turns generated by hedge funds as a whole do not seem to exceed those of the 
market on a risk adjusted basis.
200
 And the most optimistic is not the most reli-
able. Public CEOs that manage corporations into insolvency do not tend to get 
second acts. But hedge funds fail regularly,
201
 and the industry-wide data about 
their returns is likely overstated in a material way by the failure to consider this 
reality.
202
 Of course, it is not surprising that hedge funds would fail more; after 
all, the argument is that they are taking more risk to get more gain. The ques-
tion, though, is why anyone who believes in the efficient market hypothesis 
would embrace the idea that hedge fund managers as a class were likely to beat 
 
(“[Starboard employs] a focused and fundamental approach to investing in publicly traded 
U.S. companies. Starboard invests in deeply undervalued companies and actively engages 
with management teams and boards of directors to identify and execute on opportunities to 
unlock value for the benefit of all shareholders.”). 
200. When comparing against benchmarks and adjusting for hedge-fund-specific data biases, 
studies have found that hedge funds materially underperform their relevant benchmarks. 
Mila Getmansky et al., Hedge Funds: A Dynamic Industry in Transition 21 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21449, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2645525 
[http://perma.cc/2ZV9-AHWD]. At least one analysis found that, in the aggregate, inves-
tors would have been better off putting money into Treasuries than hedge funds. Lack, supra 
note 160, at 14. The measurement time frame is very important. Studies examining returns 
before the late 1990s and early 2000s tend to find positive risk-adjusted returns, albeit not 
necessarily performances that materially exceed a benchmark index. Getmansky et al., supra, 
at 21. But even some of those studies find that their positive returns result from a limited 
number of months within a multi-year sample period. Id. Additionally, even when studies 
have found only short-term persistence in strong performance, evidence of long-term per-
sistence in strong performance is elusive. Id. at 24 (observing that overall evidence is 
“mixed” although most studies focused on hedge fund industry returns found persistence in 
the short term, if at all); see also Nir Kaissar, Hedge Funds Have a Performance Problem, 
BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Mar. 24, 2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly
/articles/2016-03-24/hedge-funds-have-a-performance-problem [http://perma.cc/W349 
-7VJ2] (showing that ten-year returns peaked for equity hedge funds in February 2000 and 
have declined by an order of magnitude since then). The same general decrease in returns 
exists for hedge funds focused on strategies other than equity trading, e.g., macro funds, 
Kaissar, supra. 
201. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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the market. Sure, there may be the fund manager who types Shakespeare for a 
decade or so, but that anomaly is likely to be just that. Investors who thought 
high-flying hedge fund activists were writing A Midsummer Night’s Dream ear-
lier this decade likely found their 2015 reports announcing record-breaking 
poor performance to read more like a disgraced politician’s “mistakes were 
made” speech.
203
 And the hedge fund industry’s overall performance has de-
creased steadily since the late 1990s,
204
 raising questions about whether hedge 
fund activists can continue to grow and find high-quality targets.
205
 More fun-
damentally, if it is now the case that hedge funds predominantly focus on con-
sistently profitable firms that they believe should pay out more to their inves-
tors now,
206
 there is less reason to think they are making the economy much 
more efficient and more reason to be concerned that they are perhaps pushing 
steady producers of societal wealth on a riskier course that has no substantial 
long-term upside. 
Another worrying trend in this republic is the unmooring of corporate citi-
zenship. Corporate citizenship is not tied to any natural conception of citizen-
ship, and so-called American corporations have a large international investor 
base and derive large portions of their revenues from off-shore operations. The 
adage that “what’s good for GM is good for America”
207
 is likely to induce jus-
tifiable eye rolling if it is applied to many American corporations now. In fact, 
many household names have abandoned the United States as their domicile al-
together, putting the chance to secure a tax haven and calmer governance con-
trols over any concern for national identity.
208
 American institutional investors 
have been happy to support these abandonments of our nation. 
No doubt, it would markedly overstate things to attribute stagnation in 
median wages, simultaneous explosive growth in executive compensation and 
pay for financial industry participants, and overall income and wealth inequali-
ty to the increasing ability of momentary stockholder majorities to influence 
 
203. See Jen Wieczner, Why Big Investors Are Finally Pulling Their Money out of Hedge Funds, FOR-
TUNE (Mar. 2, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/hedge-fund-investors 
-withdraw-returns/ [http://perma.cc/QCJ5-A367]. 
204. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra note 64 (discussing changes in activist targets from underperforming companies to 
profitable firms and an associated decrease in returns). 
206. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
207. See Wilson, supra note 142. 
208. Zachary Mider & Jesse Drucker, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Apr. 6, 2016,  
5:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion [http://perma.cc/DE9R 
-RGU9] (reporting that more than fifty U.S. companies have reincorporated in low-tax ju-
risdictions and twenty have done so in the last four years). 
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corporate behavior through the adoption of corporate governance policies 
moving corporations toward a form of direct democracy. But it would also be 
wrong to ignore the influence that enhancing the power of a stock market fo-
cused on immediate gratification has on the way public corporations approach 
doing business. Investing in their workers’ productivity to increase profits over 
the long term takes more time than offshoring jobs to nations where workers 
receive pay that none of the advocates of stockholder power would accept for 
themselves or their children. Keeping the market happy with stock buybacks, 
special dividends, or a tax-slashing inversion may involve less headache than 
sticking by a thoughtful, substantial program of long-term capital investment. 
Shortcuts become comparatively more tempting when those who wield the 
power seem more focused on near-term returns than cultivating sustainable 
wealth. 
Admittedly, these big picture facts cannot be solely or primarily attributed 
to policy moves within corporate law itself or to the increasing power of insti-
tutional investors and immediate stock market sentiment over public compa-
nies. Trends like vigorous international competition that accelerated rapidly 
since the 1970s, the reduction in legal protections for constituencies like orga-
nized labor, and evolving technologies have influenced how American public 
corporations have done business and had an effect on key issues like employ-
ment and wage growth, income inequality, and the extent to which corpora-
tions can engage in gain-sharing between their equity investors and other cor-
porate constituencies, such as workers and the communities in which the cor-
corporation operates. Likewise, with the globalization of not only product and 
service markets, but stock ownership itself, corporations have increasingly lost 
any genuine national identity. 
The intra-agent skirmishes of this corporate republic do not fit nicely with 
the needs of those agents’ supposed masters—human investors. As Part I ex-
plained, real humans are stuck in for materially longer periods of time, and 
they obtain most of their wealth through wages, rather than the markets. What 
wealth does come from the markets is derived from a mixture of equity and 
debt. These special attributes of human investors, distinct from the other 
members of the corporate republic, give them disproportionate exposure to 
whatever risks hedge funds generate for our country. As I discuss in the next 
Part, human investors face two main areas of exposure: as indirect investors in 
hedge funds themselves and as participants in the real economy businesses in 
which activist hedge funds intervene. 
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iv  
Hedge funds, as one peculiar class of agents in this corporate republic, have 
the potential to cause harm to human investors in two different capacities. One 
that is too often overlooked is that human investors bear risk as indirect inves-
tors in hedge funds themselves. The hedge fund industry’s growth has been in-
creasingly fueled by investments made by pension funds to which human in-
vestors are looking for support in their retirement. The other source of 
potential harm comes from the influence that activist hedge funds have on the 
policies of public companies. That influence involves, most obviously, the 
changes hedge funds generate when they target specific companies and those 
companies accede in whole or in part to the hedge funds’ demands. But both 
proponents and skeptics of hedge funds agree that the influence of activist 
hedge funds goes beyond the companies they specifically target because the po-
tency of hedge fund activism has an effect on the policies of companies not yet 
facing the wolf pack’s direct attack.
209
 Those who fear the wolf rationally have 
an incentive to do what it takes to avoid an encounter, by deciding to adopt 
strategies that make it less attractive to the wolves to mount an attack. 
A 
Although typically unable to invest in hedge funds on their own, human 
investors are still frequently directly exposed to hedge fund gains and losses. 
Human investors are locked out of direct investments in hedge funds them-
selves by a variety of paternalistic, if well-meaning, rules, which include re-
quirements that investors must be able to change their allocation of invest-
ments in 401(k)s at least once every three months,
210
 and by the reality that 
 
209. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1147-54; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 594 (noting that 
the threat of an activist engagement has been found to pressure nontargeted firms “to  
cut back on long-term investments and increase shareholder payout”); Martin Lipton,  
The Bebchuk Syllogism, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug.  
26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/26/the-bebchuk-syllogism/ [http://
perma.cc/57F9-HKZB] (“There is no way to study the parallel universe that would exist, 
and the value that could be created for shareholders and other constituents, if these pres-
sures and constraints were lifted and companies and their boards and managements were 
free to invest for the long term.”). 
210. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(1) (2015). Hedge funds typically impose a variety of 
requirements that make it difficult for investors to achieve instant liquidity. See, e.g., All 
Locked-Up, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9596328 [http://
perma.cc/9X4F-XQ9C]; Ross Ford et al., Liquidity: Overview of Hedge Fund Liquidity Struc-
tures, PREQIN (Dec. 2012), http://www.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/hf/Preqin_HFSL_Dec
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almost all hedge funds offer only unregistered securities and are thus prohibit-
ed from securing investments from anyone who is not a so-called “accredited 
investor” under Regulation D.
211
 But those prohibitions do not mean that hu-
man investors, or important societal institutions, such as our hugely subsidized 
university sector and many charities, do not bear investment risk if hedge 
funds fail or deliver returns lower than the market, on a risk-adjusted basis. It 
just means that human investors are dependent on the sophistication and fidel-
ity of pension boards and other fiduciaries. Count me skeptical that there has 
been an exponential growth in the base of sophisticated pension board fiduci-
aries, which renders them able to assess the quality and prudence of hedge 
fund investments well, at least in the absence of better data than are currently 
available.
212
 
The accredited investor exception has its origins in allowing rich investors 
to engage in caveat emptor transactions if they wished.
213
 I think of it as the 
Thurston Howell exception because that iconic figure from Gilligan’s Island 
comes to mind as the sort of person policymakers believed could proceed at his 
own risk because we did not particularly care if he got hurt.
214
 But that excep-
tion has ballooned into one that exposes far more than super-wealthy individu-
als to substantial risk from making investments about which they know too lit-
tle. Because pension funds, charities, and universities can qualify and claim to 
be sophisticated,
215
 they regularly now expose human investors and society as a 
 
_2012_Liquidity_Structures.pdf [http://perma.cc/RP9R-6UQ6] (describing hedge fund 
restrictions on redemptions). 
211. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016). 
212. See e.g., Elizabeth Parisian & Saqib Bhatti, All that Glitters Is Not Gold, ROOSEVELT INST. 
(2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/All-That-Glitters-Is-Not 
-Gold-Nov-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JC6-SHWJ] (noting that hedge funds were respon-
sible for significant investment losses for pension funds). 
213. See Report on the Review of the Definition of “Accredited Investor,” U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION 2 (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/review 
-definition-of-accredited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PVD-D42A] (remark-
ing that the concept of an accredited investor was “intended to encompass those persons and 
entities whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or 
ability to fend for themselves render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration pro-
cess unnecessary” (quoting Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Ben-
efit Plans, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015 (Jan. 16, 1987))). 
214. Id. Thurston Howell III has appeared at number nine on Forbes Magazine’s “Fictional 15” 
list of the wealthiest figures in popular fiction. Michael Noer, #9 Howell III, Thurston, 
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/11/thurston-howell-money-oped 
-books-cx_mn_fict1507_1211howell.html [http://perma.cc/2FJ7-9HJP]. 
215. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (including in the definition of accredited investor “any plan estab-
lished and maintained by a state, its political subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality 
 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1936 
whole to the risks that come with hedge fund investing. Many pension funds 
are not in fact well positioned to prudently select hedge funds or other non-
registered investments and may be attracted to those types of investments be-
cause they have not prudently funded and invested the pension fund in the 
past.
216
 Thus, they chase the impossible dream of using above-market returns 
to fill a hole left by previous underinvestment and poor investing, creating a 
probability that when the impossible dream does not come true, the hole is 
even larger. And although the direct investor who makes these investments is 
accredited, it is the human investor (who is supposedly unable to invest in 
these vehicles) who in fact bears the risk of investment losses. Making this sys-
tem even less rational is the reality that the lack of disclosure puts consumers 
like pension funds and college investment funds in a poor position to shop 
knowledgeably because track record information is unclear and unreliable, and 
fund managers seem to be able to tout publicly return records that put to the 
side their past failures. 
The other major question is whether hedge fund activism can actually scale 
in an effective and rational way, if the hedge funds who engage in the activism 
are to be a prudent investment for socially important institutions upon which 
human investors depend, such as pension funds, universities, and charities.
217
 
 
of a state or its political subdivisions, for the benefit of its employees, if such plan has total 
assets in excess of $5,000,000” and “[a]ny organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code . . . with total assets in excess of $5,000,000”); see also Cheffins & 
Armour, supra note 53, at 89-90 (describing how rule changes in the mid-1990s allowed 
greater institutional investor participation in hedge funds). 
216. See Parisian & Bhatti, supra note 212, at 4 (“[H]edge funds failed to deliver significant bene-
fits to any of the pension funds we reviewed.”); id. at 3 (arguing that pension fund motiva-
tion for selecting hedge funds was the “promise [of] outsized returns”). Some pension 
funds have gotten burned after they rushed to alternative asset managers, like hedge funds, 
to fill funding gaps. For example, after the dot-com crash caused steep losses, the Austin Po-
lice Retirement System moved almost half of its assets to alternative managers, only to expe-
rience another steep decline in the financial crisis. Julie Creswell, Pensions Find Riskier Funds 
Fail To Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/business
/pension-funds-making-alternative-bets-struggle-to-keep-up.html [http://perma.cc/RU6R
-DT78]. The Teacher Retirement System of Texas has similarly moved into alternatives, 
committing slightly under a third of its assets to various private equity and hedge fund 
managers to try to make up losses from the financial crisis. Michael Corkery, Pensions  
Bet Big with Private Equity, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
10001424127887323485704578258242293295894 [http://perma.cc/5TW7-5845] (describing, 
among other investments, a material stake in the hedge fund Bridgewater Associates). 
217. LO, supra note 56, at 16 (“As assets under management increase, it becomes progressively 
more difficult for fund managers to implement strategies that are truly uncorrelated with 
broad-based market indexes like the S&P 500.”). Concrete examples exist too. In a study 
conducted on the University of California’s twelve-year experiment with hedge fund invest-
ments, AFSCME Local 3299 found that that the University of California could have saved 
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As has been discussed, as hedge fund activism has grown, its targets have shift-
ed to profitable companies that they think can be even more so,
218
 but there is 
also evidence that returns from this shift are less substantial.
219
 At the same 
time, more money managers and more money are chasing what seem to be a 
finite set of high-growth opportunities,
220
 and that competition is vigorous, so 
it is not clear that hedge funds will be able to find value gaps that will produce 
the above-market returns required to justify their greater costs and risks as a 
larger industry,
221
 and the evidence to date is that industry-wide hedge fund 
 
$950 million in fees and generated the superior returns it sought by investing in low-cost, 
traditional asset classes. There was a strong, positive correlation between the University of 
California’s hedge fund-based returns and general market returns, showing that the Univer-
sity paid upward of $1 billion in fees for returns that largely mirrored the trends in the stock 
market. The University’s hedge fund program yielded a cumulative 112% in net returns 
whereas, excluding hedge fund investments, the returns were 168%. See Missing the Mark: 
How Hedge Fund Investments at the University of California Shortchange Students, Staff and 
California Taxpayers, AFSCME LOC. 3299 (Jan. 2016) http://www.afscme3299.org
/documents/media/WhitePaper_MissingTheMark.pdf [http://perma.cc/522R-7JS3]. Pen-
sion funds have also suffered because of unsuccessful investments in hedge funds. The New 
York Times reported in April 2012 that the $26.3 billion Pennsylvania State Employees’ Re-
tirement System had paid $1.35 billion in management fees during the prior five years and 
reported a five-year annualized return of 3.6%, well below the 4.9% median return among 
public pension systems. Creswell, supra note 216. In the wake of these developments, some 
pension funds have increased their allocation to passive management and reduced the  
money given to private equity funds and hedge funds. See, e.g., Timothy W. Martin, What 
Does Nevada’s $35 Billion Fund Manager Do All Day? Nothing, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19,  
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-does-nevadas-35-billion-fund-manager-do-all 
-day-nothing-1476887420 [http://perma.cc/7R68-ZEBC] (profiling the head of the Nevada 
Public Employees’ Retirement System, which has moved all of its holdings to passive funds 
but has returns over one-, three-, five-, and ten-year periods besting pension funds such as 
CalPERS). 
218. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
219. Brav et al., supra note 5, at 2726 (“[W]e find that the improvement in production efficiency 
associated with hedge fund activism is more pronounced when the activist targets opera-
tional issues, such as business strategies or asset sales, relative to when the activist targets 
general undervaluation or capital structure issues.”); see also id. at 2739 tbl.5 (providing sta-
tistics behind Brav et al.’s findings). 
220. John Authers & Robin Wigglesworth, Pensions: Low Yields, High Stress, FIN. TIMES (Aug.  
22, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/8a54a0c6-648b-11e6-a08a-c7ac04ef00aa [http://
perma.cc/F84K-B5WB] (describing pension deficits and pension funds’ focus on finding 
better-yielding—usually riskier—investment opportunities driven by the increasing number 
of retirees and low interest rates). 
221. Lack, supra note 160, at 15 (finding decreasing overall returns as the hedge fund industry has 
increased in size); cf. Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, Are Lower Private Equity Returns 
the New Normal?, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 3 (June 2016), http://cepr.net/images
/stories/reports/private-equity-performance-2016-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/N34C-TEFL] 
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returns generate either a small amount of return over a safer buy-and-hold 
market-based strategy, or in fact, are lagging the market.
222
 Because the activist 
hedge funds are pursuing strategies in strong tension with what the efficient 
market hypothesis and market data suggest about prudent long-term ap-
proaches to investment, these factors suggest reason for concern that it is so-
cially useful to have important institutions that ordinary investors depend up-
on investing in hedge funds, especially given the dearth of reliable and 
consistent information available about them.
223
 
B 
The other way that human investors are exposed to the risk of hedge fund 
activism is the one that is more often discussed. That involves the question of 
whether hedge fund activism has a positive or negative effect on the long-term 
performance of the public companies it targets. Because human investors bear 
risk as indirect investors in public companies and, more importantly, as work-
ers dependent on the economy’s ability to create and sustain good jobs, this is-
sue is very important. This exposure is not limited to firms directly targeted by 
activists. As Professors Coffee and Palia observe, summarizing studies on the 
topic, “[f]or every firm targeted [by activists], several more are likely to reduce 
R&D expenditures in order to avoid becoming a target.”
224
 A detailed survey of 
top managers and directors found that corporate boards were not only feeling 
increasing pressure to think and act short-term, but that boards and managers 
were themselves more and more likely to propose the types of corporate finance 
moves, such as increasing stock buybacks, that they perceived activist hedge 
funds would likely advocate.
225
 Other companies, perhaps including those in 
this country’s dynamic sectors, try to find ways to avoid the wolf. An incisive 
market participant argued to me that stockholder activism is having an influ-
 
(attributing the decrease in private equity returns in part to increased competition among 
private equity firms for deals and increased capital available to deploy). 
222. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
224. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 576 (summarizing studies on the topic). 
225. Dominic Barton et al., Rising to the Challenge of Short-Termism, FCLT GLOBAL  
8-10 (2016), http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fclt 
-global-rising-to-the-challenge.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Z8P-QPJJ]. Also, the propensity of 
managers and directors to say “more-vocal activist investors,” which was the most important 
driver of pressure for short-term performance, doubled in the three years since the last sur-
vey took place. Id. at 10. 
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ence on even the faster-growing segments of the economy.
226
 He noted that be-
cause even the most successful companies have been targeted by activists,
227
 
entrepreneurs in the technology space are insisting on securing a dual-class 
structure or other strong defenses if they go public, or they consider avoiding 
activism another advantage to remaining private.
228
 
For human investors, the overall trends as to the factors relevant to the 
question of if activism harms or helps them are, at the least, worrying. Ameri-
can public corporations seem to be spending much more of their free cash flow 
on stock buybacks, increasing dividends, and other tactics to guarantee imme-
diate payoffs than on research and development and other forms of long-term 
investment.
229
 For the stuck-in human investor, increased dividends have to be 
invested back into the very companies paying them out, and the same is basi-
cally true as to buybacks. And if the sources of those dividends or buybacks are 
funds that would have otherwise been invested in developing new products or 
services, which involve the prospect for greater employment opportunities and 
growth in the future, this choice of current consumption over future growth is 
problematic.
230
 Even Professor Brav, who is generally optimistic regarding the 
 
226. E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:44 PM) (on file with author). 
227. Id. Apple has been one recent activist target. See sources cited supra note 106. Other  
well-performing technology companies that have been recent activist targets include  
Microsoft, data-storage company NetApp, and design software maker Adobe Systems. Da-
vid Benoit et al., Activist Investor Report Card, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://graphics
.wsj.com/activist-investor/#FBHS [http://perma.cc/9CF4-KX68]; David Benoit & Vipal 
Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining American Companies?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712 
[http://perma.cc/U4KC-CHVW]; supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
228. A prominent venture capitalist made this point as well. In an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, Ben Horowitz argued that activist investors increase the likelihood that young, 
growing companies will refrain from going public. Joann S. Lublin, Venture Capitalist: Be-
ware of Activist Holders, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052702303292204577518733086203236 [http://perma.cc/Q7E5-VB2P]. 
229. In the second quarter of 2016, forty-four companies in the S&P 500 paid annual dividends 
exceeding their prior twelve month’s net income, reaching a new decade-high. Mike Bird et 
al., Dividends Eat up Bigger Slice of Company Profits, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/dividends-eat-up-bigger-slice-of-company-profits-1471565154 [http://
perma.cc/56XE-JDBF]. The time horizons of a company’s shareholders have been shown to 
affect managers’ decisions about investment—specifically, that “transient” ownership “sig-
nificantly increases” the likelihood that managers will cut research and development invest-
ment for the sake of earnings. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573-74 (quoting Brian J. 
Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. 
REV. 305, 307 (1998) (summarizing studies)). 
230. Taking a broader look at the effect of changes that shift power from management to share-
holders (including hedge fund activism) on target companies, one study found that compa-
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effect of hedge fund activism, admits that hedge funds’ tool boxes are limited 
and tend to be concentrated in corporate finance moves,
231
 as discussed in Part 
II. The reason for this, Brav candidly admits, is that most hedge fund managers 
are financial, not operational or management, experts and “are not experts in 
the specific business of the target firms.”
232
 
Another important attribute of human investors is that they are also likely 
to be invested not just in equity securities, but in debt securities.
233
 Without 
disparaging them, it is not clear that mutual fund families spend a great deal of 
time worrying about the implications of corporate governance arrangements on 
their investors in funds that focus on debt securities. As discussed, the voice of 
debt capital in corporate governance has decreased and tends to become loud 
only when firms are in actual distress.
234
 And under corporate law itself, the 
corporation’s lenders have no vote and are left to rely on triggering events of 
default and other extreme measures.
235
 Perhaps for this reason, some scholars 
have found that rather than creating additional firm value, hedge fund activism 
engaged in by equity investors has the effect of shifting wealth from debt capi-
tal to equity capital.
236
 For human investors, especially those in the years when 
 
nies experienced a “pop” in performance in the first year after the change, followed by a re-
verse in gains in terms of sales, profitability, and payouts. Jillian Popadak, A Corporate Cul-
ture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value 3-4 (Oct. 25, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345384 [http://perma.cc/56U6 
-SSST]. The author concludes that shareholder-centric governance reforms are a “dual-
edged sword,” by which she means that whatever short-term boost stockholders get is then 
followed by the risk of a longer-term decline that erases the gain and cuts long-run perfor-
mance. Id. at 4; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 574-76 (describing studies by re-
searchers who nominally fall on both sides of the activist debate but who all tend to find that 
activist targets reduce spending on research and development after an intervention; and 
summarizing the studies’ findings by stating that “it seems safe to conclude only that re-
search and development expenditures decline significantly in the wake of hedge fund pres-
sure,” but conceding that it is possible that targets “increase the profitability of their R&D 
investments” in the wake of an activist intervention). 
231. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741-44. 
232. Id. at 1755; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 591 (summarizing studies tending to show 
“[l]ittle evidence” that activist interventions promote sales growth or increases in assets). 
233. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, INV. COMPANY INST. (Sept.  
2014) http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [http://perma.cc/VE68 
-RXYD] (showing that 401(k) balances included at least 20% fixed income assets, measured 
as a percentage of assets). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 178-180. 
235. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 179, at 1075-77. 
236. See Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 194 & n.11, 224-25 (finding that hedge funds’ targets expe-
rienced a “significant” post-intervention increase in leverage, often sold off assets, and were 
less profitable, but paid out more returns to equity); Hadiye Aslan & Hilda Maraachlian, 
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they actually are relying on their investment portfolio to pay for tuition or their 
expenses during retirement,
237
 value shifts of this kind are of dubious, and 
even perhaps negative, value, especially when solvency risks are considered.
238
 
Perhaps more troubling, there is evidence that equity gains from activism 
come from the workers of the target firm. Because human investors owe most 
of their wealth to their ability to find and hold a job, and from the wages that 
they receive from their labor,
239
 transfers from labor to equity are likely to hurt 
human investors. In one paper by respected scholars, the authors referred to 
the activists reducing “labor rents.”
240
 That is an interesting usage, which sug-
gests that the workers at the target firm were exploiting the equity holders. 
There are other words than “interesting” for this usage, given the overall trends 
during the last thirty years of American economic history. During this period, 
the traditional share that workers have received from increases in their produc-
tivity has been eroded substantially to their detriment and to the benefit of eq-
 
Wealth Effects of Hedge Fund Activism 30 (Feb. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.efa2009.org/papers/SSRN-id1428047.pdf [http://perma.cc/CD3M-79FS] (“[P]art of 
the overall gain to stockholders is the result of a wealth transfer from bondholders.”); see also 
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588-89 (summarizing studies showing, for example, “that 
there is a wealth transferred from bondholders to shareholders”); Chris Plath, Shareholder 
Activism: Impact on North American Corporate Sectors, MOODY’S INV. SERV. 1 (Mar.  
11, 2014), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/activist-interventions-round 
table-2014-materials/2014_03_shareholder-activism-impact-on-na-corporates.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5WLE-BBQT] (noting that activist interventions are “[i]n most cases . . . a credit-
negative for bondholders”). But see Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1147 (“[S]ummary statis-
tics for the full universe of activist interventions do not reveal higher odds of financial dis-
tress than for non-targeted public companies.”); Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1732, 1767 
(finding no shifts from equity to debt because even though leverage goes up, many targets 
have no substantial long-term debt, even after increasing near-term payouts). 
237. See discussion supra Part I. 
238. See Jin Xu & Yinghua Li, Hedge Fund Activism and Bank Loan Contracting 25 (AFA 2011 Den-
ver Meetings Paper 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573217 [http://perma.cc/J8F9-57XD] 
(“[W]e find that hedge fund activism significantly increases the credit risk of target firms.”); 
see also Plath, supra note 236, at 1. Human investors also depend on life insurance, and life 
insurance companies often buy debt securities in order to fund their obligations to pay off 
policies. Insurance companies buy their bonds looking for the correct durational structure 
and risk profile, rather than an investment with which they can take an aggressive posture. 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 179, at 296. 
239. See discussion supra Part I. 
240. Brav et al., supra note 5, at 2753; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 589 (noting that wag-
es and hours worked at target firms stagnate and that the total number of employees may 
decrease). 
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uity investors.
241
 Given this undisputed reality, as well as stagnation in median 
income and wage growth,
242
 post-activist intervention gains that result from 
reducing labor rents might well be considered yet another deepening of income 
inequality that reduces the wealth of the many to benefit the few.
243
 Human in-
vestors care not just about whether corporations make money, but also about 
how. Gains that come from squeezing out workers and squeezing those who 
remain do not promise wealth gains for most human investors, but wealth 
losses. 
Another related issue is the potential costs to human investors in the future, 
in terms of slower job, wage, and overall economic growth, if hedge fund activ-
ism tends to result, both for direct targets of activism and, as a systemic matter, 
for the overall market, in reduced capital investments. Respected scholars have 
concluded that after hedge fund activists succeed, targeted firms’ research and 
development spending materially decreases.
244
 Now, there are of course con-
 
241. Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. 4 fig.2 (Jan. 6, 
2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnation-in-nine-charts.pdf [http://perma.cc
/4MFT-HXKS]. 
242. Josh Bivens et al., Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. 4-5 (June 4, 2014), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/65287.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TYG9-VF2M] (showing that wages for the vast majority of workers have either 
stagnated or declined since 1979, extending even to college degree holders). 
243. Mishel et al., supra note 241, at 3 fig.1. 
244. One recent study concludes: 
 We provide evidence that the presence of short-term investors is associated with 
cuts in long-term investment to generate earnings surprises, leading to temporary 
boosts in the stock price. Short-term investors benefit from temporarily inflated 
stock prices as they subsequently leave the firm so that only long-term sharehold-
ers suffer from the reduction in long-term investment and equity value. 
  Martijn Cremers et al., Short-Term Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value 27 
(July 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2720248 [http://perma.cc
/7E7E-NG7C]; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 574-77, 590 (noting that activist inter-
ventions are associated “with a decline in R&D and long-term investment”); Krishnan et al., 
supra note 64, at 309 tbl.9 (noting that research and development spending decreased post-
intervention in the aggregate for a collection of 396 of 447 interventions studied); supra 
notes 229-232 and accompanying text. But see Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 220-21 tbl.VIII 
(finding negative effects to creditors but no drop in spending on research and development 
in the first year after a hedge fund activist intervention, and suggesting that other activist in-
terventions reduce research and development more than hedge fund interventions). There is 
also more generalized evidence suggesting short-term shareholders decrease companies’ re-
search and development spending. Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on 
Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 307 (1998) (finding that firms with 
more short-term shareholders are more likely to cut research and development expenses to 
meet short-term targets). As discussed elsewhere, interventions by certain subsets of activist 
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tradictory arguments and evidence that hedge fund activists increase the short-
term harvest on prior investments and make research and development more 
efficient.
245
 What is worrying, of course, is that most of us realize that it is pos-
sible, over some period, to milk an asset (human or machine) to squeeze out 
more. When a new coach or boss comes in, when the workforce is terrified by 
the prospects of job cuts, when output is pushed to the max in a blitz, results 
can go up.
246
 But if the changes are not durable and do not involve policies that 
are sustainable and nurture future growth, the immediate years of robust har-
vest can portend future famine. Surveys of corporate managers done by schol-
ars have found that: 1) managers feel the pressure to deliver short-term profits 
and to develop business plans using a horizon that they believe is counterpro-
ductively short-term;
247
 and 2) managers admit to refusing to do projects with 
very positive long-term prospects because they would involve reductions in 
GAAP earnings in the near term and therefore a feared negative immediate 
stock market reaction.
248
 Other scholars have looked at the effect of short-term 
pressure on research and development output and found similar trends.
249
 
 
investors are associated with an increase in research and development. Krishnan et al., supra 
note 64, at 309 tbl.9. 
245. Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation? 6-7  
(2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409404 [http://perma.cc
/2W5S-CSZA] (noting that target firms decrease research and development spending, but 
do not see a decrease in the quality and quantity of patents); see also Coffee & Palia, supra 
note 6, at 576 (noting that activist targets may increase profitability from research and de-
velopment after an activist engages with the company). 
246. Cf. Jon Bois, Should You Fire Your Coach Midseason? A Statistical Breakdown, SB NATION (Apr. 
10, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/2012/4/10/2936696/head-coach-fired-stats 
[http://perma.cc/UT2D-5X3E] (reviewing changes in professional sports teams’ intra-
season records when a head coach is fired midseason and showing a slight boost from such 
firings in the aggregate—with a great deal of underlying variation). 
247. Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Investing for the Long Term, MCKINSEY  
& CO. (Dec. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal 
-investors/our-insights/investing-for-the-long-term [http://perma.cc/5N9M-PRYY] (sur-
veying directors and C-suite executives and finding that 79% felt “especially pressured” to 
demonstrate strong financial performance over a period of two years or less and that 86% of 
respondents believed that using a longer time horizon would positively affect corporate per-
formance). Managers are possibly pressured to the point of engaging in financial misreport-
ing. Natasha Burns et al., Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial 
Misreporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 454 (2010). 
248. See John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANA-
LYSTS J. 27 (2006) (surveying a material group of executives willing to trade long-term 
growth for smoother earnings). 
249. For example, one study, using research-analyst coverage as a proxy for pressure to focus on 
the short term, found that the number of granted patent applications and citations of those 
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Admittedly, there is also some evidence that the intervention of activist hedge 
funds who are willing to place experienced business executives on target boards 
and remain as investors for a period more like a typical private equity investor 
is not associated with declines in research and development. In contrast, the re-
sults in interventions by hedge funds who are more short-term and less fo-
cused on a strategy of improving their targets’ long-term performance is asso-
ciated with declines.
250
 
Setting aside the effect activism has on the internal workings of its targets, 
how stock prices increase matters to human investors. For example, a good deal 
of the stock price gains that scholars claim result from hedge fund activism 
come in the form of returns from targets pushed or nudged into sale mode.
251
 
 
applications by other parties was inversely related to the intensity of analyst coverage. Jie 
(Jack) He & Xuan Tian, The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation, 109 J. FIN. 
ECON. 856 (2013). 
250. One interesting example of this work is a study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, which has a 
blended private equity and hedge fund model, where researchers were afforded unusual ac-
cess to the fund’s private records. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence 
from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093 (2009). Hermes 
is generally regarded as a strong performer and the researchers determined that over 90% of 
the fund’s excess return was related to activism. Id. at 3096. The vast majority of interven-
tions were never public and involved “numerous meetings and telephone calls” both with 
senior executives as well as other executives, such as divisional managers. Id. at 3109 tbl.5. 
The fund’s median holding period was around two-and-a-half years, although that masks 
material variation, with Hermes holding many of its targets closer to three to four years. Id. 
at 3107 tbl.3. This is materially longer than results recorded studying hedge funds more 
broadly. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 567 (summarizing studies). Intervention by 
Hermes was connected with an increase on return on assets that was sustained after the fund 
exited the investment. Becht et al., supra, at 3097, 3118 tbl.10. Although Hermes often called 
for asset sales and other typical activist goals, its goals were as often operational in nature, 
involving calls for changes in company strategy, as often as they were financial, involving 
changes in the firm’s payout policy. Id. at 3112 tbl.6 (comparing the “Financial policies” cate-
gory of goals with the “Other policies” category). Even when viewed in this comparatively 
positive light, though, Hermes’s interventions may not have been universally positive for 
human investors: in twenty-eight out of thirty interventions, at least one of the fund’s goals 
included asset sales or restrictions on new investments, id. at 3097, and companies targeted 
for restructuring by the fund substantially decreased the number of their employees after the 
fund’s intervention, id. 
251. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1759; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588 (“[C]hanges in the ex-
pected takeover premium, more than operating improvements, account for most of the stock 
price gain, both in short-term and long-term studies.”); William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund 
Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat 13 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 16-20; Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law 
Paper No. 330/2016) (Sept. 1, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2835610 [http://perma.cc
/MU7Q-JS7S] (summarizing studies and observing that “[t]here is no question that activ-
ism prompts mergers”); see also Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, The Game of ‘Activist’ 
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It is, of course, the case that hedge funds sometimes come in on the buy side to 
argue that the buyer is making an improvident acquisition, sometimes an ac-
quisition urged by another activist.
252
 What seems less clear is that there is any-
thing like symmetry in this context, as it seems unlikely and not borne out by 
experience that hedge funds have often come into ownership of acquiring firms 
to block an improvident acquisition.
253
 By contrast it has often been the case 
that hedge funds have bought into corporations and pushed them to sell them-
selves.
254
 There is evidence, in fact, that activism aimed at encouraging the tar-
get company to sell itself provides the best returns for the activists.
255
 And to 
the extent that some hedge funds enter the target side to goose up an already 
large premium, the potential for negative effects to employees and communi-
ties grows, as the only way for the buyer to maintain the profitability of the 
surviving entity is to jack up the “synergy gains” from the merger, gains that 
often involve cutting jobs, slashing wages, and closing operations in some 
communities. In other words, activism of this kind can actually increase the 
dangers of mergers to human investors. 
Human investors experience the benefits and risks of this sort of merger or 
sale differently from their agents. For one thing, target-side gains must be 
weighed against buy-side losses. A good deal of evidence exists that mergers 
 
Hedge Funds: Cui Bono?, INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 18 (“[T]he large gains realized 
by hedge funds [came] from getting targeted companies sold off.”). 
252. Bratton, supra note 46, at 1426. 
253. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 tbl.I (noting that 2.4% of studied hedge fund activism in-
volved buying the shares of an acquirer in a pending acquisition to block the deal or push for 
better terms). 
254. See id. (noting that 14% of studied hedge fund activism involved urging the sale of a target 
to a third party). See generally Nicole M. Boyson et al., Activism Mergers, J. FIN. ECON. (forth-
coming 2017) (noting that the probability of a company receiving a takeover bid is three 
times larger for companies in which a hedge fund switches from being a passive investor to 
an activist investor in the company, compared to companies that did not experience such a 
switch). 
255. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1759; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588. See generally Allaire & 
Dauphin, supra note 251 (noting that the most lucrative opportunities for activists involve a 
sale of the target company or a spinoff of some of its assets). One troubling case study on 
this point involves Timken Steel, by all accounts a well-run midwestern steel manufacturer 
that had delivered steady profits and was beginning to reap the rewards of a multi-decade 
investment program, but became a target for an activist urging the company to sell or break 
itself up to achieve a higher market value. Nelson D. Schwartz, How Wall Street Bent Steel, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/business/timken-bows-to
-investors-and-splits-in-two.html [http://perma.cc/RVJ5-XG4N]. The company ultimately 
acceded to the activist’s demands and split apart, delivering a strong stock price return but 
creating great uncertainty about the two new companies’ respective futures. Id. 
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are often injurious to the buying firm and its stockholders.
256
 If human inves-
tors tend to be diversified and a merger involves two public companies, it will 
often, if not usually, be the case that the human investor has a stake in both 
sides of the merger.
257
 The question for the human investor is whether the 
costs of the merger outweigh the benefits, a question that cannot be answered 
without evaluating the costs to the buying firm and whether the wealth that 
will be generated by the single entity after the merger exceeds that which 
would have been expected had the firms continued to operate independently. 
What is likely, as scholars have long detailed, is that the acquirer in a merger 
will not do well, and for many mergers, it is not clear that the net gains to di-
versified investors from the premiums paid to them as owners of targets are 
outweighed by the collective losses.
258
 
Those stock price losses may not constitute the only way human investors 
lose out in a hedge fund-induced merger. For human investors, of course, the 
other costs involved in mergers—which can often involve job losses for work-
ers, demands on state and local governments to provide subsidies as a cost of 
keeping operations, and the diverse harms that can occur when an acquisition 
is done at such a high premium that the resulting firm cannot pay its creditors 
from operations after the merger and must enter bankruptcy
259
—are very real 
and little focused on by corporate law scholars. 
 
256. See, e.g., Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-
Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 757 (2005) (noting that acquiring-
firm shareholders lost twelve cents per dollar spent on acquisitions). 
257. Maria Goranova et al., Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlap-
ping Institutional Ownership, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1114, 1115 (2010) (“A cursory analysis of 
the 2,688 M&A deals involving publicly traded companies during 1998-2004 from the 
Bloomberg database reveals that in 41.7 percent of the deals, the acquiring and target firms 
shared some of the same owners.”). 
258. Bratton, supra note 46, at 1424-25 (observing that the “merger premium appears in most 
cases to be so substantial as to arrogate the entire merger gain to the selling shareholders,” 
and that a study looking at combined gains and losses from mergers from 1991 to 2001 
found mergers caused a combined loss of $90 billion in stock price terms). 
259. See Neil Fligstein & Taek-Jin Shin, Shareholder Value and the Transformation of the U.S. Econ-
omy, 1984-2000, 22 SOC. F. 399, 401 (2007) (“[M]ergers subsequently led to more layoffs, 
consistent with the shareholder value perspective that emphasizes that firms needed to de-
ploy their resources more efficiently as they reorganized.”); Paul M. Healy et al., Does Corpo-
rate Performance Improve After Mergers? 15 (NBER Working Paper No. 3348, 1990) (finding 
that the median number of employees and employee growth rate at merged firms decline 
post-merger); William D. Schneper & Mauro F. Guillén, Stakeholder Rights and Corporate 
Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 263, 275 (2004) 
(summarizing studies showing that hostile takeovers tend to result in job cuts). See generally 
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE 
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In certain activism campaigns, activists have set off a chain of events that 
have caused a transfer in wealth from society as a whole to equity investors. For 
example, to the extent that activists have pushed for inversion transactions that 
reduce the duty of previously American corporations to pay taxes,
260
 the bur-
den to fund important American priorities like national defense, health re-
search, transportation, technologies to address climate change, higher educa-
tion, and other priorities that matter to Americans—and that provide a support 
structure within which businesses operate—is shifted to others. Not only that, 
hedge fund activism has spurred mergers and other activities, such as plant 
closings and consolidations, that involve wealth transfers to the corporations 
from society.
261
 That does not just involve the obvious costs, such as increases 
 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (arguing that hos-
tile takeovers enable private benefits even when they are socially undesirable). 
260. Many activists have indeed pushed for inversion transactions in the recent inversion  
wave. See, e.g., David Benoit, Activist Firms Join Tax-Deal Push, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3,  
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-firms-join-tax-deal-push-1407124167 [http://
perma.cc/CAW8-SMWG] (describing the hedge fund Mercato shopping an inversion in-
volving InterContinental Hotels Group PLC); Liz Hoffman & Rob Copeland, Hedge  
Funds Bet Big on Overseas Tax Deals, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/hedge-funds-bet-big-on-overseas-tax-deals-1406330775 [http://perma.cc/82EQ 
-WY8B] (describing Sachem Head calling for Helen of Troy Ltd. to find a U.S. buyer for in-
version purposes). 
261. See, e.g., Liz Moyer, 2 Senate Democrats Introduce Bill To Curb Activist Hedge Funds,  
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/business/dealbook/2-sen 
ate-democrats-introduce-bill-to-curb-activist-hedge-funds.html [http://perma.cc/4N3U 
-BBEC] (explaining that a bill designed to limit hedge fund activism was inspired by a small 
town in Wisconsin whose economy was devastated after activist fund Starboard Value tar-
geted the Wausau Paper Company, which led to the closing of a paper mill and the elimina-
tion of more than a hundred jobs). In the case of Wausau, the hundred jobs were only the 
beginning—a total of 450 jobs were predicted to be eliminated shortly after Starboard an-
nounced its program. John Schmid, Changes at Wausau Paper To Have a Ripple Effect, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 24, 2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/business/changes-at 
-wausau-paper-to-have-a-ripple-effect-ko3hkhm-136163678.html [http://perma.cc/ZV7D 
-7GGE]. The layoffs were predicted to remove at least $72 million a year from central Wis-
consin’s economy. Id. But see generally Alon Brav et al., Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curi-
ous Case of the Brokaw Act (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2860167 [http://perma.cc/3HED-VWJK] (examining the events driving the 
Brokaw Act and arguing that activists were not the cause of the mill closures). Other recent 
examples abound across many sectors of the economy. Design software company Autodesk 
cut 10% of its workforce within two months of an activist disclosing its stake. Kshitiz  
Goliya, Autodesk To Cut Jobs by 10 Percent as It Transitions to Cloud, REUTERS (Feb.  
3, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-autodesk-restructuring-idUSKCN0VC1OR 
[http://perma.cc/W6EZ-5HLS]. Rolls-Royce said it would cut three thousand jobs in its 
aerospace and marine businesses after an activist began agitating for change. Robert Wall, 
Rolls-Royce To Cut More Senior Management Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www
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in government expenditures for unemployment and other dislocation costs 
when workers are displaced, but also involves the arbitrage corporations en-
gage in with affected communities when they are squeezed by stockholders. In 
a case that hits close to home for me, in the activism campaigns at DuPont and 
Dow that resulted in their decision to merge, any resulting gains to equity 
holders will involve direct shifts from taxpayers in Delaware, Iowa, and Indi-
ana.
262
 In Delaware alone, DuPont and its to-be-named agricultural spin-off 
 
.wsj.com/articles/rolls-royce-to-cut-more-senior-management-jobs-1454013670 [http://
perma.cc/S8YU-8T48]. Packaged foods company ConAgra cut one thousand jobs and 
moved its headquarters from Omaha to Chicago at an activist’s behest. Barbara Soderlin, Ja-
na’s Still Hungry: ConAgra’s Activist Investor Is Sticking Around, Which Means More Changes 
May Be on the Way, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (June 7, 2016), http://www.omaha.com
/money/jana-s-still-hungry-conagra-s-activist-investor-is-sticking/article_612c8b4f-6bcf-5a
5f-93df-8299d279fd4f.html [http://perma.cc/MB38-BM2T]. Qualcomm provides another 
example, having announced plans to cut around 15% of its workforce after an activist took a 
stake in the company. Liana B. Baker, Qualcomm President Says Splitting Company May Not 
Create Value, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-pres
ident-idUSKCN0R32HL20150903 [http://perma.cc/7S9D-XD8P]. Still another example is 
Macy’s, the department store chain. After activist Starboard took a stake in Macy’s, it  
began agitating for Macy’s to split its property portfolio into separate joint ventures, arguing 
that the stock market was not giving Macy’s adequate “credit” for those holdings. Unlocking  
Value at Macy’s, STARBOARD VALUE 4-5 (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.starboardvalue.com
/publications/Starboard_Value_LP_Presentation_M_01.11.16.pdf [http://perma.cc/3UMY 
-TX73]. Macy’s ended up cutting costs by laying off thousands of workers and closing de-
partment store locations. Suzanne Kapner, Macy’s To Cut Costs, Thousands of Jobs, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/macys-to-cut-costs-thousands-of-jobs-145211
5239 [http://perma.cc/WXK4-GY22]. DuPont and its spin-off, Chemours, cut thousands of 
jobs and closed plants as part of their efforts to address an activist intervention. See sources 
cited supra notes 246-247. Over a decade earlier, a distant descendant of the DuPont Com-
pany, Hercules Inc., was approached by corporate raider cum activist Samuel Heyman. Reid 
Champagne, Recalling Hercules, DEL. TODAY (Dec. 2008), http://www.delawaretoday
.com/Delaware-Today/December-2008/Recalling-Hercules [http://perma.cc/TV47-6PTY]; 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Corporate Raider Tries a Moneyless Coup, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,  
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/11/business/corporate-raider-tries-a-moneyless 
-coup.html [http://perma.cc/DNE2-TNLZ]. Against that backdrop, Hercules went from 
10,000 employees in 2000 to 4,700 in post-activist 2008 when it was purchased by a com-
petitor. Joseph N. DiStefano, Hercules Inc. Sold; Another Headquarters To Leave Area, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (July 12, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-07-12/business/25245304_1_her
cules-shareholders-hercules-chief-executive-officer-dow-chemical [http://perma.cc/2BE2 
-54V6]. In a twist, Hercules’s acquirer was later acquired by Ashland Inc., which has  
more recently shed businesses and jobs at the behest of a different activist. Jack Kaskey  
& Brooke Sutherland, Ashland Pushed by Jana Seen Higher with Split, BLOOMBERG (May  
28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-28/ashland-pushed-by-jana 
-seen-higher-with-split-real-m-a [http://perma.cc/H8AW-ZM47]. 
262. Joseph N. DiStefano, In Delaware, New Incentives for Wealthy DuPont and Dow, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20160328_In_Delaware
__new_incentives_for_wealthy_DuPont_and_Dow.html [http://perma.cc/GZ9V-DD8S]; 
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asked for and received subsidies from the state and county governments, cost-
ing other taxpayers over $57 million over four years for keeping downsized op-
erations in Delaware.
263
 These operations are downsized in the important sense 
of involving operations that employ at least 1,700 fewer workers, many of 
whom were skilled scientific researchers and technical workers.
264
 The hedge 
fund-inspired merger itself was leveraged by DuPont and Dow to extract value 
from society itself to give to its hungry equity owners. Whether the merger—
which involves two huge science corporations becoming one in order to then 
become three—will generate more jobs and wealth for Americans in the long 
term remains to be proven. What is certain is that lots of corporate advisors 
and others will have generated huge fees when the tumult settles, lots of hu-
man investors will have lost jobs, and the affected communities will either have 
to look to their human citizens to make up for the revenues lost or cut the pub-
lic services they would otherwise have delivered. 
Admittedly, no one wants executive rent seeking or empire building for its 
own sake. Perhaps hedge funds are operating on companies that face slack 
competitive pressures to otherwise be efficient in deploying capital? Perhaps 
they squeeze oligopolies? I suppose this story would be more plausible had we 
not just gone through nearly fifty years of robust and ever-growing interna-
tional competition. Yesterday’s Japan became today’s China, without lessening 
the vigor of Japanese competition, or Korean, or German, or Swedish for that 
matter. Even without hedge funds, private equity firms, strategic acquirers, and 
institutional money managers have had sharp eyes on American public compa-
nies. Without doubting that inefficiency will always tend to creep into some 
organizations, the overall vigor of competition seems to belie the idea that large 
pockets of “fat” exist that can be cut, cost-free. Thus, fear that what may be oc-
 
Christopher Doering & Kevin Hardy, $17M Deal: No DuPont Ag HQ, but No Jobs Lost Either, 
DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agricul
ture/2016/02/19/iowa-loses-ag-headquarters-new-dow-dupont/80561874 [http://perma.cc
/BMJ4-A9XW]; Scott Goss et al., How Delaware Outhustled Other States To Win DuPont  
Ag Unit, NEWS J. (Feb. 21, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/02 
/20/how-delaware-outhustled-other-states-win-ag-unit/80633980 [http://perma.cc/SS9P 
-NTHU]; Jeff Mordock et al., Spinoffs To Stay in Delaware After Dow-DuPont Merger, NEWS 
J. (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/02/19/dupont-dow 
-name-delaware-headquarters-ag-unit/80599772 [http://perma.cc/HN74-LGU9]; Press 
Release, Office of Governor Markell, Governor Signs Commitment to Innovation Act  
(Mar. 17, 2016), http://news.delaware.gov/2016/03/17/governor-signs-commitment-to-in
novation-act [http://perma.cc/PZW3-JYEX]. 
263. Mordock et al., supra note 262. 
264. Beryl Lieff Benderly, DuPont Cutbacks Send a Chill Through Delaware’s Science Community, 
SCI. AM. (June 23, 2016), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dupont-cutbacks-send
-a-chill-through-delaware-s-science-community [http://perma.cc/H7UR-QP8X]. 
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curring are cuts in investments in “muscle” are not irrational, but instead arise 
from considering the larger facts about the markets and incentive systems 
within which American corporations and their managers work. And this is the 
crucial point often lost in corporate governance debates: Just because a fact is 
large and systemic does not render it unimportant. That a “law and amper-
sand” scholar can’t fit it into his model without creating too much noise does 
not make the uncomfortable sound of reality go away. 
Looking at the big and systemic facts from the perspective of an average 
American human investor, the world is not an optimistic place. Median income 
has stagnated since the early 1970s.
265
 Productivity increases have slowed and 
wages never did fully experience the benefit of the rapid productivity increases 
of the last two decades.
266
 Economic growth is stagnant.
267
 The government 
has been compelled to provide giant subsidies to corporations engaged in risky 
commercial conduct.
268
 At the same time, the number of American public cor-
porations has declined sharply.
269
 Finally, there is a growing disparity between 
the pay of CEOs and that of average workers, symptomatic of a general in-
 
265. Real median household income has hovered around $50,000 since the mid-1970s. See Car-
men DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States 2013: 
Current Population Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5 fig.1 (2014), http://www.census 
.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf [http://perma.cc
/L3KV-7JYR]. 
266. Bivens et al., supra note 242, at 5 (“Between 1979 and 2013, productivity grew 64.9 percent, 
while hourly compensation of production and nonsupervisory workers, who comprise 80 
percent of the private-sector workforce, grew just 8.2 percent. Productivity thus grew eight 
times faster than typical worker compensation.”). 
267. See PAVLOS E. MASOUROS, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION: HOW SHAREHOLD-
ER VALUE AND SHORT-TERMISM CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECLINE OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIES 
3 (2013) (arguing that increased short-term focused shareholder influence has contributed to 
“persistent stagnation” and lower GDP growth). 
268. See STOUT, supra note 193, at 4-5 (arguing that recent events such as the 2008 bailouts illus-
trate how “[c]orporate America’s mass embrace of shareholder value thinking has not trans-
lated into better corporate or economic performance”); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. 
Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1231 (2012) (“[T]he long-term 
implications of a short-run income-maximization strategy were apparent, but preserving 
long-term reputation did little to address immediate earnings pressures.”); Tyler Cowen, 
Bailout of Long-Term Capital: A Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/economy/28view.html [http://perma.cc/2F8N 
-P4FB]. 
269. David Weild & Edward Kim, Capital Markets Series: A Wake-Up Call for America, GRANT 
THORNTON 1 (2009), http://www.rcgt.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/2/files/2011/04/A_wake
_up_call_for_America.pdf [http://perma.cc/PG6J-BWQ9] (noting that between 1997—the 
peak for U.S. listings—and 2008, the number of exchange-listed companies declined from 
6,943 to 5,401); see also STOUT, supra note 193, at 5 (describing the “go-private” trend). 
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crease in inequality.
270
 These larger considerations raise an issue about hedge 
fund activism’s effect on human investors that is serious. If proponents of 
hedge fund activism disclaim that activists have contributed to these negative 
trends—things like growing income inequality, inflated executive pay, job loss-
es, wage stagnation, increases in externalities—and instead attribute them to 
vigorous international and domestic competition in products and services mar-
kets, they must consider the consequences of that answer. If that type of com-
petition is already acting on American public companies, does it add socially 
useful value for activist investors with short-term perspectives to put additional 
pressure on them, pressures that tend to involve increases in near-term payouts 
rather than innovative, long-term investment strategies that position the Unit-
ed States and its worker base to thrive in the future? In other words, if compe-
tition in products and services markets has already squeezed out most of the 
slack, the likelihood that pressures that predominantly involve demands for 
corporate finance moves, like leveraging up, spin offs, or mergers, will create 
incentives for corporations to focus their energies on ways of making money 
that are also good for their workers and society seems less probable. 
C 
In the clash between small, less important facts that the law and ampersand 
movement can measure and evaluate, and bigger, more important ones the 
movement seems to slight because it cannot, modesty would suggest grappling 
with the larger facts in as candid a way as possible and not instead exaggerating 
the significance of less important facts, such as short-term stock market prices, 
that law and ampersand scholars can turn into mathematical equations and 
 
270. See STOUT, supra note 193, at 20-21 (noting that the disparity between CEO and worker pay 
increased after Congress enacted tax policies encouraging linking CEO compensation to 
stock price increases); Roger Altman et al., Reforming Our Tax System, Reducing Our Deficit, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 6-7 (Dec. 2012) http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content
/uploads/2012/12/CAPTaxPlanReportFINAL-b.pdf [http://perma.cc/MF3P-TH47] (noting 
“skyrocket[ing]” income inequality over a period from 1979 to 2007 and the shrinkage of the 
federal tax rate applied to the wealthiest Americans); Harold Meyerson, The Forty-Year 
Slump, AM. PROSPECT 20-27 (Sept.-Oct. 2013), http://prospect.org/article/40-year-slump 
[http://perma.cc/2YD8-AN5A] (noting that income stagnation was driven in important 
part by the embrace of the principle that shareholder wealth maximization is the sole objec-
tive for corporate governance and noting that if median household income kept pace with 
productivity gains from 1974-2013, the income level would be over $86,000, rather than the 
2013 level of approximately $50,000); cf. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE 
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 185-86, 200, 240 (2013) 
(arguing that corporate owners with the shortest time horizon are able to concentrate wealth 
with themselves “at the expense of other stakeholders”). 
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when the smaller facts you measure are themselves less than assuringly reliable, 
there is even less basis for failing to challenge your ideological world view 
against the systemic facts. 
In that vein, the most hotly debated topic regarding activist hedge funds 
does not, however, involve whether it is good for human investors for pension 
funds and charitable institutions to invest in them or whether human investors 
benefit from the changes activist hedge funds work on human investors’ em-
ployers. Rather, the central topic has been whether hedge fund activism has a 
positive or negative effect on the stock price performance of public corpora-
tions. Specifically, much ink has been spilled on the question of whether com-
panies targeted by hedge funds enjoy durable increases in their stock prices 
after the activist intervention has occurred, and whether any resulting gains re-
flect an increase in overall societal wealth or a transfer in wealth from other 
corporate constituencies to equity holders. These debates are ongoing and vig-
orous.
271
 
Distinguished corporate practitioners have also jumped into the fray, com-
plicating the lives of those obsessed with regressions by introducing perspec-
tives from those in the trenches.
272
 Firing back, scholars with their own firm 
ideological views have in turn vexed the practitioners by taking them up on du-
els regarding what data is necessary to prove their contending perspectives.
273
 
 
271. The papers in this back and forth have proliferated in recent years. A database started by 
Professors Randall Thomas, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Frank Partnoy has been the source of 
numerous articles examining the impact of hedge fund activism on stock prices, corporate 
creditors, employees, and other workers. Brav et al., supra note 16. Later authors whose 
work uses the database include Yvan Allaire, The Case for and Against Activist Hedge Funds, 
INST. FOR GOVERNANCE PRIV. & PUB. ORGS. (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613154 
[http://perma.cc/6WKZ-L8D8]; Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 251; Bebchuk et al., supra 
note 5; and Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 
(2010). Other respected law and economics scholars have also contributed to the debate. See, 
e.g., Bratton, supra note 46; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6; Cremers et al., supra note 244; K.J. 
Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 67 (2016); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 170; Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, In-
vestor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362 (2002); Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge 
Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2693231 [http://perma.cc/N6WP-7Q9Z]. 
272. See, e.g., Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2007); Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist 
Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge 
-funds [http://perma.cc/MP6N-R3NL]. 
273. The origin of The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, was 
a debate between its author, Lucian Bebchuk, and corporate lawyer Martin Lipton. See Mi-
chael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton’s War, AM. LAW. 44 (Apr. 2015), http://www.siia
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Although some of the intellectual fisticuffs have a “handbags at six paces” qual-
ity, the intensity of the interaction is suggestive of the shared agreement of the 
participants that the subject they are discussing is societally important. 
Empirical data is a very useful thing, and it should not be ignored. But em-
pirical data also involves factual renditions of what is behind a statistic that has 
been aggregated. For humans interested in knowing about their human world, 
that means that the story behind statistics matters. And the stories behind the 
empirical data cited by hedge fund activists seem to mostly involve financial 
engineering. And what they do not commonly involve is most important. They 
do not involve tangible stories of technological breakthrough accomplished be-
cause hedge funds have identified an innovative new way to make something. 
They do not typically involve thinking up new services that humans need or 
even want. They do not typically involve transformational approaches in man-
aging businesses, or in marshalling the productivity of American workers. Even 
as to interventions by hedge funds led by experienced, proven operators, the 
scholars have not yet put names of companies to the data, to show how the 
hedge fund has improved corporate operations in a durably valuable way.
274
 By 
contrast, examples of operational failures, such as the interventions at J.C. 
Penney
275
 and Sears,
276
 are widely known. 
Of course, if one could peer behind the regressions and consider the human 
facts, these overall tendencies are not surprising. Hedge fund managers have 
typically never managed an actual business that makes a product or delivers a 
service. For the most part, they are the sidewalk superintendents of manage-
ment, those who by dint of having gotten a prestigious M.B.A. and being good 
in finance classes, were recruited into the stock-picking business. Finance is 
what they were taught and what they focus on. This is not a criticism; it is 
simply an observation, but one that cannot be logically ignored by anyone con-
 
.net/archive/neals/2016/filez/442068/688_1732_442068_e3453e11-8f7e-4e03-bbee-a396f76
c806a_82357_3_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3N5-AVQ6]. 
274. E.g., Krishnan et al., supra note 64 (finding meaningful differences in post-intervention re-
turn on assets among targets of different groups of activist hedge funds without connecting 
differences to operation change). 
275. See supra notes 84, 125-126 and accompanying text. 
276. See Kevin Allison, Edward Lampert and His White Whale, Sears, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.  
29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/business/dealbook/edward-lampert-and 
-his-white-whale-sears.html [http://perma.cc/9724-V7TH] (comparing the activist  
head fund manager and CEO of Sears to Captain Ahab); Mina Kimes, At Sears,  
Eddie Lampert’s Warring Divisions Model Adds to the Troubles, BLOOMBERG (July  
11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-11/at-sears-eddie-lamperts 
-warring-divisions-model-adds-to-the-troubles [http://perma.cc/M6D9-GJVA] (attrib-
uting many of Sears’s problems to its hedge fund manager-CEO). 
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cerned about facts. Because if the reality is that the ability of corporations that 
make products and deliver services to generate sustainable profits turns more 
importantly on talents that do not involve financial engineering, then why 
would one rationally expect that business strategies shaped by pressures from 
hedge funds lacking any substantial managerial, technological, scientific, or en-
trepreneurial expertise would be engines for long-term wealth creation? 
Participants in the debate about our corporate governance system often 
joust about the comparative relevance of examinations of empirical evidence 
from relatively short-term periods and of arguments based on more descriptive 
evidence about how corporations and the institutional investors who influence 
them behave. I have no desire to disparage either source of information, as it 
seems to me that someone who is open-minded ought to be willing to consider 
a variety of relevant factors in coming to conclusions about important issues of 
public policy. But being open-minded does not require paying homage to argu-
able results from arguable data measuring results inarguably inconsistent with 
the horizon relevant to human investors and relevant to those who actually 
manage real businesses. As to the debate about wolf packs, there are several 
factors that make these studies a dubious guide to good policy. 
For starters, the gains to target stock prices from hedge fund activism do 
not seem that impressive, even when taken at face value. Professor Bebchuk’s 
five-year analysis of target company stock price performance finds value-
weighted abnormal returns of 5.81% over that five-year period (by another 
measure, investors would have experienced a slightly negative abnormal re-
turn).
277
 But these gains are not measured in a way that makes for easy ac-
ceptance on that basis. For example, that study starts with 1,584 companies tar-
geted by activism and ends with 694 companies in year five.
278
 This is a large 
drop, and each company’s fate is not tracked and documented.
279
 Undoubtedly, 
targets were pushed into sale. Others may have gone insolvent, though. And 
the overall gains seem largely driven by those targets that did get sold for a 
premium, rather than by increased productivity or the execution of a new busi-
ness plan.
280
 Scholars who bring a non-ideological perspective to the debate 
have questioned how sufficiently that study’s data supports its findings.
281
 
 
277. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1126-27. 
278. Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 70, at 9 (critiquing the study’s methodology). The study’s au-
thors acknowledged this defect. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1118. 
279. Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 70, at 9. 
280. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
281. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 587 n.173. Professors Coffee and Palia observe: 
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Duration is another issue. The longest of the studies measure the impact of 
hedge funds over a period—typically two years, with one important study 
tracking performance for five years following activist intervention
282
—that is 
decidedly not long-term. Human investors save for two primary purposes, pay-
ing for college for their kids and paying for retirement for themselves. Deter-
mining that hedge fund activism is not associated with any negative impact on 
stock price during a one- to five-year period is not the same thing as determin-
ing that the changes in business policy generated by that activism produce 
more wealth for human investors than a policy not influenced by their behav-
ior. 
The argument, of course, is that if the stock price increase driven by activ-
ism endures for one to five years, that means that the activism has not reduced 
the corporation’s ability to generate sustainable returns over the long term. But 
proving that is not only difficult, it also seems to me to require a long-term 
analysis, which scholars have not done. If market prices are dominated by 
speculation (i.e., traders with short-term perspectives) and thus those involved 
in marginal trading tend to be focusing on short-term movements in prices, it 
seems possible that the changes activists cause could, in fact, reduce the firm’s 
long-term earnings without necessarily causing it to suffer a stock price reduc-
 
[Professor Bebchuk’s] Table 4, which reports ROA and Tobin’s Q over the six 
years that begin with the event year, shows only five out of twenty regression co-
efficients in the post-event year (or 25%) to be positive at the standard 95% confi-
dence level. Thus, the majority of coefficients are not positive, which is hardly 
supportive of their conclusion. They also find that the third, fourth and fifth years 
after the activist intervention earn higher ROA and Tobin’s Q than the year of, or 
prior to, intervention. But this test is inconclusive because we know that it is sig-
nificantly affected by the firm’s underperformance in the year of, or prior to, in-
tervention. Additionally, in their Table 5, they repeat their analysis, using high 
dimensional fixed-effects of industry codes and year dummies as controls. This 
method does not adequately control for firm-level effects. 
  Id. (citations omitted); see also Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 70, at 8, 11 (observing that 
some of the study’s results are not statistically significant and that its use of dummy varia-
bles “is particularly questionable”). 
282. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1089, 1099 (“[W]e study how operational performance 
and stock performance relative to the benchmark evolve during the five-year period follow-
ing activist interventions,” and “we use this dataset of activist interventions to provide the 
first systematic evidence on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism.” (emphasis added)); 
Matthew Denes et al., Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research 
10-11 (June 8, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608085 [http://
perma.cc/9WYN-8V6N] (summarizing studies focusing on hedge fund activism with 
measurement windows largely measured in terms of months, not years). 
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tion in the near term.
283
 That is especially so if activists are targeting so-called 
value firms that are profitable but pre-intervention are reinvesting more cash in 
the business or retaining more of it than other firms. It is, of course, possible 
that changing their financing to reduce capital expenditures and increase cur-
rent payouts will have no negative impact on the firm’s earnings future, but it is 
also possible that it will have a negative impact but that the effects are not felt 
enough in the near term to have a negative effect on the stock price. 
As to this point, this is where ignoring long-term trends and the absence of 
plausible real-world stories comes in. The big picture for human investors en-
tails declining wages, growing inequality, and greater international competi-
tion. At the same time, pension money has flooded into the market and de-
mand has met supply with more funds looking for investments and more 
analysts searching for value gaps. Between these two trends, it is unclear what 
story hedge funds have to explain how they create long-term value. 
v 
As the preceding discussion suggests, any policy initiative sensibly designed 
at better balancing the benefits and risks of hedge fund activism must focus as 
much, if not more, on the incentives and duties of other institutional investors 
and other agents who participate in the corporate governance debate, as much 
as on the activist hedge funds themselves. In this final Part, I offer a measured 
set of proposals, beginning with regulatory changes that would increase hedge 
fund disclosure of factors, such as performance, managers’ compensation, and 
prior manager fund failures, that are relevant to human investors and their 
agents. Then, in a similar vein, I propose changes to current position-reporting 
rules so human investors, mainstream institutional investors, proxy advisory 
firms, target corporations, and other participants in our corporate republic can 
understand an activist’s overall economic positions in a target—and take them 
into account accordingly. Expanding my focus from the wolves to their prey, I 
next turn to what the rise of activism means for public companies and how 
those concerned about activism’s effect on their investments should think about 
certain corporate takeover defenses. The balance of this Part considers what 
other participants in this corporate republic—including the agents who hold 
human investors’ equity capital—can do to better align their actions with the 
best interests of human investors. I offer reforms that will best promote a long-
term perspective on the part of human investors in how they hold their mutual 
 
283. That said, a survey of studies finds that firms targeted by activists do not seem to produce 
better operating results. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 587. 
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and index funds and on the part of funds themselves in terms of how they vote 
and compensate their managers. Finally, I propose that we treat human inves-
tors more like adults and give them direct access to invest in private equity 
funds that have investment philosophies more aligned with long-term inves-
tors than those of actively traded mutual funds. 
 
* * * 
 
The primary issues regarding the regulation of activist hedge funds are 
similar to those faced by many industries when they reach a level of success 
where they wield power that affects society in a materially important way. 
When that happens, it is often the case that the emerging industry must be 
prepared to disclose more about how it works and to be open about its inter-
ests.
284
 To my mind, there is nothing intrinsically worrisome about the philos-
ophy of activist hedge funds. Whether or not I or others believe their approach 
to investment is sustainable on the scale to which it has now grown is not a 
sufficient basis to ban the industry. If it were, then actively traded mutual funds 
would be on regulatory death row. And, as to those hedge funds willing to, as 
my British friends say, get stuck in, contribute meaningful management exper-
tise for the long term, and eat their own cooking, I harbor little skepticism at 
all, so long as the fund matches its actions in long-term commitment to its up-
front promises. 
But what does distinguish all activist hedge funds is not only that they do 
not have to make anywhere near the level of disclosure required of investment 
funds registered under the Investment Company Act, but also that the activist 
funds are not passive investors, and instead have as their goal influencing the 
business plans of their targets in a manner that therefore affects other investors 
and other corporate constituencies. Furthermore, because it is not the case that 
hedge funds take only investments from wealthy individuals who are well posi-
tioned to bargain for themselves, but take money from pension funds, univer-
sities, charities and other institutions on which ordinary Americans depend, 
the rationale for allowing them to continue to disclose so little in terms of reli-
able track records, taking into account past failures, is hard to discern. 
To better protect human investors from direct investment risk, it would 
therefore seem useful to enhance the disclosure hedge funds must provide to 
 
284. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction 
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331-36 
(1988) (describing the development of federal securities law partially in response to growth 
in industry and capital markets activity in the first quarter of the twentieth century). 
the yale law journal 126:1870  2017 
1958 
those considering investing in them. The additional registration and disclosure 
mandated by Dodd-Frank
285
 was a step in the right direction, but it was not 
sufficient. Recognizing the reality that hedge funds’ main investors are increas-
ingly socially important pension funds and university and charitable endow-
ments on which ordinary Americans depend, rather than wealthy and financial-
ly sophisticated individuals, suggests more and standardized disclosure about 
hedge fund performance should be required. Under this model, institutional 
investors who are fiduciaries of pensioners, universities, or charities could not 
purchase hedge fund investments that were not subject to a more extensive dis-
closure regime. This disclosure regime should require complete disclosure re-
garding the fund manager’s past track record so that over time better public in-
formation about specific fund managers and overall industry performance is 
known. Especially important is a requirement to identify closed funds and ac-
count for their records, including the records of the funds that failed. Likewise, 
it is vital that regulators develop a standard disclosure regime allowing for reli-
able comparisons of what the sponsoring fund manager made, considering its 
profit participation, total fees, and returns, and that of its actual investors, and 
taking into account their costs, including the manager’s compensation. These 
should involve clear charts comparing how dollars invested resulted in invest-
ment gains, net of fees, over time in comparison to the overall market and to 
the fund manager itself. As for all investment funds—not just hedge funds, but 
traditional mutual funds, too—disclosure about average and median holding 
periods for particular investments would be illuminating, by giving investors 
and regulators reliable information about portfolio turnover and how much a 
fund deviates from a buy and hold strategy. These disclosures, in all respects, 
should not allow for material variations among funds, but rather create reliable 
information about industry performance and its effect on investors. 
Now it may be that some will argue this disclosure regime would lock these 
institutions out of this sector. There are two answers to that concern. The first 
is that if those are the consequences of increased disclosure, a departure from 
 
285. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IV, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (2010). Title IV of Dodd-Frank eliminates the private adviser exemption 
from the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and requires advisers with more than $150 million 
in assets under management to register with the SEC as investment advisers. Id. §§ 403, 
408. Title IV also includes exceptions for venture capital fund advisers and advisers with less 
than $25 million in assets under management, as well as foreign private advisers. Id. §§ 402-
403, 408. Title IV also requires registered investment advisers to maintain records and other 
information that the SEC requires to evaluate the private fund industry. Id. § 404; see also 
Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry: Comparative Ev-
idence from 2012 and 2015, 71 BUS. LAW. 1151, 1158-65 (2016) (explaining the new require-
ments for private fund advisers under Dodd-Frank). 
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the sector might be preferable to a status quo where human investors and soci-
ety as a whole face risk from fiduciaries poorly positioned to be good consum-
ers of funds whose investment philosophy is unlikely to beat the market over 
time, especially when risk is considered. The second is that this is a false choice. 
The hedge fund industry cannot function at its current scale without finding 
investments from pension funds and the like, and would, as a practical matter, 
be required to comply with a sensible registration and disclosure regime that 
takes into account the industry’s unique investment style—no need to disclose 
the “secret sauce”—but that recognizes that style is no justification for lack of 
other forms of reliable disclosure. This would help pension fund fiduciaries 
make more informed decisions about with whom they entrust their real human 
beneficiaries’ capital.
286
 
 
* * * 
 
Consistent with the focus on disclosure, more should be known about 
hedge fund interests by the rest of the market. Scholars have argued that hedge 
funds are useful in framing debates between themselves and corporate manag-
ers, which mainstream investors like mutual funds can then resolve using their 
voting power.
287
 This contention, however, is problematic if the electorate does 
not have full and complete information about the activists’ own economic in-
terests. Just like institutional investors have called for corporate managers and 
directors to disclose their economic interests, so too is it vital that the electorate 
know just how long an activist is in the company and any arrangements rele-
vant to its likely holding period. The current reach of Section 13 is incomplete, 
outdated, and has not kept pace with financial evolutions. It seems a modest 
 
286. On a related front, state efforts to mandate better disclosure of information of this sort by 
private equity funds were met with fierce resistance by the industry. Gretchen Morgenson, 
Private Equity Funds Balk at Disclosure, and Public Risk Grows, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,  
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/private-equity-funds-balk-at-disclo
sure-and-public-risk-grows.html [http://perma.cc/6436-QNYH] (describing efforts to re-
quire private equity funds investing public pension money to publicly disclose information, 
such as fees and related-party transactions). Like hedge funds, private equity fund returns 
have been declining in the past decade relative to funds that track market returns, and like 
hedge funds, there is a question of whether the private equity industry can generate solid re-
turns at its greatly expanded size. See generally Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 221, at 5 (re-
viewing recent studies and suggesting that the median private equity fund no longer beats 
the S&P 500). 
287. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 170, at 901 (“Activist shareholders specialize in fram-
ing alternatives to existing company strategies and thereby increasing the value of govern-
ance rights to institutional investors.”). 
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and inarguable improvement to require all-in disclosure of financial instru-
ments of any kind—long or short, natural or synthetic—tied to the value of the 
company’s stock so market participants can understand a fund’s ability to gain 
from increases or decreases in a target’s stock price. All in, pure and simple, no 
exceptions. Likewise, disclosure relating to any contractual or other arrange-
ments that relate to the hedge fund’s incentives, commitment, and ability to 
hold the target stock should be reported so that its likely investment horizon 
can be evaluated by the electorate. Given the emerging evidence that funds that 
act as long-term relational investors are associated with better outcomes, dis-
closure requirements that bear on the hedge fund’s investment horizon and 
willingness to remain as a long-term investor as well as bear the risks of its 
proposed strategy as long-term investors would be valuable. This important 
information would help mainstream investment funds and their proxy advisors 
evaluate whether activist incentives are really aligned with the best interests of 
the target’s long-term investors. 
In addition, after an activist has come public under Section 13(d), real-time 
disclosures of changes in position, as are now required in the United Kingdom 
and the European Union generally, should be expected. Even Professor Beb-
chuk, an ardent opponent of amending the rule to require more timely disclo-
sure, is troubled by the evidence he has found of substantial rates of noncom-
pliance with the existing disclosure rules.
288
 An effort by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), similar to its 2014 sweep of routinely late-filing 
insiders,
289
 could help increase the baseline level of compliance with the current 
rule in a way few involved in the corporate governance debates could criticize. 
And, of course, evidence that other hedge funds follow the scent of the al-
pha wolf supports updating Section 13 to require more prompt disclosure when 
an investor crosses the reporting threshold. It seems entirely clear to me that 
the idea of Section 13 was that an investor should come public as soon as rea-
sonably possible after hitting the 5% threshold and that the reporting deadline 
was due to what it took to type up, proof, and deliver to Washington the re-
quired filing in 1968, when word processors and electronic filing with a button 
 
288. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 85, at 13-14 (identifying more than 10% of a sample of Section 
13(d) filings where investors failed to disclose stakes within ten days of crossing the 5% 
threshold). 
289. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Charges Against Corporate In-
siders for Violating Laws Requiring Prompt Reporting of Transactions and Holdings  
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13705429046
78 [http://perma.cc/CXP7-VH2E]. This enforcement initiative involved “quantitative ana-
lytics” of ownership reports completed by corporate insiders, including Schedule 13D. Id. 
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push did not exist.
290
 But, the hedge fund industry wants to grab more stock 
than 5%. Fair enough, I suppose. But how about then coming up with a sensi-
ble higher threshold—say 8%
291
—and requiring immediate reporting upon hit-
ting that threshold or a requirement to cease further acquisitions until disclo-
sure is made. Opponents of reform vehemently argue that situations when a 
hedge fund or its fellows in the pack have come public with control of over 10% 
are anomalous
292
 and that most hedge fund activists come public with a medi-
an stake of 6.3%.
293
 If that is so, how about using a sensible threshold as the 
basis for a new rule? Additionally, sophisticated commentators have noted that 
using a single percentage threshold for all companies, regardless of market cap-
italization, is a rather blunt instrument, given the variation in market capitali-
 
290. See Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and 
Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 135, 143 (2013) (citing Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate 
Takeover Bids: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
90th Cong. 136 (1967) (statement of Stanley Kaplan, Professor, University of Chicago)) 
(noting that Congress’s decision to impose a ten-day reporting window was due to the ad-
ministrative burden of preparing and filing the Schedule 13D). 
291. The United States’s 5% level is higher than that of major European nations, such as the 
U.K., Germany, Netherlands, and Italy. See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in 
Europe 8 n.8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 283, 2010) (noting that 
public disclosure thresholds were set at 2% in Italy and at 3% in the U.K.); European Regula-
tory Snapshot: The Amended Transparency Directive, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL 3 (2013), 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/10.24.13.European.Regulatory.Snapshot.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Z734-4NUV] (describing the current U.K. disclosure thresholds, where 
disclosure is required when an investor’s voting rights reach, exceed, or fall below 3% and 
each 1% threshold thereafter); Rulefinder Shareholding Disclosure: Germany, AOSPHERE 1  
(2016), http://www.aosphere.com/downloads/Germany_Shareholding_Disclosure_Rules
_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TFE-DASJ] (reflecting Germany’s 3% disclosure thresh-
old); Han Terrink, Summary of Changes in Ongoing Reporting and Disclosure Requirements Fol-
lowing Implementation of Amendments to Transparency Directive in the Netherlands,  
CLIFFORD CHANCE 2 (2016), http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2016/02/summary
_of_changesinongoingreportingan.html [http://perma.cc/74PL-KHUW] (noting the 
Netherlands’s 3% threshold). This Feature does not deal with the ideal. Rather, it advances a 
practical threshold that allows sizable but not unreasonable stake building. But it then de-
mands that stake building cease until immediate disclosure. 
292. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 85, at 4 (arguing that anecdotes supposedly illustrating gaps in 
the current rules are not representative of typical practice). The anecdotes include two 
funds’ acquisition of 25% beneficial ownership of J.C. Penney before disclosure. See Letter 
from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &  
Exch. Comm’n 5-6 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6WF7-WCR5]. 
293. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 85, at 4-5. But see Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 597 (arguing 
that reported stability in hedge fund accumulations does not take into account the growth in 
“wolf pack” behavior). 
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zation of U.S. companies. Perhaps, then, it would make sense to have a thresh-
old that is lower—e.g., the current 5% threshold—for purchases of shares in 
large cap companies and one that is higher for small- and mid-cap companies, 
where a larger percentage stake is necessary to obtain an economic interest 
sufficient to reward the activist for its costs. 
Furthermore, given the strong evidence that activist accumulations seem to 
be discovered by other wolves and that these other wolves engage in trading 
before the alpha wolf discloses to the larger public, there seems to be a strong 
basis for requirements that address what information an activist can share with 
others before the activist goes public. A presumption that a tip made between 
investors creates a 13(d) group might be one way to do it.
294
 The argument that 
hedge funds should not have to disclose until they can stake out a position that 
is sufficiently large to justify the costs of their activism is understandable. What 
is not understandable is carving out an exception that allows funds to selective-
ly share knowledge of their purchases and other plans with industry colleagues 
while keeping the larger community of investors in the dark. 
Some commentators believe that activist investors should be considered fi-
duciaries, owing duties of loyalty to their targets on the grounds that they act 
on their targets, influence their business strategies, and thus wield elements of 
corporate control that affect all other investors.
295
 Adolph Berle, no less, pres-
aged the potential power of institutional investors and the need to regulate 
their power.
296
 This is a complicated topic, but I do agree that there is more 
comfort for other investors and corporate constituencies when an activist hedge 
fund places a representative on the board, and, as a result, is subject to a host of 
equitable and legal restrictions. These include the state law and fiduciary trad-
ing restrictions that result if the fund representative on the board has access to 
non-public confidential information, both by their status as an insider
297
 and 
by typical provisions operating to restrict the fund’s ability to trade apart from 
regulation.
298
 
 
294. Professors Coffee and Palia have proposed something similar. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 
6, at 600-01. 
295. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1255 (2008). 
296. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 142, at 143. 
297. There are obvious and important fiduciary implications of that representative sharing com-
pany information back at the hedge fund ranch. In that situation, the hedge fund itself is a 
fiduciary and can only use that information while complying with its legal and equitable du-
ties to the portfolio company and to its other stockholders. 
298. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Eliminating the unfair tax advantages hedge funds get over other human 
laborers—e.g., the ability to treat some of their managerial income as capital 
gains rather than wages from labor under the “2 and 20” model—would also 
diminish the ability of hedge fund managers to reap profits not shared with 
their investors and their targets’ other stockholders in the long-run.
299
 This 
would therefore shift the activist hedge fund market directionally toward those 
fund managers able to generate value by contributing managerial expertise that 
creates durable value for the public companies in its portfolio. 
 
* * * 
 
Under the current Section 13(d) stake disclosure regime, concerns about 
creeping control from wolf pack behavior are not irrational. In much of the 
world, the definitions of when an investor or group of investors are considered 
to have control are triggered at lower levels than is the case in U.S. corporate 
law. In the European Union, it is common for any group of concerted investors 
who acquire 30% of shares to be required to make a mandatory offer to all oth-
er stockholders to buy their shares.
300
 The emergence of a bloc of stockholders 
who can deter other bidders and influence corporate management poses risks 
for other stockholders. Institutional investors have long salivated for sell-side 
premiums. Thus, they should understand why it is useful to ensure that con-
trol is not bought on the cheap, leaving ordinary investors without a takeover 
premium and potentially subject to a riskier business plan. Especially in a 
world where classified boards are increasingly rare,
301
 institutional investors 
should rethink their traditional hostility to poison pills. A standard poison pill 
used by a declassified board can do human investors more help than harm by 
preventing a creeping takeover where an activist or wolf pack acquires effective 
negative control over a corporation without paying a control premium. An in-
novative refinement to the standard pill comes from Professors Coffee and Pa-
 
299. See Fleischer, supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
300. See Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
Takeover Bids, 2002 O.J. (L 142) 12 (stating that the “mandatory bid rule” requires stock-
holders crossing certain ownership thresholds set by individual European countries to make 
a bid for all of the company’s shares); Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover 
Bids, COMMISSION EUR. COMMUNITIES 13-14 (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_mar 
ket/company/docs/takeoverbids/2007-02-report_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/FH36-L4NL] 
(summarizing ownership thresholds adopted in different jurisdictions with 30% being the 
most common threshold in major economies, such as Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, and the U.K.). 
301. 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, supra note 185, at 12 (noting that 92% of directors are cur-
rently elected on an annual basis, compared to 51% in 2005). 
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lia, who have proposed a “window closing” pill structured to force activists to 
disclose their stakes before the end of the Schedule 13D ten-day period.
302
 
 
* * * 
 
But the most important changes suggested in this Feature are not within 
the hedge fund industry itself. Rather, human investors would see great benefit 
from reforms encouraging the agents responsible for their money to adopt the 
long-term horizon held by their principals, i.e., human investors. 
First, recognizing that mutual funds and other institutional investors face 
irrational incentives to compete on short-term metrics rather than areas aligned 
with the interests of human investors is vital. Demonizing fund managers is 
unfair when they face cost-free fund hopping from their investors and equity 
investors get credit for holding an asset long-term if they can eke out a year. 
Adoption of a sensible fractional trading tax on all securities transactions, in-
cluding transactions by 401(k) investors, and capital gains reform to make eli-
gibility for a long-term rate dependent on long-term investment would help 
fund managers focus more on long-term returns.
303
 Not only that, Pigouvian 
taxes like these discourage speculation, including in derivatives, thus reducing 
systemic risks and the need for more complex forms of regulation. And they 
would also raise world government revenues to invest in infrastructure; basic 
research to address critical issues, such as climate change; and human capital to 
give workers the skills needed to compete in more technologically advanced so-
cieties, thereby fueling long-term economic growth. 
At the same time, corporate managers are often hostage—or at least feel 
hostage—to the metrics they are required to report in securities disclosures, 
and to which fund managers and stock analysts look when considering if they 
will invest in or recommend the stock. An interesting proposal has been made 
to give corporations greater market credit for a type of investment that human 
investors should care deeply about—investment in human capital, such as job 
training.
304
 Unlike research and development spending, which is typically dis-
closed as a separate line-item on a company’s income statement, expenditures 
 
302. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 602. The pill would be triggered if an activist crossed the 5% 
threshold and did not file a Schedule 13D immediately. Id. 
303. Others have proposed tax law reforms that might have the effect of inducing activist funds 
to increase their holding periods and “deter the ‘hit-and-run’ activist.” Id. at 594-95. 
304. See Angela Hanks et al., Workers or Waste? How Companies Disclose—Or Do Not Disclose—
Human Capital Investments and What To Do About It, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS  
(June 2016), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03042031
/HumanCapital.pdf [http://perma.cc/S85Q-KZD4]. 
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on human capital are lumped in the Sales, General, and Administration 
(“SG&A”) expense line.
305
 SG&A is also home to the kinds of general overhead 
expenses that investors, activist or otherwise, like to see kept to a minimum, 
and so this disclosure regime creates an incentive for corporate managers to cut 
back on the all-important investment in human capital.
306
 Commentators con-
cerned that activist campaigns will put even more pressure on human capital 
investments have thus urged that the SEC require disclosure of several varia-
bles related to human capital investment, including, most importantly, disclos-
ing the total amount spent on worker skills training.
307
 There are perhaps other 
changes to public company disclosure that would similarly help align the met-
rics corporate managers are measured against to the interests of human inves-
tors. 
The index and mutual funds that are primarily responsible for human in-
vestors’ money should vote with their investors’ needs in mind. This is a rela-
tively simple proposition to state but, as discussed elsewhere in this Feature, it 
gets lost in practice. Index funds should be required to use voting policies and 
recommendations tailored to the reality that they have only voice, not exit op-
tions. Human index investors do not benefit from bubbles or corporate-
governance fads. Thus, index funds should be required to think independently 
and vote in a way that reflects an informed judgment about what is best for 
their investors over the long haul—not just what the fund family proxy unit or, 
even worse, a proxy advisor has generically instructed it to do. To that end, in-
dex funds should be precluded from relying on proxy advisory firms that do 
not provide guidance tailored to index funds’ unique buy-and-hold perspec-
tive. Admittedly, there are promising developments in this field. A prominent 
investment manager, Blackrock, has voiced the need for and utility of index 
funds more assertively voting their stuck-in, long-term perspective.
308
 And, 
some important money managers have signed on to a paper arguing for a “new 
paradigm,” which contains a call for money managers to adopt a set of shared 
 
305. Id. at 9. 
306. Id. at 10-11. 
307. Id. at 14. 
308. See, e.g., John Authers, Passive Investors Are Good Corporate Stewards, FIN. TIMES (Jan.  
19, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/c4e7a4f6-be8a-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf [http://
perma.cc/6BCG-7U6Y] (reporting on Blackrock CEO Larry Fink’s comment that “[index 
funds] can’t sell those stocks even if they are terrible companies. As an indexer, our only ac-
tion is our voice and so we are taking a more active dialogue with our companies and are 
imposing more of what we think is correct”). 
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principles predicated on the goal of “economic growth that benefits sharehold-
ers, employees and the economy as a whole.”
309
 
Both index funds and mutual funds should also take a fresh look at their 
policies and how the policies fit with the long-term growth conducive to hu-
man investors’ needs. Any fund that accepts 401(k) or college savings money 
should be required to have voting policies specifically tailored to the long-term 
purposes of those investments.
310
 At a minimum, increased disclosure demon-
strating, as a practical matter, how much a given fund deviated from off-the-
shelf voting procedures would help investors gauge if a fund advertising itself 
as socially responsible or for the long-term actually behaved that way. 
Implicit in these proposals that essentially urge more thoughtful voting be-
havior is a need for votes only on those matters requiring thought. Rolling back 
the federal mandate that essentially requires institutional investors to vote on 
every measure before them would be one way to begin to achieve this end.
311
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As former SEC Commissioner Gallagher has argued, money managers have 
approached voting with too much of a “compliance mindset” rather than a “fi-
duciary mindset,” and he at least partially attributes that shift to the SEC.
312
 
Rule changes allowing institutional investors to make rational decisions about 
what votes actually mattered to the investment objectives of their human prin-
cipals, and focusing their limited resources on analyzing the optimal way to 
vote would be useful. 
As important, if proxy advisory firms are going to continue to be an im-
portant influence on the behavior of societally important institutions like mon-
ey managers and public companies, they should be regulated in the public in-
terest. Sensible requirements preventing investment funds from relying upon 
proxy advisory firm recommendations unless those are tailored to the fund’s 
investment style and horizon would create incentives for proxy advisory firms 
to do better; and in particular, force them to develop voting recommendations 
and policies tailored to index investors, who are uniquely long-term and com-
mitted to sustainable wealth creation. A bill in Congress was introduced
313
 and 
action at the SEC has been suggested
314
 to address the responsibility of this in-
dustry, which only exists because of changes to federal laws, such as ERISA
315
 
and the Investment Company Act,
316
 in recent decades mandating that institu-
tional investors have voting policies. 
As important, stockholder votes should only occur if the electorate can ac-
tually take them seriously and vote on an informed basis faithful to the inves-
tors’ interests. It comes with little grace to simultaneously argue that corpora-
 
312. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Society of Corporate 
Secretaries and Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech
/Detail/Speech/1370539700301 [http://perma.cc/4FER-Q7MV]. Gallagher also identifies 
rulemaking by the SEC as inadvertently increasing money manager reliance on proxy advi-
sory services. Id.; see also Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (2011) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275). 
313. Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(proposing requirements for proxy firms to register with the SEC). 
314. Id. (requiring the SEC to conduct assessments of proxy advisory firms). But see Div. of Inv. 
Mgmt. & Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF), Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting 
Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for 
Proxy Advisory Firms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm [http://perma.cc/LJG3-549F] (describing the SEC staff ’s 
position that investment advisors should assess proxy advisory firms’ “capacity and compe-
tency to adequately analyze proxy issues”). 
315. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2015) (“The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares 
of corporate stock includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of 
stock.”); see also Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz to Helmuth Fandl, supra note 311. 
316. See supra note 158. 
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tions should be inundated with thousands of votes on say-on-pay, 14a-8 pro-
posals, and the like, and then argue that institutional investors cannot possibly 
be expected to vote on a fund-specific basis because that costs too much. That 
is inconsistent hypocrisy. Stockholder voting is only valuable if it is thoughtful 
and helpful to holding corporations accountable for the creation of sustainable 
wealth. Burdening corporations with constant referenda at the insistence of in-
stitutions that do not wish to invest in thinking about voting is a wasteful drag 
on social welfare. If something is important to do, it should be done only when 
it can be done well. 
The current frantic cycle of say-on-pay votes in particular is not conducive 
to thoughtful voting and could be made more rational on a systemic basis. The 
initial legislative mandate for say-on-pay votes did not require that they be held 
annually.
317
 Holding say-on-pay votes every third or fourth year would allow 
investors to cast their votes more thoughtfully, both because they would have 
fewer votes to focus on in a given year and because they would have an actual 
management track record to assess. The incidence of costly 14a-8 proposals 
could be reduced by sensible reform involving a required filing fee, a higher 
ownership threshold, and a stronger bar on resubmitting proposals that have 
failed.
318
 Scholars have noted that as a practical reality, there is “no alternative 
to stockholder democracy.”
319
 Taking that as true, they recognize, makes it even 
more important that the system of so-called stockholder democracy works for 
those whose capital is ultimately at stake, not just for the agents who control it. 
The continuing creep toward direct stock market control of public corporations 
is difficult to reconcile with any sensibly constructed system of accountability 
toward human investors. Instead, what it maximizes is the disruptive power of 
momentary coalitions of agent money managers, which may act at any time on 
a corporation, rather than in a rationally ordered system of accountability fo-
cusing on sustainable and ethical wealth creation. 
Perhaps fund managers would be more likely to think and invest in a man-
ner more aligned with their investors’ long-time horizon if their compensation 
was more tied to the performance of the funds they manage than to that of the 
asset manager who employs them.
320
 Although, as with compensation for pub-
 
317. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that “[n]ot less frequently than once every 3 years” 
a company “include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the com-
pensation of executives” in its proxy materials for a shareholder meeting). 
318. Professor Romano has made useful suggestions for reform on this point. See Romano, supra 
note 175, at 229-30 (arguing that rebalancing the cost-benefit calculation for submitting pro-
posals under Rule 14a-8 would encourage more thoughtful submissions). 
319. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 606. 
320. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing fund manager pay structures). 
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lic company managers, this is a complex task, subjecting a material part of a 
fund manager’s compensation to the same realities that, for example, 401(k) or 
index investors face, should better align their interests. Moves in this direction 
would also move in a complementary direction with the incentives that would 
be created with tax reforms that priced the costs of fund-hopping and portfolio 
turnover, and together help solid, buy-and-hold fund managers adhere to fun-
damentally more sensible strategies, without as much fear of losing funds un-
der management because of short-term market sector bubbles or busts. 
 
* * * 
 
Finally, and consistent with these prior thoughts, human investors should 
have investment options tailored to their long-term investment horizon. Alt-
hough many of these other proposals would help sharpen money managers’ 
focus on the longer term, some investments are structurally better suited to the 
patient money of a twenty-five-year-old starting to save for retirement. A 
locked-in ten-year investment in a private equity fund of funds would arguably 
be a more appropriate place for retirement investments the saver will not touch 
for at least three decades, as compared to an actively traded mutual fund that 
frequently turns over its holdings in search of benchmark-beating returns. Un-
fortunately, providing an option to allow for human-investor access to private 
equity as part of the 401(k) portfolio requires overcoming numerous regulatory 
barriers.
321
 But as between actually traded mutual funds and private equity, the 
latter is clearly a more rational choice for human investors. For this to be feasi-
ble, however, the private equity industry must be assured that it can aggregate 
pools of capital from ordinary investors for lengthy periods. It is an unwise pa-
ternalism to facilitate worker access to churning mutual funds, while denying 
them the arguably most rational choice after index funds. 
 
* * * 
 
 
321. Sponsors of self-directed plans, such as 401(k)’s, have a safe harbor from liability to plan 
beneficiaries if the investment options available to beneficiaries are structured in certain 
ways. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012). The safe harbor acts as a barrier to the development 
of a private equity option because it is only available if the plan offers investments from 
which participants can achieve liquidity on a relatively frequent basis. Id.; 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2550.404c-1 (2016). Similarly, private equity-style funds might have to register under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 for ordinary investors to be permitted to invest in them. 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2012). 
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Most of all, however, it is time to ask whether we have lost our focus on 
what is most important in the corporate governance debate. As this concentra-
tion on human investors reveals, it is the economy’s ability to create and sustain 
good jobs that remains most important to most people. The current corporate 
governance system, however, gives the most voice and the most power to those 
whose perspectives and incentives are least aligned with that of ordinary Amer-
ican investors. 
If empowering short-term investors turns out to be optimal for our society 
and its human citizens, that seems like a very improbable and unsustainable 
triumph of the law of unintended consequences. Call me old-fashioned, but it 
would be more comforting to know that those with the power over the capi-
tal—equity, debt, and most important, labor—of ordinary Americans were du-
ty-bound to align their thoughts and actions with those they supposedly repre-
sent. American optimism makes me have confidence when we pull together 
toward a common goal, but be consequently skeptical when the many are asked 
to accept that what is good for the plutocrats is good for them. 
